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How do international aid agencies disburse their aid resources? Do their aid activities work for 
developing countries? In this dissertation, I attempt to address these questions by focusing on the 
Education for All-Fast Track Initiative (FTI). The FTI was launched in 2002 under the leadership 
of the World Bank as well as other foreign aid agencies with a view to achieving universal 
primary school education (UPE) in developing countries.  
The purpose of the study is to disentangle the complexity of foreign aid and clarify a 
causal pathway of its effectiveness by focusing on the FTI, a multi-donor initiative in the 
education sector. The FTI provides a mechanism for both donors and recipients to effectively use 
foreign aid resources. Developing countries are required to show the donor community a credible 
poverty reduction strategy and education sector plan in order to receive support from the FTI, 
and donors are expected to disburse their aid resources to align with the FTI in order to improve 
its effectiveness. However, in the efforts to use the FTI to promote UPE, donor agencies have 
faced a number of challenges.  
In order to analyze the causal pathway of the effectiveness of the FTI, I conducted 
document analyses and interviewed foreign aid policy makers; I then analyzed the findings from 
the perspective of the donor agencies’ concerns, contracting problems, and capacity. Since the 
situation of foreign aid differs depending on the context of recipient countries, I conducted case 
studies by focusing on three developing countries in Asia: Mongolia, Vietnam, and Cambodia. 
 iv 
I present the study in 10 chapters. In chapters 1, 2, and 3, I offer the framework of this 
research. In chapters 4 and 5, I demonstrate a part of the findings from the research by 
analytically describing the mechanism of the FTI and by analyzing observed patterns from the 
perspective of the donors’ concerns, contracting problems, and capacity, respectively. I narrate 
the findings from the case studies in chapters 6, 7, and 8, and I evaluate the performance of the 
FTI donor agencies in chapter 9. With chapter 10, I conclude this thesis. 
 v 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
As a citizen of Japan, I believe that it is imperative for my country to become more aware of 
foreign aid, specifically in the area of helping developing countries. The current alienated 
sentiment toward foreign aid may be derived from the fact that Japan is geographically distanced 
from developing countries; its people tend to be indifferent towards those impoverished countries 
unless their explicit interests are involved.1 This is natural because Japanese people, except for 
diplomats and aid workers, rarely encounter the problems of developing countries. On the other 
hand, Japan has become one of the largest foreign aid contributors among rich countries. People 
interested in having their tax money used effectively with minimal waste pay attention to public 
works, including foreign aid activities, which use their taxation.2 This ambivalent feeling of 
disinterest and concern, unfamiliarity and urgency, may be shared with the citizens of other 
developed countries: These individuals may be sensitive about how their tax money is used, but 
they may not have a clear sense regarding what happens in developing countries so distant from 
their own. 
                                                 
1 For example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) indicates the existence of 
“aid fatigue” in Japan. OECD reports that the Japanese public is “generally unfamiliar with ODA issues” and “is 
only marginally influenced by” official development information (OECD, 2004, P.10). 
 
2 “Although in part due to Japan’s weak economic situation, the public is also becoming critical regarding the 
effectiveness of the aid programme and the commercial sector has become less supportive of aid” (OECD, 2004, 
P.10). 
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Meanwhile, a number of researchers and practitioners have discussed the effective use of 
foreign aid resources so far. Numerous theoretical arguments and empirical researches have tried 
to explain how foreign aid either succeeded or failed to boost development of poor countries, 
while many developing countries have not overcome poverty. My dissertation responds to this 
discussion. Because citizens of rich countries care about the use of their foreign aid resources but 
remain unacquainted with developing countries, attempting to improve the effectiveness of 
foreign aid emerged as a tricky task. I argue this challenge from the perspective of the wealthy 
nations, that is, from the viewpoints of the foreign aid providers.  
Industrialized countries have various incentives to provide their resources for the welfare 
of developing countries. Rich countries and their foreign aid agencies have been struggling to 
maximize the effect of their foreign aid on the socio-economic development of poor countries 
while also ensuring their own interests. It is widely recognized that education can break the cycle 
of poverty in developing countries and create a more stable and prosperous economy and society. 
In this paper, I focus on a global initiative in the education sector, the Education for All-Fast 
Track Initiative (EFA-FTI), in order to examine how wealthy countries have made an effort to 
utilize their foreign aid resources for developing countries and whether those efforts have 
succeeded. I track the analytical format taken by Keohane and Levy (1996), which frames 
foreign aid from the viewpoint of “3Cs”—the donors’ concerns, contracting problems, and 
capacity. Using this approach, I examine the effectiveness of the FTI from the donors’ 
viewpoints with an emphasis on the donors’ delivery of foreign aid resources, which include 
financial and in-kind resources, as well as opportunities for learning and knowledge exchange.  
I choose international development as the topic of my dissertation because this topic is 
critical not only for poor countries but also for wealthy ones. Approximately eighty-percent of 
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the world’s population lives in developing countries, and their problems affect industrialized 
countries because people, money, and goods are moving across national borders much more than 
before.3 Thus, people living in developed countries have more of a stake in the socio-economic 
conditions of developing countries. Journalist Thomas Friedman refers to several developing 
countries to explain how “the world is being flattened” (Friedman, 2005). International 
development should, therefore, be a challenge for the people of wealthy countries as well.  
I also focus on international development because industrialized countries have spent vast 
amounts of resources in order to boost the development of poor countries. Over $1.7 trillion has 
been spent on development assistance since 1960 (Dichter, 2003, p.2). While some countries 
have experienced success, a number of other countries, particularly those of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
have stagnated. Even though many developed countries care about the condition of poor 
countries from a humane or moral standpoint, they also must be accountable to their taxpayers 
concerning their foreign aid activities.  
Poverty in developing countries is a global problem that developed countries must share. 
This is because commonalities exist between poverty problems of developing countries and those 
of developed countries: “Market failures happen across the world; policy problems are 
ubiquitous; and much of what development workers do in poor countries has been found to be 
useful in redressing poverty in the rich OECD countries too” (Bryant & Kappaz, 2005, p.5). It is 
notable that the expertise of international development in poor countries could be put to work 
solving problems in wealthy countries. As a citizen of one of the richest countries of the world, I 
would like to explore international development, an issue that challenges contemporary society.  
                                                 
3 While 82% of world’s population lived in low and middle income countries in 1980, the number rose to 85% in 
1990 (Soubbotina, 2004, p.158). More than half of these people in developing countries live on less than $2 a day; 
this may indicate that they do not have the means to satisfy their basic needs (Léautier & Moreno-Dodson, 2005). 
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I present the study in 10 chapters. In Chapters 1, 2, and 3, I offer the framework of this 
research. In Chapters 4 and 5, I demonstrate a part of the findings from the research by 
analytically describing the mechanism of the FTI and by analyzing observed patterns from the 
perspective of the donors’ concerns, contracting problems, and capacity, respectively. I narrate 
the findings from the case studies in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, and I evaluate the performance of the 
FTI donor agencies in Chapter 9. With Chapter 10, I conclude this thesis. 
The following figure is a flow chart of Chapter 1 concepts.  
 
Chapter 1. 
Introduction
Perspectives    
1) Donors         
2) EFA-FTI      
3) Foreign aid 
delivery
Causality chain 
of aid 
effectiveness
Statement of 
the problem 
and hypotheses
   
  
   Assessing the 
effectiveness of 
EFA-FTI
Significance of 
the inquiry
 
Figure 1. Chapter 1 flow chart 
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1.1 PERSPECTIVES 
I explore the foreign aid effectiveness from the following three perspectives: 1) donors, or 
foreign aid providers, in industrial countries; 2) the EFA-FTI; and 3) foreign aid delivery. I first 
address the role of donor governmental agencies. Many existing foreign aid effectiveness studies 
examine the economic, political, and social conditions of developing countries and their 
capacity. However, these points represent just one aspect of foreign aid mechanism; they do not 
take into account various conditions on the donors’ side. Many studies analyze foreign aid as an 
independent variable to explain economic growth, but they treat the institutions or delivery 
mechanisms of foreign aid as “black-boxes.” I focus on the interests of foreign aid providers and 
how they transfer their aid resources to developing countries. Donors’ behavior may significantly 
influence the performance of foreign aid; because donors provide aid in accordance with their 
own incentives and objectives, their contributions do not necessarily spur socio-economic 
development of developing countries.4 Donors may want to maximize their own interests by 
providing foreign aid. They may also be motivated more by a desire to improve their own 
reputation in the international arena than by their commitment to that community.  
Borrowing the concept presented by François Bourguignon, the World Bank Chief 
Economist, Figure 2 outlines the causality chain of aid effectiveness. In clarifying the foreign aid 
effect, Bourguignon considers the prevailing aid model based on country ownership and aid 
allocation in relation to monitorable results. He asserts the importance of improving knowledge 
about the following three links and how these links help strengthen development outcomes: 1) 
                                                 
4 Based upon the assessment of major donors’ aid activities in Sub-Saharan Africa, Lancaster (1999) concludes that 
“an absence of autonomy and capacity in aid agencies can lead to disasters” and “limitations on the autonomy of 
agencies can lead to a use of aid for non-development purposes and to significant wastage from a development 
perspective” (p.225). 
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from donors to policy makers; 2) from policy makers to policies; and 3) from policies to 
outcomes (Bourguignon & Sundberg, 2007, p.11). In addition to comprehending these links, it is 
critical to understand the relationship among donor agencies in order to avoid internal 
duplications and to lessen the administrative burdens of recipient countries. Also, the capacity of 
aid workers regarding the management of aid resources is a crucial determinant of the success of 
aid, although donor agencies usually emphasize the capacity development of recipient countries. 
This chain sheds light on how donor agencies interact with one another and how they influence 
policy makers and policies in developing countries with regard to the FTI.  
 
Donors
Policy 
Makers 
of aid 
agencies
AId
Policies
Outcomes 
of recipient 
countries
Conditionalities
Aid 
resources
Capacity of 
aid workers
Capacity of the counterparts of 
recipient countries
Donors
 
Figure 2. The causality chain of aid effectiveness 
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I do not take up the private sector as a direct target of analysis, although the private 
resource flow from industrial to developing countries is as significant as that of public donors.5 
The private sector has not been a major player in the FTI, although UNESCO has invited some 
private companies to join the discussions at EFA international conferences.6 However, since 
many public donors have, directly or indirectly, worked with the private sector in the context of 
international development, I discuss their collaboration as a potential strategy to improve the 
effectiveness of public donors’ foreign aid activities in the FTI.   
In this inquiry, the term “foreign aid” refers to the resource flow from industrialized 
countries to developing countries. This flow includes: 1) financial flow; 2) in-kind resource flow, 
such as dispatching experts, hiring consultants, providing equipment, and providing the 
opportunities of learning; and 3) any other activities for promoting socio-economic development 
of developing countries, such as advocacy, enlightenment, knowledge exchange, and awareness 
building in the international arena. 
Secondly, to achieve an in-depth analysis of donors’ institutions and the foreign aid 
delivery mechanisms, I focus on the FTI, a specific foreign aid initiative. Although a number of 
aid effectiveness studies have tried to clarify a causal relationship between aid and the change of 
social and macroeconomic indicators of recipients, the institutions and delivery of foreign aid are 
not reflected in these studies. I intend to examine the challenge of the aid delivery mechanisms 
by using a practical case of foreign aid. 
I have selected the EFA-FTI as a target of my analysis because it has been a recent 
                                                 
5 Gross unofficial flows, which include foreign direct investment and migrant workers’ remittance, increased tenfold 
between 1985 and 2002 to exceed $380 billion in 2002, whereas official aid flows were less than $180 billion in 
2002 (Klein & Harford, 2005, p.44). 
 
6 For example, the EFA Working Group Meeting in 2004 invited a number of private sector representatives to 
discuss the potential of a partnership with them (UNESCO, 2004b). 
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notable initiative by donor countries. In the wake of the World Conference on Education for All 
(WCEFA) in Jomtien, Thailand, in 1990 and at the World Education Forum in Dakar in 2000, 
the international community committed itself to supporting basic education in developing 
countries. Bilateral and multilateral donors have provided aid resources in line with this 
internationally agreed upon objective. The WCEFA formed the principles of EFA, i.e., providing 
education for all children, youth and adults, as concrete policy goals; many donors started to 
focus more on EFA after the WCEFA (UNESCO, 2002a, p.15). As a follow up to the WCEFA, 
the United Nations convened the World Education Forum at Dakar, Senegal, in 2000. At the 
Forum, the Dakar Framework of Action, which included the following six EFA goals, was 
adopted: the six goals include: 1) expanding early childhood care; 2) ensuring free and 
compulsory primary education of good quality by 2015 for all children; 3) meeting the learning 
needs of all young people and adults; 4) achieving a 50 percent improvement in levels of adult 
literacy by 2015; 5) eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005 
and achieving gender equality in education by 2015; and 6) improving all aspects of the quality 
of education (UNESCO, 2002a). 
The FTI is one of the foreign aid activities aiming to reach a goal of EFA. The FTI seeks 
to mobilize resources with a view to bridging the gap between the goal of universal primary 
education (UPE) and the current status of education in developing countries. In 2002, the 
international community confirmed the necessity of additional resource mobilization. This 
included the increase of the donors’ provision of foreign aid resources, which is known as the 
Monterrey Consensus (United Nations, 2002, March). From the viewpoint of making a 
difference in developing countries, it is noteworthy that the FTI intends to put the Monterrey 
Consensus into practice through actual operations. This is because many developing countries 
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have failed to develop the education sector partly due to a lack of resources, while many donor 
agencies have repeatedly indicated the importance of education for development.7 To analyze the 
impact of donor countries’ intervention with developing countries, I focus on the FTI, an 
initiative that attempts to rapidly improve the situation of primary school education in poor 
countries by mobilizing additional resources.  
Likewise, I examine the FTI because it contains a number of issues critical to recent 
international development. The FTI was designed as a response to the challenges that the 
stakeholders of foreign aid have been facing. Those key topics encompass the following: 1) 
ensuring the ownership of developing countries; 2) promoting partnership among donor 
agencies; and 3) changing donors’ foreign aid activities which includes proactive use of budget 
support where necessary and available (EFA-Fast Track Initiative, 2004b). These points question 
the mechanism of foreign aid provision: how donor countries deliver their aid resources and how 
recipient countries use them. The FTI, a dynamic product of donor agencies and recipient 
countries striving to improve education in developing countries from their respective positions, 
provides valuable implications not only for educational development in low-income countries 
but also for the study of international development in general.  
Thirdly, I pay particular attention to foreign aid delivery, that is, how the aid resources of 
industrial countries are mobilized and disbursed. The role of foreign aid in international 
development is theoretically explained as filling the financial gap in developing countries, such 
as Harrod-Domer’s two gap model (Chenery & Strout, 1966). Various researchers claim the 
                                                 
7 Gurria and Gershberg (2004), in a study commissioned by the World Bank, review a number of methodologies 
used in key studies that estimate the financial gap for achieving UPE. They conclude that all the studies signify a 
general need for a “sharp increase” in foreign aid, while they indicate the difficulty of the cost estimation for UPE 
due to the challenge of predicting an uncertain future (p.20). Meanwhile, improving the quality of foreign aid is 
equally important to resource mobilization for achieving UPE. Many key studies emphasize the need to increase 
efficiencies in the system. UNESCO calls for the international community to care more about the quality by 
publishing the EFA Global Monitoring Report in 2005 that focuses on the issue of quality (UNESCO, 2004a). 
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necessity of additional finance to achieve the EFA goals, or the MDGs, which hold some of the 
EFA goals. However, the delivery of aid resources from donors to recipients may be more 
critical, especially in the light of fungibility of aid resources, corruption of recipients, and lack of 
aid absorptive capacity in developing countries. In order to realize development in poor 
countries, foreign aid must not only fill the financial gap, but it must also ensure the delivery and 
quality of aid resources. In this regard, I focus on how different donors interact, collaborate, or 
evaluate each other in terms of aid delivery; I take into account that donors sometimes do not 
provide their aid resources for poverty reduction of developing countries. 
Various aid effectiveness studies offer different definitions of “effectiveness.” In this 
research, I use effectiveness to refer to those who provide foreign aid resources: taxpayers, 
voters, and their representatives, i.e., politicians and bureaucrats of bilateral donors and the 
shareholders of and resource contributors to multilateral donors. Principally, I see the proof of 
effectiveness in the improvement of the outcomes of the FTI because donors may principally 
provide aid for the FTI in order to support the educational development of recipients. However, 
since promoting developing countries’ educational development may not be the only objective of 
donors, some other changes, including the alteration of the donors’ self-interests as a result of 
providing foreign aid, may also indicate the proof of effectiveness. My approach in 
demonstrating the magnitude of foreign aid effectiveness, including variables and data collection 
methods, will be explained in Chapter 3. 
Figure 3 depicts the overall structure of my dissertation. I assess the effectiveness of the 
FTI by clarifying three main points: First, I present the donors’ interests in providing foreign aid 
for the FTI. I then view how those interests have affected the donors’ aid policies and 
implementation. Secondly, I examine how the donors disburse their foreign aid resources for the 
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FTI toward developing countries, including Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAps), alignment with 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
and the budget support; the foreign aid resources include not only finance but also in-kind 
resources and learning opportunities provided by the donors. Thirdly, I look at how the donors’ 
resource transfer has generated the outcomes, including the change of the FTI indicators and 
other byproducts of the FTI. In analyzing these points, I focus on the donors’ concerns, 
contracting problems in providing aid resources, and donors’ capacity.  
 
Figure 3. Assessing the EFA-FTI 
Donors Recipients
Affecting 
Donors
Generating 
Outcomes
1
2 3 4 5
Donors' 
Contracting 
ProblemsDonors' 
Concerns
Outcomes 
of FTI
   1. What are donors' incentives?
   2. How do donors' incentives affect their foreign aid activities?
   3. How do donors transfer aid resources?
   4. How do foreign aid activities generate outcomes?
   5. What are the outcomes?
My Dissertation: Assessing the EFA-FTI
Donors' Capacity
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 1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES 
This dissertation addresses the problem surrounding donors’ delivery of foreign aid for the FTI. 
Despite the significant amount of the donors’ foreign aid provision for the FTI to developing 
countries and the donors’ generally benevolent intentions, many challenges still remain in this 
field. For example, many countries have still not achieved the FTI goal of universal primary 
completion, resulting in a significant number of out-of-school children.   
My inquiry explores the answers to this problem from the above-mentioned three 
perspectives. I do not conceptualize foreign aid as a purely independent variable to explain the 
change of the FTI indicators of developing countries, because foreign aid does not constitute a 
true explanation of the recipients’ FTI performance; Keohane (1996) also takes this stance in 
their environmental aid effectiveness study (p.9). Instead, I intend to demonstrate causal 
pathways of aid effectiveness in the FTI by describing, analyzing, and evaluating how donors 
deliver foreign aid for the FTI. Specifically, I intend to examine the donors’ incentives in 
providing foreign aid by using the case of the FTI. Further, I plan to use the FTI to examine how 
donors base their foreign aid policy on their incentive and how these incentives may affect the 
outcomes and impact of foreign aid. 
My research probes the following hypotheses:  
1) Donors’ multiple incentives influence their delivery of foreign aid in the FTI, and 
those complex incentives cause obstacles for recipients trying to achieve the FTI 
goals;  
2) Donors’ delivery of foreign aid resources (including financial flow and in-kind 
resources flow) influences the outcomes of the FTI;  
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3) Coordination among different donors’ foreign aid policies for the FTI reduces the 
transaction cost in aid delivery and, in the end, improves the outcomes and impact of 
the FTI; and  
4) Friction exists in transferring resources for the FTI from donors to recipients; this 
may hinder the effective use of those resources.  
In order to analyze these hypotheses, I focus on four entities: 1) donors’ headquarters; 2) 
donors’ field offices; 3) recipient countries; and 4) the international society (see Figure 4). I 
separate donor agencies into their headquarters and field offices, because foreign aid policy 
makers and practitioners in charge of field operations have considerable differences in terms of 
concerns, contracting problems, and capacity. Moreover, I focus on the international society, a 
forum for both donor agencies and recipient countries that discusses poverty reduction and 
development. Arguments and discussions at the international society are critical in this paper, 
because international conferences and multilateral mechanisms usually attempt to influence the 
policies and activities of both donor agencies and recipient countries.  
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 Recipient countries
International Society 
Donors'
field offices 
practitioners, operations
Donors'
headquarters 
policymakers, top management
EFA-FTI 
Figure 4. Stakeholders of the FTI 
 
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INQUIRY 
By developing this dissertation, I intend to contribute to the academic discourse of international 
development in education in the following two ways: 1) To disentangle the incentive structure of 
foreign aid agencies in the FTI by examining the policies and activities of major bilateral and 
multilateral donors involved in the FTI and their performance in their client countries; and 2) To 
explain how foreign aid delivery, or the institutions of the target foreign aid agencies, works in 
achieving the FTI goals by using descriptive data and other relevant documents regarding the 
FTI.  
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Because foreign aid is not the only determinant of FTI performance, it is likely to be 
difficult to show a clear cause-and-effect relationship between foreign aid and the FTI 
performance in developing countries. A number of scholars, particularly those who belong to the 
orthodox development economics, have treated foreign aid delivery as a “black box” in the 
research of aid effectiveness; I intend to clarify this “black box” in the case of the FTI.  
While above-mentioned demonstrations throughout my dissertation may be small ones, 
they still offer significant additions to the academic debate concerning international development 
in education. These indications could complement existing aid effectiveness researches 
conducted from a perspective of orthodox economists, which mainly pay attention to economic 
conditions and policy environments of recipient countries, as well as the quantity of foreign aid. 
Furthermore, this inquiry could endorse and enrich the arguments of foreign aid effectiveness 
from the perspective of donor agencies’ institutions; this study may advocate the consensus of 
aid coordination and harmonization among major donors. Likewise, the findings of this research, 
derived from the examination of the incentive structure of donors and the delivery of foreign aid, 
could provide prescriptions for policy makers and practitioners of international development 
with prescriptions to improve foreign aid effectiveness in the FTI. 
1.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter depicts a total picture of my dissertation. I first explain the three perspectives of my 
analytical base include the following: 1) donors/foreign aid providers in industrialized countries; 
2) the EFA-FTI; and 3) foreign aid delivery. I then focus on the problem statements, the 
hypotheses to be proven, and the possible contributions of my dissertation to the academic 
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discourse of international development. In line with the description of this chapter, the following 
chapters narrate the review of relevant literature and the methodology of inquisition to be 
undertaken.  
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the literature relevant to my inquiry. The purpose of this literature review is 
to indicate my position in the growing perspectives of international development, particularly 
those related to education and development economics. By doing so, I intend to justify how my 
dissertation would contribute to the development of academic discourse in international 
development.  
This chapter deals with the following components: 1) how scholars, policy makers, and 
practitioners discuss international development; 2) how scholars of international development 
frame for aid; 3) how major researchers frame foreign aid effectiveness and what kind of insights 
they have thus far accumulated; and 4) how educational development, focusing on the FTI, has 
been interpreted in the context of international development. Using the mapping of existing 
theoretical arguments and research findings, I describe what would be my potential contribution 
to the development of academic discourse in international development. Figure 5 portrays the 
overall structure of my literature review and indicates how my dissertation relates to the existing 
academic discussions.  
 
 
 
 
 17 
GDP per Capita Growth
in Developing Countries
- Various Policy Variables
- Foreign Aid
Developing 
Countries
Dependent VariableIndependent Variables
International Development
(Development Economics)
Industrialized 
Countries International  Organizations
People, money, goods, services, knowledge, 
and political power are flowing.
Literature Review
Reviews how scholars, policymakers, and practitioners have viewed international development.
Reviews how scholars, policymakers, and practitioners have framed education in the context of international development
Developing 
Countries
Foreign Aid in International Development
Industrialized 
Countries
International  
Organizations
Industrial countries and the 
international community are providing 
foreign aid for poverty reduction and 
economic growth of developing 
countries.
Foreign Aid Foreign Aid
Contribution
Literature Review
Reviews how scholars in economics & institutional economics have viewed foreign aid.
Foreign Aid Effectiveness
Cause & Effect?
Under what conditions (policy environments), foreign aid contributes to economic growth?
          - The "Foreign Aid" variable refers to the amount of aid provision from donors.
          - The delivery of foreign aid is not taken into account -- it is a "black-box." 
Literature Review
Reviews how scholars, policymakers, and practitioners have examined the effectiveness of foreign aid.
 
 
 18 
1) Changes of FTI performance 
    in developing countries
2) Changes of donors' interests
1) Foreign aid in the FTI
2) Donors' multiple 
    incentives in providing
    foreign aid
Dependent VariablesIndependent Variables
My Dissertation
Influence?
Developing 
Countries
Industrialized 
Countries
International  
Organizations
1) Analyze foreign aid in the 
FTI by focusing on donors' 
institutions and their 
delivery of foreign aid 
resources.
Foreign Aid 
in the FTI
Contribution
2) Track the causal 
pathways of foreign aid in 
the FTI and examine its 
effectiveness from 
donors' viewpoints.
Foreign Aid 
in the FTI
Causal Pathways
 
Figure 5. Literature review 
2.1 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN AID 
2.1.1 Introduction 
Various scholars, policy makers, and practitioners from various academic disciplines have 
analyzed the problems of developing countries. In my review of their intellectual contributions, I 
focus on economics. This is because the field of economics emphasizes an optimum use of 
resources, something inherently scarce in human society. This nature of economics fits my 
research interest: how donor agencies can best use their limited foreign aid resources in order to 
improve the socio-economic conditions of developing countries.  
Since my research interest lies in the problems of developing countries, I focus on 
development economics. In addition to the mainstream economics, or neoclassical economics, I 
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incorporate “heterodox” economics, such as institutional economics, as well as some non-
economists’ perspectives that may be relevant to the issue of international development.  
I use the term “foreign aid” as any activity that helps strengthen the capacity of 
developing countries to meet sustainable development guided by the conditions and 
commitments in each country. This definition is consistent with the resolution adopted by the 
members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1995 (OECD, 1996, p.8). I regard various modalities, 
including grant, loan, technical assistance, knowledge sharing, and activities of NGOs, as foreign 
aid as long as they aim at supporting the development of developing countries.  
This review consists of two sections. The first section explains how development 
economics analyzes foreign aid by referring to its major theoretical arguments. It then describes 
how development economics has influenced the policies and operations of foreign aid. The 
limitations of development economics to analyze foreign aid follow. The second section 
describes how institutional economics views foreign aid by focusing on the principal-agent 
theory. It follows by analyzing the implications of institutional economics on foreign aid.  
I believe that the combination of development economics and institutional economics 
complements each other in analyzing foreign aid. While foreign aid serves multiple purposes, it 
essentially tries to foster the socio-economic development of developing countries. Therefore, 
development economics, which analyzes the socio-economic transformation of developing 
countries, offers an indispensable perspective in analyzing foreign aid. However, development 
economics itself does not address the issues of incentives of various donor agencies, competition 
and cooperation among them, and asymmetry of information among the stakeholders of foreign 
aid. Institutional economics can provide a useful tool to analyze these issues. Consequently, this 
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analytical review of both development economics and institutional economics gives me a 
theoretical foundation upon which I can assess the effectiveness of the FTI in my dissertation. 
2.1.2 Development economics and foreign aid 
2.1.2.1 What is development economics? 
Development economics is not the same as the economics of advanced capitalist nations, i.e., the 
modern neo-classical economics, nor is it similar to the economics of centralized socialist 
societies, i.e., the Marxist economics; instead, it is the economics of contemporary poor and 
developing countries (Todaro & Smith, 2003). While neo-classical economics emphasizes the 
efficient, least-cost allocation of scarce resources and the optimum use of these resources to 
produce goods and services, development economics deals with the economic, social, political, 
and institutional mechanisms at both public and private levels, which are necessary to bring 
about improvements of living conditions for the impoverished, malnourished, and less-educated 
people of developing countries (p.8). Development economics deems a larger government role 
and some degree of coordinated economic decision making mechanism as essential (p.9). 
Hirschman (1981) proposes a simple classification of development economics and other 
sub-fields of economics by focusing on two ingredients: 1) the monoeconomics claim (i.e., there 
is one form of economics that is valid everywhere) and 2) the mutual-benefit claim (i.e., 
economic relationship between developed and developing countries can be mutually beneficial). 
While neo-classical economics asserts both the monoeconomics and mutual-benefit claims, 
development economics values the mutual-benefit claim, rejecting the monoeconomics claim; 
developing economics sets developing countries apart from advanced industrial countries (p.3). 
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2.1.2.2 Major theoretical arguments of development economics 
This section reviews the major theoretical arguments of development economics. In 
discussing development economics, the characteristics being attached to development must be 
carefully spelled out, because development means different things in different contexts of 
society. Development is “not about helping a few people get rich or creating a handful of 
pointless protected industries that only benefit the country’s elite,” but it “is about transforming 
societies, improving the lives of the poor, enabling everyone to have a chance at success and 
access to health care and education” (Stiglitz, 2003, pp.251-252).  
During the 1950s and the 1960s, development was seen as “an engineered, mechanical 
process of imitation and replication.” This can be interpreted “as we did in the West in our rise to 
riches, so you should do” (Dichter, 2003, p.56). This way of thinking neglects individual people 
because the solution to the poverty in developing countries was believed to “make the nation 
rich; the benefits ‘trickle down’ to the poor” (p.57).  
During these decades, poverty reduction or equity in economic growth, a current central 
topic of development economics, was considered to be achieved through economic growth and 
industrialization. Various scholarly discourses are based on this idea. The following theories 
dispute development economics.  
Nurkse (1967) bases his argument on the vicious circle of poverty in developing 
countries. Since developing countries suffer from a lack of sufficient capital, capital formation is 
urgent for development. However, the vicious circle of poverty hampers development. Low 
development equilibrium and low incomes in developing countries lead to low consumption, 
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which then result in low productivity and the eventual persistence of poverty.8 Nurkse insists that 
balanced growth is necessary in order to achieve development. He advocates the expansion of 
the size of market and the simultaneous increase of investment motivations by many 
complementary industries to increase balanced production for development (pp.11-17). 
Hirschman (1958), who opposes the balanced growth, asserts that imbalanced growth is 
necessary for development.9 He argues that in order to achieve development, investment should 
concentrate on these industries that have large linkage effects: 1) the forward linkage (the outputs 
of industry are used as the inputs for other industries) and 2) the backward linkage (the efforts to 
supply the inputs necessary for activities by domestic production). According to Hirschman, the 
imbalance can be created and, through its spill-over effects, economic development can occur 
(pp.98-119). 
Hirschman (1981) also explains rural underemployment, which justifies the intervention 
of public policy and the creation of a public investment plan for industrialization by mobilizing 
the rural underemployment, in terms of the vicious circle of poverty (p.7). In addition, he asserts 
the idea of late industrialization; since developing countries are newcomers, industrialization 
requires intentional, concentrative, and induced efforts. This argument justifies protectionalism 
and planning in the national economy (p.10). 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1961) presents the Big Push theory. Focusing on indivisibility of 
production function (i.e., input, output, and production process cannot be divided), he asserts that 
                                                 
8 Nurkse (1967) analyzes the capital accumulation of economically-backward countries as follows: “On the supply 
side, there is the small capacity to save, resulting from the low level of real income. The low real income is a 
reflection of low productivity, which in turn is due largely to the lack of capital…On the demand side, the 
inducement to invest may be low because of the small buying power of the people, which is due to their small real 
income, which again due to low productivity” (p.5). 
 
9 Hirschman (1958) justifies the unbalanced growth because development has proceeded “with growth being 
communicated from the leading sectors of the economy to the followers, from one industry to another” (pp.62-63). 
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a certain scale of investment should be necessary for development (pp.60-61). His hypothesis 
regarding the necessity of large-scale investment for development justifies the investment in the 
large-scaled infrastructure projects implemented by the World Bank. 
Chenery (1975) proposes the Structuralist Approach, which is similar to Hirschman’s 
development economics. Assuming that a structural rigidity in developing countries, he focuses 
on the mechanism by which the economy of developing economies transforms the domestic 
economic structure from an agriculture-centered one to the industry-oriented one. Based upon 
this argument, Lewis (1954) creates a model which consists of two sectors: 1) traditional 
overpopulated rural sector, characterized by zero marginal labor productivity (i.e., surplus labor 
exists) and 2) a highly productive modern urban industrial sector. Lewis’ model focuses on both 
the process of labor transfer and the growth of output and employment in the modern sector. Fei 
and Ranis (1964) extend this model by conducting an economic analysis of the labor surplus type 
of underdeveloped economy. They focus on “the predominance of an agricultural sector 
characterized by widespread disguised underemployment and high rate of population growth” 
and “a small but hopefully growing industrial sector” of developing countries (p.7). 
Meanwhile, Rostow (1960) argues that “take-off” is necessary in the transformation from 
developing to developed countries. He asserts that the rapid expansion of agricultural 
productivity, the building of social infrastructure, and the increase of investment rate for 
production are needed for developing countries to “take off” toward a higher stage of 
development. 10  In a similar context, Gerschenkron (1962) argues that the process of 
development is different depending on each country. He presents the idea that late-comers have 
                                                 
10 Rostow (1960) categorizes all countries’ economic dimensions into five stages: 1) the traditional society; 2) the 
preconditions for take-off; 3) the take-off; 4) the drive to maturity; and 5) the age of high mass-consumption. He 
explains how those economies transformed from one to another (pp.4-16). 
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an advantage: late-comers (i.e., developing countries) can industrialize themselves much faster 
than developed countries because they can use the know-how of industrialized countries to 
achieve development.11 
Prebisch (1959) and Singer (1950) present a different view on development from the 
above-mentioned economists. They view the world as center (i.e., developed, industrialized 
countries) and periphery (i.e., developing countries, or producers of primary commodity).12 They 
assert that developed countries enjoy double benefits by consuming primary commodities and by 
producing industrial products, whereas developing countries lose twice because of the consistent 
low price of primary commodities and, as a result, low income. The Prebisch-Singer thesis, 
which asserts that the declining terms-of-trade phenomenon results in a long-term transfer of 
income from developing to developed countries, reflects this argument.13   
The above-mentioned perspectives articulate how representative economists frame 
development. These views, widely shared among foreign aid agencies, become a basis of their 
strategy in assisting developing countries.  
2.1.2.3 How development economics affect foreign aid 
In this section, I describe how various arguments of development economics have 
influenced foreign aid policy. In the context of development economics in the 1950s and 1960s, 
                                                 
11 Gerschenkron (1962) emphasizes the “great elasticity and variability in the industrialization processes.” He asserts 
that “what may have functioned as a prerequisite and, in a sense, as a “cause” of industrialization in one country 
appears as an effect of an industrialization in another” (pp.50-51).  
 
12 Prebisch (1959) states “historically, the spread of technical progress has been uneven, and this has contributed to 
the division of the world economy into industrial centers and peripheral countries engaged in primary production, 
with consequent differences in income growth” (p.251).  
 
13 Singer (1950) describes that, as a result of international trade, “the industrialized have had the best of the world, 
both as consumers of primary commodities and as producers of manufactured articles, whereas the underdeveloped 
countries had the worst of both, as consumers of manufactures and as producers of raw materials” (p.479).  
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Chenery and Strout (1966) suggest the Two-Gap Approach to analyze foreign aid.14 This Two-
Gap model is based upon the Harrod-Domer’s growth model, which is based on the prediction 
that “GDP growth will be proportional to the share of investment spending in GDP” (Easterly, 
2002, p.29). As Rostow (1960) describes, a certain level of growth rate, i.e., the large scale 
investment, is needed in order to “take off” from a lower stage of development. 15  Since 
developing countries cannot procure equipments and materials necessary for take-off, a certain 
level of import is needed. However, developing countries have neither sufficient foreign 
currency nor exporting capacity. Here, the lack of saving and foreign currency is recognized as 
the bottleneck of economic development. According to the Two-Gap approach, the role of 
foreign aid fills the financial gap to attain growth by removing the bottleneck of the shortage of 
saving, i.e., required investment-saving gap, and the foreign currency, i.e., export-import gap 
(Easterly, 2002, p.29). However, this argument does not address various modalities of resource 
flow from industrialized to developing countries, such as technical assistance, absorptive 
capacity of aid, and differences between public and private resources flow, which are all 
influential over foreign aid and development.  
The dominant conviction of development economics during the 1950s and 1960s, i.e., the 
trickle-down hypothesis and the investment for economic growth, did not contribute to reducing 
poverty in many parts of the world. In the 1970s, the United Nations proposed the idea of 
satisfying Basic Human Needs (BHN), those basic goods and services necessary for a minimum 
standard of living, by addressing poverty in developing countries (United Nations, 1977). The 
                                                 
14 In order to analyze the role of external assistance, Chenery and Strout (1966) design the “investment limited 
growth” model, in which the limits on skills and saving are relevant, and “trade limited growth” model, in which the 
balance of payments limit is effective (p.683).  
 
15 Rostow (1960) analyzes that “during the take-off, the rate of effective investment and savings may rise from, say, 
5% of the national income to 10% or more” (p.8). 
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BHN affected the policy of the World Bank. Robert McNamara, the Bank’s President, declared 
his strategy for targeting the poor at the World Bank’s annual conference in Nairobi in 1973; his 
plan was represented as the Redistribution with Growth (Chenery, Ahluwalia, Bell, Duloy, and 
Jolly, 1974; World Bank, 2003, March).16 During the 1970s, the Bank had invested in such fields 
of BHN as education and health, in addition to the infrastructure projects. However, the oil 
shock, as well as serious indebtedness in Latin America and Africa in this decade, limited the 
government-led developments. 
One of the prevailing ideas in development economics during the 1980s is the neo-
classical conviction: emphasis on market mechanism and deregulation regarding trade and 
investment can bring economic growth to any countries; as a result of economic growth, poverty 
reduction can be realized. This belief, later described as Washington Consensus, became a 
theoretical basis of the World Bank-led Structural Adjustment Programs (Williamson, 1993). 
The Structural Adjustment Programs imposed conditionality on developing countries by 
demanding these developing countries to employ macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization, 
and privatization. However, Structural Adjustment, which did not work in most countries, 
resulted in exacerbating poverty in developing countries. UNICEF published the “Structural 
Adjustment with Human Face” in 1987 to assert the importance of providing a social safety net 
for vulnerable people. Responding to this message, the World Bank started to directly 
incorporate the programs that targeted the social sector and the impoverished people into the 
Structural Adjustment programs (Hoeven, 1991).  
                                                 
16 Regarding the redistribution with growth, Chenery et al. (1974) indicate that “the poor receive little or no benefit” 
in some developing countries, but “the opposite is true” in others. They assert that “this diversity of experience 
provides a basis for identifying different approaches to policy and for evaluating their effects on poverty” (p.xiii). 
This idea may affect the discussion of the diversity of foreign aid delivery. 
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Meanwhile, Gore (2000) asserts that the introduction of the Washington Consensus has 
brought about a shift from historicism to ahistorical performance analysis. Gore argues that 
theorizing development strategy has shifted from attempting to understand patterns and laws of 
development, i.e., historicism, to explaining the national performance of various types, i.e., 
ahistorical analysis (p.794). It seems that this shift towards performance-oriented assessment has 
influenced major international initiatives, such as the MDGs or Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, which emphasizes the importance of measuring the performance of foreign aid. 
During the beginning stages of foreign aid in the 1950s and the 1960s, development 
economics suggested that poverty reduction could be achieved through economic growth, but 
this hypothesis did not work in many developing countries. The idea of BHN emerged from this 
fact in the 1970s, leading many aid agencies to directly target the people under poverty. 
However, oil shock, as well as debt crisis in developing countries, revived such neo-classical 
strategy as the Structural Adjustment of the 1980s. Most Structural Adjustment programs failed 
and even increased poverty. This fact made the international community again focus on poverty 
reduction as a mainstream agenda in the 1990s’ post-Cold War world. 
2.1.2.4 Major policy trends of foreign aid 
In this section, I will review the major policy regarding foreign aid after the Cold War. My 
arguments reflect development economics and the lessons learned from the past applications of 
development economics.  
During the Cold War, Western donor countries used foreign aid as a political lever to 
support friendly political regimes in developing countries; most socialist countries’ aid also 
resulted from political and strategic motivations (Todaro & Smith, 2003, p.653). While these 
political motivations remained after the end of the Cold War, the World Development Report in 
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1990 refocused poverty reduction in the 1990s; this has since been a core issue of development 
assistance (World Bank, 1990). After this report, the World Bank resumed treating poverty 
reduction as a critical topic to be addressed, analyzing this poverty reduction in the context of 
development economics.  
In addition, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) launched the annual 
Human Development Report in 1990, aiming at putting people back at the center of development 
in economic debate, policy, and advocacy (UNDP, 1990). This report focused on people and on 
how development enlarges their choices. This idea, based on Amartya Sen’s “capability” 
approach, pays attention to the real opportunities people have regarding the lives they may lead 
(Sen, 1987, p.36). 
In 1995, the United Nations hosted the World Summit for Social Development in 
Copenhagen. The Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, which states that the 
international community reached a consensus on the need to place people at the center of 
development, was adopted (United Nations, 1995). As a follow-up of the Copenhagen 
Declaration, the High Level Meeting of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
OECD in 1996 adopted a strategic document called “Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution 
of Development Co-operation” (OECD, 1996). This strategy, which contains six goals, later 
became known as the International Development Goals. It includes a reduction by one-half in the 
proportion of people living in extreme poverty as well as the achievement of universal primary 
education by 2015. The commitment of donors and developing countries, coordination among 
donors, and coherence between foreign aid policies and other policies that have an impact on 
developing countries are crucial for reaching these goals. 
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The Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), proposed by World Bank President 
James Wolfensohn in January 1999, has achieved these principles. Asserting that developing 
countries be in the driver’s seat, the CDF concentrates on a recipient country’s ownership and 
partnership among stakeholders in a participatory process (World Bank, 1999). Following up the 
CDF, the annual meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1999 
adopted the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). PRSP, a paper prepared by developing 
countries, analyzes the macroeconomic, structural, and social policies and programs of these 
countries for three years or more to promote broad-based growth and to reduce poverty (Craig & 
Porter, 2002). As an important strategic paper for international development, PRSP has been 
used as a source of decision-making in a debt relief initiative for heavily indebted countries and 
other types of soft loans provided by the World Bank and IMF. In addition, many developing 
countries have adopted PRSP as integral to their national development plans. The basis of PRSP 
– approaching poverty reduction in a country-driven manner, promoting pro-poor growth, 
facilitating empowerment by promoting good governance, and enhancing security – have been 
widely shared by donor communities and have even been applied to non-PRSP countries; PRSP 
has become a new regime of international development in the post Cold War era.  
In 2000, following the International Development Goals by OECD-DAC in 1996, the 
United Nations Millennium Summit adopted the Millennium Declaration as well as the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (United Nations, 2000; Vandemoortele & Roy, 2004, 
August). The MDGs, made by modifying the International Development Goals, added a new 
goal of building a global partnership for international development. Specifically, the MDGs 
target comprehensive and diverse sectors and actors. Their globally shared goals have been 
reinforced by the PRSP, which states the respective country’s strategy. Therefore, the PRSP 
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emerges as a basic strategy in achieving the MDGs for each developing country. The MDGs 
have acquired strong consensus from developing countries, the donor community, and the civil 
society.  
In March 2002, The United Nations convened the International Conference on Financing 
for Development at Monterrey, Mexico. The Conference argued the need to significantly 
increase foreign aid, mobilize domestic resources within developing countries, and promote 
trade, private investment, and debt relief in order to achieve the MDGs. The outcome of this 
Conference is known as the Monterrey Consensus (United Nations, 2002, March). Because the 
attacks of 9/11 took place six months before the Conference, those is attendance discussed 
poverty reduction in developing countries in the context of fighting against terrorism; this led to 
the U.S. and many European donors pledging a significant increase in their foreign aid. In 
addition to advocating a quantitative increase of foreign aid, the Conference highlighted the 
effectiveness of aid. The attendants discussed donor coordination as well as aid harmonization as 
a way to reduce the transaction cost of foreign aid. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, which later chapters will explain in relation to the FTI, extended this trend by 
establishing an international architecture of aid effectiveness.  
A review of the trends of foreign aid since the end of the Cold War yields some common 
characteristics. There has been a global consensus regarding poverty reduction. Furthermore, 
there has been an emphasis on the ownership of recipient countries and partnership among 
various donors and between the foreign aid community and such other entities as the civil society 
and the private sector. These trends reflect the relationship between the theoretical arguments of 
development economics and the practice of foreign aid; they show how these arguments have 
been modified in line with the changes in international society. Because purely neo-classical 
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types of prescriptions have not worked in many developing countries, development economists, 
as well as the international community, have been inclined to more directly address poverty in 
impoverished countries. 
My dissertation provides a new perspective on the above-mentioned microcosm of 
development economics and foreign aid. Although many researchers have stressed the role of 
foreign aid in the context of economic growth and poverty reduction, these points are merely a 
part of the donors’ objectives; donors have multiple incentives in providing aid to developing 
countries. My dissertation argues how this complexity affects the outcomes and impacts of 
foreign aid.  
2.1.3 Institutional economics and foreign aid 
2.1.3.1 What is institutional economics? 
Institutional economics examines how informational problems affect organizational performance 
(Martens, Mummert, Murrell, & Seabright, 2002, p.7). It is different from neo-classical 
economics, which assumes that near perfect-information is available at near-zero transaction 
costs. The following provides an understanding of institutional economics and its role in foreign 
aid.  
Vebren (1990), one of the initiators of institutional economics, defines institutions as 
“settled habits of thought common to the generality of men” (p.239). He views institutions not 
only as the results of a selective process which shapes the prevailing types of attitudes, but as the 
methods of human relations and efficient factors of selection (Vebren, 1973, p.131). Hodgson, a 
representative economist of modern institutionalism, shares this view. He perceives institutions 
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as durable systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions 
(Hodgson, 2003, p.xiii). 
Commons (1931) develops these views and framed institutions as “collective action in 
control, liberation and expansion of individual action” (p.649). He argues that while collective 
action controls individual action, it also liberates individual action from coercion, duress, 
discrimination, or unfair competition by other individuals (p.651). Commons defines institutions 
as having two different features: controlling and expanding individual action.  
In connection with Commons’ notion of controlling individual actions, North (1990) 
equates institutions with the rules of the societal game involving the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction and determines which structures provide incentive in human 
exchange (p.3). Since institutions are a creation of human beings and are altered by human 
beings, North claims this theory must begin with the individual (p.5).  
All of these perspectives frame institutions as victims of economic constraints when 
determining choices of action. These perspectives can be useful in analyzing the effectiveness of 
foreign aid, because the will of benevolent individuals in donor countries is usually altered by 
such institutions as foreign aid agencies. 
2.1.3.2 How institutional economics analyzes foreign aid 
Institutional economics provide a tool to analyze foreign aid. Coase (1937) explains the nature of 
a firm and why people work there; he claims that the transaction costs determine the size of 
firms. Likewise, Martens (2005) explores why foreign aid agencies exist, arguing that aid 
agencies mediate divergent preferences between donors and recipients. 
Quarles van Ufford (1988) pays attention to institutional incentives and organizational 
arrangements regarding foreign aid implementation. He discusses foreign aid agencies as part of 
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a long and complex chain of interdependent organizations and, in a sense, intermediate bodies of 
a wider network through which the money flows (p.12). He also observes that the quality of aid 
is related to the way in which it is organized and its capability of producing the desired results 
(p.11). 
Carr, McAuliffe, and MacLachlan (1998) proclaim that a chain of organizational 
decision-making groups, i.e., donor, recipient, funding body, intermediary, consulting firm, etc., 
exists in foreign aid, and this chain recasts aid activities in terms of their respective priorities 
before its objectives can become visible in the target population (p.44). They assert that the 
conflicting agenda in the aid delivery chain creates difficulty in the determination of expected 
outcomes for aid projects (pp.44-45).  
More specifically, one branch of institutional economics, the principal-agent theory, 
provides a useful tool for analyzing foreign aid. According to the principal-agent theory, modern 
organizations are hierarchically structured with principals giving instructions to agents. 
However, principals cannot make all the decisions and carry out all tasks themselves; they need 
to delegate at least a certain part of these tasks to their agents (Martens et al., 2002, p.8). The 
principal-agent theory identifies two types of problems in this delegating process. The first 
problem is moral hazard: agents may deviate from the instruction given by the principal; they 
may carry out the delegated tasks in such a way they advance their own interests, rather than 
those of the principals (p.8). The second problem is adverse selection: the agents may gain 
access to the information inaccessible to the principal; this may cause agents to manipulate the 
information in a way that runs against the principal’s interests (p.8). In order to mitigate these 
problems, it is necessary to create a strong design by setting up incentive structures that motivate 
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agents to reveal relevant information to the principals and that reduce biases in agent behavior 
(pp.8-9). 
The principal-agent theory faces limitation in analyzing foreign aid. Although the 
principal-agent theory has wide application to every aspect of organization and contracts, it has 
few applications in development economics and the analysis of foreign aid. This may be because 
of the lack of sufficient empirical data to test the models (Laffont & Tirole, 1993, p.669). 
Collecting data on the behaviors in negotiation within and between foreign aid agencies requires 
a detailed analysis of the resource allocations and procedural complexity of agencies; this is 
difficult in many cases (Martens et al., 2002, p.10). However, the principal-agent theory itself is 
a useful analytical tool to assess the delivery process of foreign aid organization. 
2.1.4 Concluding remarks 
This section reviews major theoretical arguments of development economics and institutional 
economics in connection with foreign aid. It presents a series of arguments and analyzes the 
influences and limitations of these arguments in terms of foreign aid. Although development 
economics has tried to provide a prescription for the development of impoverished countries, 
poverty reduction is still a critical challenge in many developing countries, despite the significant 
amount of foreign aid. Institutional economics, particularly the principal-agent theory, seems to 
work as a useful tool to analyze foreign aid delivery in view of improving its effectiveness, but 
its application to the research of foreign aid has been limited so far due to the difficulty in 
accessing empirical data.  
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2.2 FOREIGN AID EFFECTIVENESS 
2.2.1 Introduction 
This section describes foreign aid effectiveness and reviews its major research findings. 
First of all, I define foreign aid effectiveness, including its relevant historical background. I then 
analytically review major research findings of foreign aid effectiveness from the macro level to 
the micro institution level. The monitoring and evaluation of Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and Education for All (EFA) are also described. Finally, I briefly state implications of 
these existing research findings in my dissertation. 
2.2.2 What is foreign aid effectiveness? 
Foreign aid effectiveness examines what works and what does not work in foreign aid. 
Former World Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz states that foreign aid is “a learning 
business that continually evolves as lessons of success and failures become clear” (World Bank, 
1998, p.ix). Assessing foreign aid effectiveness contributes to the ongoing learning process of 
foreign aid. UNDP concludes that three conditions lead to foreign aid effectiveness: 1) aid has to 
be delivered in sufficient quantity to support human development take-off; 2) aid has to be 
delivered at a predictable, low transaction cost and value for money basis; and 3) effective aid 
requires the ownership of recipient countries (UNDP, 2005, p.7).  
Although many different research findings exist in the discourse of foreign aid 
effectiveness, they share the same concern regarding how foreign aid can better contribute to the 
socio-economic development of developing countries. Here, foreign aid refers not only to the 
 36 
transfer of money from developed to developing countries, but it is also the assistance that 
developed countries give developing countries to generate the knowledge they need for their 
development (World Bank, 1998, p.ix). 
The notion of foreign aid effectiveness emerged from the aid weariness of the 1970s and 
1980s (Todaro & Smith, 2003, pp.659-660). Although many developing countries experienced 
growth in the 1960s, the oil shock in 1973 halted their growth and stagnated their economies. 
The hypothesis of trickle-down, which believed that macro-level economic growth could 
improve the living condition of the people, was questioned. In the 1970s, the international 
community addressed poverty in developing countries in a more direct manner by asserting the 
importance of Basic Human Needs (BHN). However, in the 1980s, many developing countries, 
except for the East Asian countries, experienced debt crisis because of the changes of global 
economy. Since the Structural Adjustment Programs, which tried to stabilize macroeconomic 
conditions of those countries as well as the BHN, did not work in many developing countries, the 
significance of foreign aid was doubted. Donor countries not only became suspicious of foreign 
aid, but they also began to focus on such domestic issues as inflation, unemployment, and 
government payments (pp.659-660). Although political reasons did not decrease the amount of 
foreign aid by the end of the Cold War, many donor countries did cut their foreign aid budgets in 
the 1990s and did become more caring about the effects of foreign aid. As such, the effectiveness 
of foreign aid began to be discussed in the context of aid weariness. 
2.2.3 How is foreign aid effectiveness measured and evaluated? 
Many stakeholders of foreign aid, including public donor agencies as well as recipient 
governments and NGOs, have been involved in examining what works and what does not work 
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in foreign aid. The voices of developing countries receiving foreign aid have tended to be weak 
compared with those of aid providers. Yet, as counterparts of donors, recipient countries usually 
have participated in various evaluation researches of donors. Some government officials of 
developing countries have published the results of their aid effectiveness research in academic 
journals in collaboration with experts from donor countries.17 I frame various major existing 
research findings from two different angles: one is related to development economics, which 
analyzes foreign aid from a macroeconomic perspective and primarily focuses on the conditions 
of aid recipient countries; the other is related to institutional economics, which analyzes foreign 
aid by examining the behavioral incentives of donor countries and the way aid is delivered.  
2.2.3.1 Macroeconomic perspective 
This section reviews some major arguments regarding the foreign aid and economic growth from 
a macroeconomic perspective. The World Bank Chief Economist François Bourguignon 
observes that, according to a number of cross-country regression analyses, the relationship 
between foreign aid and development outcomes is “fragile and often ambiguous” (Bourguignon 
& Sundberg, 2007, p.1). 18  A meta-analysis of 97 studies of the effects of development aid 
demonstrates that aid has an insignificant positive effect on growth (Doucouliagos & Paldam, 
2005). The following synopsis reveals the fragility and ambiguity of foreign aid effectiveness 
studies. 
                                                 
17 For example, a Japanese expert and government officials of Cambodia analyze the technical assistance and 
capacity development in Cambodia (Godfrey, M., Sophal, C., Kato, T., Piseth, L. V., Dorina, P., Saravy, T., Sovora, 
T., & Sovannarith, S., 2002). 
 
18 For example, Rajan and Subramanian (2005) find little robust evidence of a positive (or negative) relationship 
between aid inflows into a country and its economic growth.  
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I place Burnside and Dollar (2000) (henceforth, BD) at the core of my review because 
their results have a major impact on policy makers and practitioners in international 
development. BD becomes influential because some governments and international organizations 
have used this article as a basis for their decisions. BD asserts that foreign aid has contributed to 
economic growth in countries with strong policy environments (p. 864). They then suggest that 
foreign aid be allocated to these countries in order to increase the aid effectiveness. Some aid 
organizations are adopting BD’s suggestions as a basis of their strategies. For example, the 
United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development at Monterrey, Mexico in 
March 2002 cited BD. At this post 9/11 watershed conference, international communities 
pledged to significantly increase their amount of foreign aid (United Nations, 2002, March).  
In addition, BD plays an important role in the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) in 
selecting the eligible countries. MCA is a new foreign aid system of the U.S. established by 
President George W. Bush (Easterly, 2003). In addition to this article, I chose the following 
articles for the literature review: Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004) have skeptical visions 
toward BD; Gomanee (2002, September) has a neutral view; Hansen and Tarp (2001) oppose 
BD; and the World Bank (1998) supports the vision of BD. On the other hand, it should be 
noted that there is an article which concludes that aid neither increases investment nor benefits 
the poor, but it does increase the size of government (Boone, 1996). This diversity of opinions 
illustrates the nebulous role of foreign aid in development.  
Hansen and Tarp (2001) point out the substantial difficulty of the analysis of aid and 
growth: the absence of a clear theoretical explanation about the aid-growth processes from an 
institutional perspective. This analysis would be required to create satisfactory empirical 
specifications and formulate testable hypotheses (p.566). By changing the variables or the dataset 
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of the BD, different results are derived and resultant different policy implications are generated. 
In other words, the deliberation of aid-growth analysis is still an on-going process; uncertainty 
and fragility will continue until a better theoretical explanation is found.  
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) try to solve this uncertainty. They present the 
idea that a country’s current institutional quality, which is estimated by the effect institutions 
have on economic performance, is related to its colonial experience. Although they mention that 
colonial policies did not necessarily predetermine today’s institutions, they emphasize that the 
mode of colonial settlement is a factor affecting a country’s institutions.  
How above-mentioned articles study the problem as well as what can be learned from the 
articles regarding foreign aid and economic growth can be summarized as follows: Easterly et al. 
(2004) have a skeptical view of the conclusion of BD: aid has a positive impact on growth in 
developing countries with good policies but has little effect in the countries with poor policies. In 
order to show their doubt, Easterly et al. reassess BD’s analysis using the same specifications but 
adding new information available after the BD analysis and extending the data for four more 
years (p.774). Their results do not support BD’s assertion that aid encourages economic growth 
in a country with good policies (p.779). It is interesting to see that Easterly et al. evaluate the BD 
paper as one that makes a difference in the aid effectiveness argument, but comment that the 
answers to this issue have not yet been found (p.780). This implies that, before BD, no reliable 
empirical economic analysis of the relationship between aid and growth existed. The comment of 
Easterly et al. seems to be a warning to the community of international aid business, particularly 
to the United States and the United Nations, which use the BD as one of the theoretical bases for 
foreign aid strategy. 
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Gomanee (2002, September) does not attempt to discuss the validity of BD, but rather 
shows a different angle to examine the relationship between aid and growth. After making a 
regression analysis focusing on investment in relation to the economic growth, he concludes that 
foreign aid has had a positive effect on growth largely through investments (p.18). Unlike BD, 
who focuses on policies, Gomanee analyzes the relationship between aid and growth in terms of 
investment as a determinant of growth. His argument does not become a direct counterargument 
toward BD. However, as he infers that Africa’s economic growth would have deteriorated more 
than it did without foreign aid, it seems that his stance opposes that of BD. This is because quite 
a few African countries do not necessarily have good policies in terms of finance, budget, and 
trade while those countries with good policies tend to be selected as eligible aid recipients by the 
U.S. and the World Bank. The hidden message of Gomanee seems to be that the international 
community should not abandon poor African countries just because their policies are not 
necessarily good from BD’s point of view. 
Hansen and Tarp (2001) provide an opposite view on BD. They analyze the relationship 
between aid and growth using cross-country regression. Different from BD’s methodology, they 
include investment and human capital in the growth regression (p.548). Their analysis leads them 
to conclude that foreign aid contributes to the growth rate; their results do not support BD’s 
conclusion that foreign aid contributes to economic growth in the countries with good policy 
environments (p.566). It is further interesting to note that Hansen and Tarp suggest the need for 
more theoretical work regarding the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth 
before the results of various cross-country regression, including those of their study, are utilized 
in the real world settings (p.566). This seems to be a more explicit warning than that of Easterly 
et al. (2004). However, in the U.N. Monterrey Conference, held after Hansen and Tarp 
 41 
published, used the result of BD as a basis of the argument; this Conference became a precedent 
in forming a new trend of international development in the post 9/11 world. 
The World Bank (1998) aims to rethink foreign aid in post cold war international 
structure (p.ix). It analyzes many topics that could contribute to re-conceptualizing foreign 
assistance in light of a new paradigm. Regarding the relationship between aid and growth, The 
World Bank supports the view of BD.19 In addition to the BD argument, the World Bank (1998) 
used the results of cross-country analysis of public investment projects financed by the Bank 
according to the borrowers’ economic management (p.14). The World Bank’s conclusion is the 
same as BD; the Bank asserts that aid has a positive effect on economic growth when 
development countries have stable economic environments and sound policies; foreign aid would 
not work in the countries with poor management (p.14). It is important to note that the World 
Bank is not only a research institute but also an organization that implements foreign aid. 
Because the Bank recommends that foreign aid be allocated to poor countries with good policies, 
it has implemented its aid projects in line with this recommendation (pp.15-16). With its huge 
amount of financial resources and political power, the Bank has had a significant influence on 
developing countries as well as the international community, and its assertion has become the 
mainstream; nevertheless, doubts and uncertainty concerning the argument of BD still remain. 
One reason why the World Bank suggests that aid be allocated to those countries with 
strong policies is that aid resource is fungible. Cassen and Associates (1994) define fungibility as 
“the argument that aid really finances, not the high-priority investments it ostensibly pays for, 
which ‘would have been carried out anyway’ but the more marginal investments (or even 
consumption) which aid permits the recipient to finance” (p.17). The World Bank turns to food 
                                                 
19 The World Bank (1998) cites the working paper version of BD to support their argument (Burnside & Dollar, 
1997). 
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stamps to illustrate fungibility: “Food stamp recipients are sophisticate and have their own 
objectives, in which case the recipient would reduce expenditures on food from their non-food 
stamp income dollar-for-dollar with increases in food stamp expenditures” (World Bank, 1998, 
p.63). Likewise, François Bourguignon, the Bank’s Chief Economist, states that “money is 
fungible, even with earmarking” and “due to the difficulty of attribution, it is not really possible 
to say how many children inoculated or crops taken to markets on account of a dollar of aid” 
(Bourguignon & Sundberg, 2007, p.3). Allan Meltzer of Carnegie Mellon University, who 
provided advice regarding the reform of the World Bank, echoes the fungibility of foreign aid: 
“Money is fungible. Projects with the highest social or economic return may be used to get a loan 
from the Bank, but they would have been done in any case” (Meltzer, 2005, March 18). All of 
these experts agree that, to make foreign aid effective, it is imperative to shift focus from donors’ 
aid projects to recipient countries and their capacity.  
In the post 9/11 world, effectiveness of foreign aid has been widely discussed to ensure 
the economic growth and poverty reduction in developing countries. To clarify the relationship 
between aid and growth, the Burnside and Dollar (2000) article is the first empirically analyze 
this issue; the result was shared among various aid agencies for a basis of building their strategy. 
The World Bank (1998) supported this. However, the Bank’s recommendation that aid 
contributes to growth as long as countries have good policies cannot be completely generalized. 
Easterly et al. (2004) and Hansen and Tarp (2001) show that the BD’s conclusion is not valid if 
dataset are extended and some additional variables are employed. In addition, Gomanee (2002, 
September), Easterly et al. (2004), and Hansen and Tarp (2001) imply that it is too early for aid 
policymakers and practitioners to use BD as a basis of their aid strategies; they raise the point 
that a valid theoretical explanation should be designed. 
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2.2.3.2 Institutional economics’ perspective  
Unlike the aid effectiveness research from a macroeconomic perspective, the application of 
institutional economics to the research of foreign aid has not been common so far because of the 
difficulty in accessing empirical data (Martens, 2002, p.5). However, some institutional 
economists have analyzed foreign aid by applying the principal-agent perspective.  
Many institutional economists have made major contributions to the analysis of foreign 
aid. For example, Pietrobelli and Scarpa (1992) focus on contractual forms between donors and 
recipients, arguing that the incentive mechanism of foreign aid should be redesigned to induce 
developing countries to more effectively use the aid resources they receive. Meanwhile, Collier, 
Guillaumont, Guillaumont, and Gunning (1997) discuss conditionality problems in foreign aid. 
Analyzing the outcomes of conditionality by donors, they explored how the ownership of 
recipient countries was undermined.  
Rodrick (1995, June) examines the advantages of multilateral lending donor agencies. He 
empirically analyzed the role of multilateral donors in information provision in terms of 
monitoring governmental policies in recipient countries as well as their exercise of 
conditionality; Rodrick argues that the interaction between multilateral donors and recipients 
could be less politicized than inter-governmental links. 
Streeten (1988) explores the principal-agent question in aid conditionality. Citing a case 
of a multilateral lending agency imposing conditions for loans, he analyzes how conditionality, 
which an outside body imposes, creates irritation and acrimony even if the conditions are in the 
interest of recipient countries and even if their policy-makers agree with them (p.110). Although 
some of the above-mentioned articles do not explicitly mention the principal-agent theory, they 
analyze the effectiveness of foreign aid from the institutional perspective.  
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2.2.4 MDGs and EFA 
I will briefly touch upon how the effectiveness of major foreign aid policies are monitored and 
evaluated by focusing on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Education for All 
(EFA) goals. Since the launch of MDGs in 2000, the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan 
nominated Mark Malloch Brown, the then administrator of UNDP, and Jeffrey Sachs, an 
economist of Columbia University, as the scorekeeper and campaign manager of the MDGs. The 
Millennium Project was organized for the purpose of promoting the MDGs, and both Malloch 
Brown and Sachs have taken the initiative in not only monitoring the progress of MDGs but also 
in encouraging rich countries to mobilize more resources for the achievement of MDGs. The 
latest report by the Millennium Project, which was presented at the U.N. General Assembly in 
September 2005, conclude that the MDGs are not achievable in broad regions; in particular, 
many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are far off track (United Nations Millennium Project, 
2005). UNDP (2003) reports that, at the current pace, Sub-Saharan Africa would not reach the 
goal of halving income poverty until 2147 (p.2). UNDP suggests that the pace of progress should 
be dramatically accelerated since a business-as-usual approach would not realize the MDGs (p.2). 
Bryant and Kappaz (2005) explain the indicators for measuring what has happened, or 
might happen, for any foreign aid activities, which can be a basis for understanding the 
monitoring and evaluating of MDGs and EFA (p.138). The indicators can be differentiated along 
a continuum as follows: 1) inputs, i.e., activities used to actualize the project; 2) outputs, i.e., 
products and services produced with inputs; 3) outcomes, i.e., short-term results generated by 
project outputs; and 4) impact, i.e., longer-term change as a result of the project (p.141). Bryant 
and Kappaz state that the MDGs’ explicit targets and indicators increased the attention to the 
goals themselves: thousands of actors and aid agencies feel a sense of ownership of the MDGs 
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and therefore monitor the progress in different places and settings (p.144). This positive change 
among various stakeholders of the world can be counted as an impact of the MDGs.  
The MDGs are too ambitious for many developing countries to really achieve. Still, 
examining how foreign aid has been delivered by various actors and what kind of incentive 
structures (or interests) have been out there will shed light on why they could not be achieved 
and will be beneficial for future foreign aid activities. UNDP (2003) points out that the MDGs 
can be achieved where national ownership by governments and communities exists and the 
Goals can spur democratic debate (pp. 1-2). When there is pressure from engaged populations, 
leaders are more likely to take the actions required for the MDGs (p.2). This analysis may share 
a similar value with Burnside and Dollar (2000), who emphasize the importance of governance 
for improving foreign aid effectiveness. Lack of democratic debate, therefore, may be a cause of 
impeding the MDGs. This factor should be more deeply analyzed from the perspective of how 
foreign aid could foster the ownership of recipients, not only at the governmental level but also 
at the community level. 
The EFA Global Monitoring Report was launched by UNESCO to monitor and evaluate 
the progress of the six EFA Dakar goals; the MDGs duplicate two of these goals. UNESCO has 
undertaken the monitoring of EFA. The annual EFA Global Monitoring Report was established 
in 2001 by compiling existing educational reports. The Report, prepared by an independently 
organized section in UNESCO, addresses the progress of EFA all over the world. The latest 
Report describes pessimistic perspectives: while total aid to basic education could double, 
reaching about US$3-3.5 billion by 2006, it remains far short of the US$7 billion per year that is 
required if the goal of universal primary completion, let alone the other EFA goals, is to be 
achieved by 2015 (UNESCO, 2004b). The Report also analyzes an issue of EFA each year: the 
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2005 Report deals with the quality of education, while the 2006 and 2007 Reports respectively 
address literacy and early childhood care and education. The Report has also been discussed in 
the UNESCO-convened international EFA conferences in order to generate synergy with 
UNESCO’s other coordination activities. 
2.2.5 Concluding remarks 
This section briefly reviews major research findings regarding the foreign aid effectiveness. 
From a macroeconomic perspective, various economists, including a foreign aid agency such as 
the World Bank, conducted the research focusing on the contribution of foreign aid to the growth 
of developing countries. Many of them discuss whether governance, or sound policy, of 
developing countries is a determinant for effective foreign aid. However, they do not address the 
mechanisms by which foreign aid is delivered from developed countries to developing countries. 
On the other hand, from the perspective of institutional economics, some economists focus on 
the side of foreign aid providers; they pay attention to behavioral incentives of donor countries in 
the process of foreign aid delivery. Although their theoretical models are well-structured, based 
on the principal-agent theory, those models have not been tested empirically due to the difficulty 
of accessing and collecting data of foreign aid agencies.  
The arguments from the macroeconomic perspective can be a basis for exploring the 
effectiveness of the EFA-FTI, the focus of my dissertation, because many developing countries 
include EFA-related activities in their national development strategy, such as the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers. Regarding the perspective of institutional economics, the challenge 
in accessing empirical data of donor agencies may be overcome when it comes to the EFA. 
UNESCO, which has provided an arena for discussion regarding the EFA, has played the only 
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coordinator’s role since 1990. Various matters regarding donors’ behaviors have been discussed 
in their forum; some of these matters can be used as empirical evidence to analyze donors’ 
behaviors, or the foreign aid delivery. In addition, regarding the primary school completion goal 
among six EFA goals, the World Bank established the FTI secretariat in cooperation with other 
donors and provided an arena for the primary completion, which is the main focus of my 
dissertation (Bruns, Mingat, & Rakotomalala, 2003, p.17). By concentrating the foreign aid 
delivery in the FTI, I prepare my dissertation by making use of empirical information from these 
aid agencies and from other actors such as bilateral donors and the governments of developing 
countries.  
2.3 EDUCATION IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
2.3.1 Introduction 
In the context of international development, different people frame education differently. The 
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan described education as “a human right with 
immense power to transform” and claimed that on “its foundation rest the cornerstones of 
freedom, democracy and sustainable human development” (UNICEF, 1999, p.4). As implied by 
his words, there seem to be two different views in the discussion of education in developing 
countries. One view sees education as important for the socio-economic development of 
developing countries, which may include the prevalence of freedom, democracy, and sustainable 
human development. The other view regards education per se as valuable because education is a 
human right. 
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In this section, I focus on the former perspective of education, that education is important 
for the socio-economic development of developing countries. My research interest lies in 
analyzing the effectiveness of foreign aid in education; also, a critical objective of foreign aid is 
to realize socio-economic development in recipient countries, although foreign aid is usually 
used for other purposes such as a political and diplomatic tool of donor countries or 
organizations. Therefore, the approach I use in this paper is to explore how education can 
contribute to the socio-economic development of developing countries from the perspective of 
development economics.  
As represented in the U.N. Millennium Declaration adopted in 2000, poverty eradication 
in developing countries has become a common challenge for all those who are engaged in 
international development, despite the different views on education among foreign aid 
agencies. 20  Development economics is an important discipline in analyzing education in 
international development, because it functions as one of the common languages among scholars 
and practitioners. This section reviews how development economics views education; it further 
examines its significance and limitations in solving various challenges of educational 
development in developing countries.  
2.3.2 Concept of human capital 
In the economic climate of the 18th century, Adam Smith considered human beings as playing a 
critical part within national welfare. Although he did not explicitly mention the role of education 
                                                 
20 The U.N. Millennium Declaration is the declaration adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 2000. The 
Declaration spells out a will of the international community to “free our fellow men, women and children from the 
abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to which more than a billion of them are currently 
subjected” and a commitment “to making the right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire 
human race from want” (United Nations, 2000).  
 49 
in a national economy, he argued that one sort of labor adds value to the national economy and 
another has no such effect (Otteson, 2004, p.129). This suggests the importance of the quality of 
the labor force in economic growth, which then led to the human capital theory in later years.  
The role of education in economic development is clearly formulated by economists such 
as Schultz, Becker, and Mincer in the 1960s. Schultz (1963) proposes the notion of human 
capital, which includes the idea that “people enhance their capabilities as producers and as 
consumers by investing in themselves and that schooling is the largest investment in human 
capital” (p.x); the framework to evaluate the returns of human capital uses the concepts of 
foregone earnings and opportunity costs (pp.5-6).  
Becker (1964) develops a formula of how human capital can be accumulated for 
economic growth. He spells out how an individual’s investment behavior accumulates the human 
capital in the light of the cost and benefit of education (i.e., an individual’s optimum behavior).21 
Mincer (1974) proposes the Mincer Specification, an economic model that estimates the rate of 
return in education in order to quantitatively measure an individual’s investment behavior toward 
the human capital.  
Many economists view education as a factor that produces value in terms of economics 
by using empirical evidence to show that human capital would contribute to the increase of 
goods and services in the end. Boissiere, Knight, and Sabot (1985) demonstrate that the human 
capital theory is valid by using the data of secondary education of Kenya and Tanzania.22 The 
World Bank starts to utilize human capital theory in its discussion of educational policy in 
                                                 
21 Becker (1964) starts with a discussion of special kinds of human capital with attention to on-the-job training and 
then moves to a general theory that applies to any kind of human capital (p.153). 
 
22 By using their survey data from East Africa, Boissiere et al. (1985) conclude that “literate and numerate workers 
are more productive, and that education is valuable to workers because it can give them skills that increase their 
productivity” (p.1029).  
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developing countries; this theory becomes influential on the foreign aid policies of donors 
(Psacharopoulos & Woodhall, 1985).23 Psacharopoulos (1984) analyzes that traditional growth 
accounting is likely to underestimate the contribution of education to growth (pp.350-351). 
Schultz (1989) defines his findings regarding human capital as: 1) the rate of return of increase in 
human capital is higher than that of reproducible physical capital and 2) human capital enhances 
the productivity of both the physical and human capital (pp.219-220). 
2.3.3 Role of education in growth at a macro level 
Many economists have analyzed the role of education in economic growth by using growth 
accounting, which is based on the idea of production function in macro economy. Some of those 
arguments reflect the notion of human capital.  
Solow (1956) presents a neo-classical growth model. His production function only 
contains physical capital and raw labor; human capital is exogenously determined. With constant 
returns to scale assumed, Solow’s model displays diminishing returns to increased physical 
capital per worker. Solow’s model does not consider human capital, and it treats technical 
progress, something that cannot be explained by the input of physical capital and labor, as an 
exogenous factor.  
On the other hand, Lucas (1988) focuses on the linkage of human capital to the 
dissemination of technical change. His model is known as the endogenous growth theory. The 
production function of Lucas places the human capital centrally in growth; the levels of human 
capital are endogenously determined by household time allocation decisions. Mankiw, Romer, 
                                                 
23 Psacharopoulos and Woodhall (1985) explain that one of the principles of the World Bank’s Education Sector 
Policy Paper in 1980 includes increasing productivity and promoting social equity (p.5).  
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and Weil (1992) assume constant returns to scale when human capital is included. They 
demonstrate that there are diminishing returns to human and physical capital, but countries with 
a higher rate of investment in human capital continue to grow faster.  
Denison (1962) presents an example of empirical study regarding the role of education on 
economic growth. In the determinants of economic growth of the U.S. from 1929 to 1957, he 
finds the existence of a non-negligible amount of “residual” part which the increase of inputs of 
capital stock and labor cannot explain.24  Denison suggests that the factors of production in 
traditional economics (i.e., physical capital, labor, and land) could not explain America’s 
economic growth during these years. He instead insists that the advance of knowledge, which is 
brought about by education or human capital, better explained the growth of the U.S.; this 
knowledge advancement could be observed as “residual” (p.229). Denison (1967) also attributes 
23% of America’s economic growth from 1950 to 1962 to the improvement of education among 
labor forces.25 His idea of the improvement of knowledge is recognized as the Total Factor 
Productivity. 
The Total Factor Productivity (TFP) has been widely discussed in analyzing the 
contribution of human capital to growth. Solow (1957) first applies this concept to his analysis of 
the causes of economic growth. Using the economy of the United States as an example, Solow 
focuses on the technical change in the aggregate production function. He concludes that 87.5% 
of American gross output growth from 1909 to 1949 results from technical change. This concept, 
                                                 
24 Denison (1962) concludes that, after the examination of “a great variety of developments that might have affected 
the growth rate” of the U.S, “the quantitative effect of many must be negligible” (p.229).  
 
25 Denison (1967) analyzes that advances of knowledge as 23% of the sources of growth in the United States 
between 1950 and 1962 (p.299).  
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known as the Solow residual, relates to that portion of output that is not attributed to labor and 
capital inputs.  
TFP was applied to the analysis of high performance in East Asian countries in the 1980s. 
One of the assertions of the World Bank’s “East Asian Miracle” is that the growth of TFP is a 
cause of growth in East Asia (World Bank, 1993). Krugman (1994) critiques this discussion of 
TFP by concluding that the economic growth in East Asia is not due to the progress of 
technology but to the improvement of the educational level of the labor force, and the growth of 
capital. This implies that there is still a significant uncertainty in interpreting and analyzing TFP; 
the concept of TFP may inherently contain some ambiguity because it has emerged from a 
“residual” part of growth accounting that may be invisible and unobservable. These arguments 
regarding TFP, which refer to an output from the human capital including education, 
demonstrate that education is important in economic growth. 
2.3.4 Role of education in growth at a micro level 
The role of education in economic growth has been analyzed at a micro level by using the rate of 
return analysis of education. Schultz, Becker, Mincer, and Rees, the economists who developed 
the notion of human capital, contribute to the development of the rate of return analysis of 
education. Schultz (1963) conceptualizes the private benefit of education by using the cost of 
education, including forgone earnings as well as an individual’s income and the social benefit of 
education in economic growth (pp.5-11).  
Using Schutltz’s conceptualization, Becker (1964) establishes the theoretical framework 
of rate of return analysis of education. The rate of return analysis of education is explained by 
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private rate and social rate.26 The private rate of return to education quantitatively measures an 
individual’s benefit of education. The social rate of return to education is usually used to decide 
an investment priority from the government’s point of view. 
Mincer (1974) proposes an econometric model to analyze the role of education in 
economic growth by using the earning function regression method. Rees (1979) concludes that 
Schultz’s concept of private and social benefits of education is significant for governments in 
deciding the amount of resources they allot for the education sector.27 
Psacharopoulos is a representative economist who applied these models to analyze 
education in developing countries. He explains some tendencies regarding the rate of return to 
education based upon the results of cross-national analysis, which conclude that “primary 
education continues to be the number one investment priority in developing countries” and 
“investment in women’s education is in general more profitable than that for men” 
(Psacharopoulos, 1994, p.1325). These findings have encouraged many donor agencies to assist 
primary education in developing countries. At the same time, Psacharopoulos and Woodhall 
(1985) mention “the widespread belief” in the World Bank that “universal rules cannot be 
applied and that educational investment must be broad and diverse if it is to respond to the 
diverse needs of developing countries” (p.321).  
                                                 
26 Becker (1964) explains the private and social rate of returns by using the following examples: “because observed 
earnings are gross of the return on human capital, some person earn more than others simply because they invest 
more in themselves” (p.153); meanwhile, “some investments in human capital do not affect earnings because costs 
are paid and returns are collected not by the persons involved but by the firms, industries, and countries employing 
them” (p.154).  
 
27 Rees (1979) explains that the market for human capital is “for the service of the capital rather than for the capital 
stock or capital goods” and “this is the major reason why most of the investment in schooling is made by students or 
their families, and much of the rest is made by governments or such nonprofit institutions as foundations and 
universities” (pp.35-36). 
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Likewise, Barro (1991) shows that investment in primary and secondary education 
contributes to economic growth. 28  Barro and Lee (1993) conclude that the male secondary 
school enrollment rates have a positive effect on economic growth by analyzing the data of 
economic growth from 1965 to 1985 in 116 countries.29 
On the other hand, Pritchett (2001) argues that education is not a sufficient condition for 
economic growth. Based on his analysis of the cross-national data, Pritchett concluded that, on 
average, “education contributed much less to growth than would have been expected in the 
standard augmented Solow model” (p.387).30 
2.3.5 Beyond human capital theory 
So far, I have reviewed various perspectives regarding education and development, focusing on 
the human capital theory. However, some arguments of education and development by 
development economists go beyond the human capital theory. I briefly touch upon two of these. 
One perspective is social capital. Since the mid 1990s, the concept of social capital has 
been discussed in the context of development. Putnam (1993) asserts that the social capital, 
which refers to trust, norms of reciprocity, and the network of civic engagement, made a 
difference in the institutional performance of local governments in Italy (p.167). Likewise, 
Coleman (1988) argues that social capital in the family and in the community aids the formation 
                                                 
28 “For 98 countries in the period 1960-1985, the growth rate of real per capita GDP is positively related to the initial 
human capital” and “negatively related to the initial level of real per capita GDP. Countries with higher human 
capital also have lower fertility rates and higher ratios of physical investment to GDP” (Barro, 1991, p.407). 
 
29 Barro and Lee (1993) conclude that differences in growth rates across countries relate systematically to a set of 
explanatory variables and indicated the positive effect on growth to the initial levels of secondary-school attainment 
as one element of this set (p.38).  
 
30 Pritchett (2001) demonstrates that “in some countries, schooling has been enormously effective in transmitting 
knowledge and skills, while in others it has been essentially worthless and has created no skills” (p.387). 
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of human capital (p.S118). Heyneman (1999) claims that social capital can be created through 
effective schooling (p.5). These arguments drew the attention of professionals of international 
development, and the World Bank takes up social capital in the World Development report 
2000/2001. Social capital, such as kinship systems, local organizations, and networks of the 
poor, affects development by forming social skills of individuals, facilitating coordination and 
cooperation for mutual benefit in local communities, and creating social environments that shape 
social structures and enable norms to develop (World Bank, 2000, p.129).  
The other perspective is human capability, which Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen presents 
as a core concept of development. Sen (1999) differentiates human capital from human 
capability. While human capital tends to “concentrate on the agency of the human beings in 
augmenting production possibilities,” human capability addresses the substantive freedom—the 
ability of people “to lead the lives that they have reason to value and to enhance the real choices 
they have (p.293).  
These perspectives demonstrate a variation of views on education and development in 
development economics, which is separate from the pure neo-classical views. These perspectives 
should also be taken into account in analyzing foreign aid policy in the education sector.  
2.3.6 Strengths and limitations of development economics 
The significance of development economics in analyzing education in developing countries is 
that the analysis of education, i.e., the analysis based upon the notion of human capital and the 
rate of return of education to economic growth, provides critical information for the policy 
makers in developing countries. From the viewpoint of scholars and practitioners in international 
development, investment priority is a critical problem. Education is not the only important sector 
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for socio-economic development of developing countries. With scarce resources, policy makers 
have to make a decision regarding how many resources should be allotted to the education sector 
and to what extent the current situation of education should be changed. Here, policy makers 
need economic development theory to endorse the information and statistics to support it so they 
can make a proper and rational decision. In this sense, the analysis of education from the 
perspective of development economics is extremely significant and useful for the development of 
impoverished countries.  
However, development economics has many limitations when analyzing education by 
development economics. Generally speaking, since development economists, particularly those 
using a purely neo-classical perspective, analyze education by exploring the “residual,” those 
economists tend to treat education as a black box; they pay less attention to such qualitative 
issues as capacity development than scholars in other academic fields. Additionally, empirical 
evidence does not necessarily support the theory of human capital, as Pritchett (2001) points out.  
2.3.7 Concluding remarks 
Focusing mainly on the human capital theory, this section briefly reviews the views and research 
findings of development economists on education. A series of these arguments will be beneficial 
in my analysis of the effectiveness of foreign aid in the FTI, which is the topic of my 
dissertation. Various actors in developing countries and donor communities have tried to make 
maximum use of limited resources for the FTI by planning, implementing, monitoring, and 
evaluating activities for the achievement of the FTI’s goals. The development economists’ 
arguments of education will help me frame the effectiveness of the FTI because, for both the 
policymakers in developing countries and foreign aid workers, the challenging questions would 
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be how they could ensure sufficient resources, to what extent the current situations should be 
changed, and how the outcome of the FTI activities can be sustained. The analysis by 
development economists, which emphasizes economic theories and statistical evidence, should 
be the basis for discussion of the effectiveness of the FTI. 
However, not only the FTI but also foreign aid activity in general has multiple objectives; 
therefore, the interests and incentives of stakeholders are diverse. Here, the analysis of 
organizational management or institutional economics will be useful in order to address the issue 
of the incentive structure in the FTI; the institutional economics will complement the arguments 
of development economics in analyzing the effectiveness of FTI. In developing the thesis of my 
dissertation, I use the combination of these disciplines.  
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3.0  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the research methodology, including data collection methods and 
analytical measures. The following framework is employed to address my research problem on 
foreign aid effectiveness in the FTI and to prove the hypotheses. The following flow chart 
depicts the research methodology.  
 
 
Figure 6. Chap r 3 flow chart 
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3.1 GENERAL DIRECTION 
As I explained in Chapter 1, this paper analyzes the causal pathway of foreign aid in the FTI by 
focusing on the policies and practices of donor agencies. In other words, this study tries to clarify 
how donor agencies mobilize their resources to promote the FTI, rather than examining how 
much foreign aid donors spend for the FTI and to what extent the FTI indicators of developing 
countries improve. My primary interest lies in the analysis of donor agencies and their behaviors, 
rather than the situations of recipient countries. Also, since foreign aid is not the only 
determinant of the success of the FTI, I would like to narrow my focus to the institutions of 
donor agencies in relation to the FTI. I prefer this approach more than one that implements 
traditional economist-type research by identifying independent and dependent variables and 
showing their correlation, with a view towards addressing this broad research topic in a 
manageable scope. Therefore, in order to address my research problem as well as to examine the 
hypotheses described in Chapter 1, I employ a qualitative-oriented research methodology that 
uses a number of quantitative data as a source of information.  
In designing my research, I refer to King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) in an attempt to 
connect the traditions of qualitative and quantitative research by applying a logic of inference to 
both (p.3). Regarding the paradigm, my inquiry will be a phenomenology-oriented one that pays 
a certain attention to positivism. My study attempts to comprehend the complexity, which may 
include chaos and uncertainty, of the mechanism regarding donors’ foreign aid provision for FTI, 
while also respecting the accumulation of insights from economics, which tries to pursue 
objective reality. 
Using the following data to examine my research problems and hypotheses, I seek to 
clarify the causal pathways of foreign aid effectiveness, not to examine its cause and effect 
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relationship. This is because foreign aid is not the only factor that affects the performance of the 
FTI and other changes within recipient countries. 
The data that indicate outcomes of foreign aid provided by donor agencies for the FTI 
include: 1) the FTI performance of recipients and 2) the interests of donors. While donors have 
multiple objectives in providing foreign aid, I classify them into two categories which may be 
interrelated: 1) providing aid for assisting developing countries for the sake of improving the FTI 
performance of the recipients and 2) providing for the donors’ own interests, which include their 
national security and their political, diplomatic, and commercial interests. 
The EFA Global Monitoring Report published by UNESCO serves a primary source of 
information for the first variable that focuses on the FTI performance of recipients. Alternative 
sources include the documentations of target donors and recipient governments. Regarding the 
second variable of donors’ interests, the documentations of donor agencies and recipient 
governments act as primary sources of information, with the documentations of OECD-DAC, 
NGOs, civil society groups, and think-tanks as alternative sources.  
Concerning the data that indicate the input from donor agencies, which may partly 
explain the outcomes of foreign aid, I emphasize the quantity and quality of target donors’ 
foreign aid for the FTI. The quantity refers to the amount of finances, in-kind resources, and 
knowledge acquiring opportunities provided by the target donors for the FTI. The quality refers 
to the modalities used by the target donors, which include project-type activities, Sector Wide 
Approaches (SWAps), Program-Based Approaches (PBAs), budget supports, and any other form 
of aid provision. I will use the documentations of target donors and their major recipients as a 
primary source of information. As alternative sources, I include the documentations of OECD-
DAC, NGOs, civil society groups, and think-tanks. Again, I would like to stress that the purpose 
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of this study is to clarify the causal pathway of foreign aid for the FTI by focusing on donor 
agencies’ institutions, rather than clarifying the relationship between the aid agencies’ inputs and 
the outcome of the FTI in recipient countries, which is beyond the scope of this study.   
3.2 APPLICATION OF OTHER AID EFFECTIVENESS STUDIES 
In accordance with the above-mentioned general direction and the approach shown by Keohane 
and Levy (1996), I collected the information and analyze it. Keohane and Levy analyze the 
effectiveness of foreign aid in the environment sector. By focusing on the institutions, those rules 
established to govern a resource flow from donors to recipients, they explore which conditions 
allow those institutions to be effective or ineffective in achieving their purposes: strengthening 
environmental policies in recipient countries and ultimately improving the quality of the natural 
environment (p.5). They claim that “the formulation and implementation of coherent and well-
designed policies governing the transfer of funds from rich to poor countries, to protect the 
natural environment, are subject to severe political constraints” (p.7). The methodology taken by 
Keohane and Levy fits to the context of my research because my study uses the institution of 
foreign aid agencies to analyze an international education initiative, similar to what they have 
done in their analysis of the international foreign aid initiative in the environment sector.   
I use the analytical “three Cs” framework employed by Keohane and Levy (1996): 
sufficient concern, solutions to contracting problem, and adequate capacity for designing and 
implementing specific measures (p.9). This framework, originally proposed by Haas, Keohane, 
and Levy (1993), tries to determine “whether, and through what mechanisms, international 
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institutions can be effective in making the environment more conducive to a healthy life for 
natural species, including but not limited to human being” (p.6). 
Like Keohane and Levy (1996), I do not conceptualize the “three Cs” of the target donors 
as purely “explanatory variables” that define the performance of the FTI in developing countries. 
This is because foreign aid activities of donor countries are “less causal factors than reflections 
of social forces, economic resources, and established institutional arrangements” (p.9). By 
utilizing this framework, I demonstrate causal pathways, which spell out the factors that must 
change for the improvement of aid effectiveness (p.9). I base my approach on that of Haas et al. 
(1993), which assert that “any effective action of international institutions with respect to the 
global environment is likely to follow a path that increases concern or capacity, or improves the 
contractual environment” (p.21). 
Also, it is important to recognize that donor agencies’ policies and approaches in 
providing foreign aid differ depending on the contexts of individual aid recipient countries. In 
order to address this differentiation, I conduct case studies by focusing on three recipient 
countries. I select Mongolia, Vietnam, and Cambodia as targets of my case study analysis. These 
three countries, all located in the region of East Asia, are FTI members as recipients of foreign 
aid since 2006.  I collected the following information of donor agencies in relation to the FTI and 
their approaches in these three Asian FTI-endorsed countries. 
3.2.1 Concerns 
Keohane and Levy (1996) define “concern” as “the interests in preserving the environment 
expressed by potential funders, recipients, and governments involved in a financial transfer” 
(p.9). My inquiry covers not only a financial transfer but also all other flows, including in-kind 
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resource transfers, in the light of the fungibility of aid resources. The significance of using 
“concern” is, as Keohane and Levy imply, to clarify the different priorities between funders and 
recipients and the resultant political tensions (p.9). 
I collect and analyze the information regarding donors’ political, economic, and other 
incentives in providing foreign aid, paying particular attention to the FTI. In the wake of a series 
of aid-related international conferences since the late 1990s, donor countries have committed to 
harmonizing their aid policies and practices to improve the effectiveness of development 
assistance; the Rome and Paris Declarations of Aid Effectiveness of 2003 and 2004 explicitly 
express this. In the meantime, donor countries more or less politicized foreign aid and treated it 
like pork barrel politics, suggesting that foreign aid cannot be free from the interests of 
politicians and voters of donor countries. I draw a comprehensive picture of the complex 
incentives of target donors in providing foreign aid in the FTI; these incentives not only include 
supporting educational development in developing countries but also satisfying their non-
altruistic interests. Based upon this incentive picture, I examine the aid effectiveness of the FTI 
in terms of how foreign aid ultimately fulfills the incentives of target donors. 
3.2.2 Contracting problems 
Keohane and Levy (1996) take up “contracting” as a part of the framework because they 
recognize conflicts over the distribution of resource transfer; “participants will seek insofar as 
possible to maximize the benefits they receive and shift costs by others” (p.10). I collect and 
analyze the information regarding the contracts 1) between resource providers and implementers, 
2) between policymakers and executing agencies, and 3) within executing agencies.  
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For the in-depth analysis of the contracting problems, I also employ the approach used by 
the institutional economists. 31  Martens et al. (2002) contribute a perspective of institutional 
economics to foreign aid effectiveness studies. Using the principal-agent theory, they examine 
“informational problems induce biases in the behavior of agents involved in aid delivery process 
and how this affects the ultimate performance of aid programs” (pp.7-8). They point out two 
types of problems of delegation which hamper the principals’ return compared to that under 
perfect information: moral hazard and adverse selection, described in Chapter 2. These problems 
result from asymmetry of information between principals and agents. These points clarify the 
principal-agent structure among stakeholders of foreign aid in the FTI and shed insight on the 
effectiveness of aid. Specifically, I examine how collaboration among donors, which may create 
multiple agents and complicate the principal-agent relationships in the FTI, either boosts or 
impedes the effectiveness of aid. 
3.2.3 Capacity 
Using a key concept in Agenda 21 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in 1992, Keohane and Levy (1996) define capacity building in terms of 
institutional capabilities and networks that enable countries to integrate development and policies 
(p.13). I pay particular attention to the capacity of those donor agencies, examining how donors’ 
capacity would facilitate or impede the performance of the FTI in providing foreign aid.  
In measuring organizational capacity, I specifically focus on the following points 
indicated by Bryant and Kappaz (2005): 1) learning processes across administrative boundaries; 
                                                 
31 Since the mid- to late-1990s, international development has added institutions to its agenda with the rise of new 
institutional economics initiated by the economic historian Douglas North (North, 1990). 
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2) ability to recognize, acknowledge, and correct errors; 3) motivated staff with performance 
goals; 4) budgets and records for financial accountability; and 5) products and policies of 
organization. These data sources include both descriptive and numerical information.  
Above all, I take notice of how donors address the dynamic changes of recipient 
countries and global political economy. This includes a focus on the strategy of the target donors 
towards new aid modalities and donor coordination. Donors are happy to see other donors 
coordinate around their own particular practices, but less willing to change their own practices to 
match those of others (Bigsten, 2006, p.20). I further look into the capacity of donors to 
contribute to global consensus building, to adjust to the new aid trends, and to reconcile the 
internationally-agreed development goals with donors’ specific interests. 
3.3 INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENT RESEARCH 
I use a qualitative approach for answering the research questions regarding foreign aid 
effectiveness in the FTI. This approach is pertinent because I try to clarify the aspect that is 
treated as a “black box” by using a number of economist-type quantitatively-oriented studies. 
Also, both the current donor reporting system and the recent trend of introducing a new aid 
modality make it difficult to track donor contributions to the FTI.32 This study, therefore, relies 
on descriptive information and findings from interviews, as well as available empirical and 
statistical evidence. I performed the analysis along the following lines:  
                                                 
32  Rothmann and Have (2004) indicate that OECD-DAC’s Creditor Reporting System cannot count the General 
Budget Support, which is an increasing aid modality employed by World Bank, DFID, and the EC, as an aid for 
primary education in (p.9). 
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In order to shape this study, I conducted document analyses and interviews. The 
following documents were collected and analyzed: 1) policy papers issued by the FTI 
Secretariat; 2) the EFA Global Monitoring Report issued by UNESCO; 3) papers issued by 
major donor agencies, particularly Lead Coordinating Agencies of the FTI, which describe 
education sector strategies and perspectives on foreign aid modality; 4) papers issued by donor 
agencies and recipient governments, which describe the situations of educational development 
and foreign aid in the field level; and 5) any other relevant information. I analyzed the 
information obtained from these documents in accordance with donors’ concerns, contracting 
problems, and capacities, which form the analytical framework of this study.  
In my attempt to understand the complexity of foreign aid by clarifying donors’ policies 
and behaviors, interviews proved to be indispensable. The candid and informal opinions of 
individual aid workers obtained from the interviews supplemented the document analyses and 
helped me clarify the reality of foreign aid in the education sector. Furthermore, incorporation of 
the informal and individual perspectives from the interviews has significance, especially because 
many documents published by donor agencies are written in a diplomatic manner. Because those 
documents usually do not provide a critical perspective toward donor agencies, it is difficult to 
unveil the reality of the FTI by merely relying on the document analysis. 
In designing the framework of the interviews, I borrowed the design created by Fillip 
(1997) and modified her specification to fit the context of my research.33  
I conducted interviews from December 2006 to February 2007. The interviewees 
consisted of a total number of 22 aid workers who were identified based upon analyzing the 
documents published by donor agencies. These aid workers have been either directly or 
                                                 
33 Fillip (1997) makes a policy analysis of the World Bank’s strategy on governance. Her research is based upon the 
document analysis and the interviews to the Bank staff members. 
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indirectly involved in the policymaking or implementation of the FTI or basic education. I 
compiled a list of the individuals who have assumed responsibilities regarding the FTI on the 
international level and those who have experiences in East Asia. Then, I contacted these people 
through e-mail to request either face-to-face interviews in Washington, D.C. or telephone 
interviews for those who reside in East Asia. Among the 22 professionals, 13 allowed me to 
interview them. In the end, I completed a total number of 12 face-to-face interviews and the e-
mail-based interview. Most of the interviewees reside in Washington, D.C., and have rich 
experience in the FTI or UPE in developing countries. Although I attempted to interview the 
professionals working in the field of East Asia via telephone or e-mail, none of them were 
available. The one interviewee I contacted for an e-mail-based interview is an FTI focal point of 
a bilateral donor agency. 
I selected a focused interview as the tool for this research (Merton, Fiske, & Kendall, 
1990). The interviewees were known to have participated in or have direct knowledge of the 
topic of study, i.e., the FTI or foreign aid in basic education. On the basis of the preliminary 
analysis of these documents, I developed an interview guide that addressed the following general 
questions in all interviews.  
3.4 QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEWS 
The following table indicates a list of the questions that I used for the interviews. 
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Table 1. Questions for interviews 
Introduction Have you observed the differences between FTI and non-FTI 
countries in terms of the performance of universal primary education 
(UPE) and donors’ business? If yes, what are those differences? 
 
Could you comment on the priority of the FTI? Does the FTI place 
higher priority on quantitative expansion of UPE rather than 
enriching its quality, or does it attempt to achieve both? What are 
your reflections on this? 
 
What has changed as a result of the FTI? 
1) Concerns Some scholars assert that donor agencies provide foreign aid in line 
with their own incentives, which is not necessarily assisting 
developing countries in the most need of help. Do you think this view 
can be applied to the FTI? If so, what kind of problems have you 
observed in the FTI in relation to donors’ incentives? 
 
The FTI claims that donor agencies should ensure the predictability 
and transparency in transferring their aid resources for UPE to 
developing countries. What kind of actions do you think the FTI can 
take to reach this objective (or to enable donor agencies to reach this 
objective)? 
 
Could you describe how the concerns of donor agencies have 
promoted or hampered UPE in developing countries?  
 
The Lead Coordinating Agency (LCA) plays a critical role in the 
process of FTI endorsement by coordinating various stakeholders. 
What are the incentives for donor agencies to become an LCA? What 
kind of challenges have you encountered in the current system of 
LCA?  
 
While recipient countries currently take an initiative to apply for the 
FTI, donor agencies initially nominated the FTI recipients. Have you 
observed any problems for donor agencies in relation to their 
concerns about the selection process in recipient countries? 
 
2) Contracting 
problems 
(between 
donors and 
recipients; 
among donors) 
 
Some documents report that the transaction costs in foreign aid for 
UPE to recipient countries have been reduced due to the FTI’s 
contributions to donor coordination and harmonization. Do you think 
this is an accurate view? 
 
The FTI does not mention the transaction costs to donor agencies. 
How do you assess the increase (or decrease) of donors’ transaction 
costs in the wake of the FTI? 
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For developing countries, being an FTI member does not guarantee 
the increase of aid resources but better aligns existing donors’ aid 
activities. Have you seen any problems in relation to this 
characteristic, particularly in terms of the incentives of recipients and 
donors to join the FTI? 
 
The FTI places priority on financing recurrent cost through Sector-
Wide Approaches (SWAps) or budget support while attempting to 
respect the ownership of recipient countries and the context of each 
developing country. Can you give examples of the problems that have 
arisen from the difference of aid modality (e.g. project, SWAps, 
budget support, etc.) among donor agencies?  
 
The FTI indicates that the Initiative’s responsibilities at the country 
level are rather informal and, therefore, sometimes unclear for 
outsiders. What kind of solutions do you think are feasible to solve 
this problem? 
 
The FTI indicates that there is a tension between the needs of 
developing countries and their compliance with the benchmarks the 
FTI requires. What kind of solutions do you think are feasible to 
solve this problem? 
 
3) Capacity 
 
What kind of capacity do you think the staff members of donor 
agencies should develop (or strengthen) to make the FTI effective? 
 
What changes do you think donor agencies should make for the FTI 
to better support UPE in developing countries?  
 
The FTI mentions that the Initiative’s operating modalities are not 
very easy to understand. How do you think this problem can be 
solved? 
 
The priority for the FTI Secretariat in 2007-8 is to strengthen the 
support for and assure the quality of the country level process. How 
do you think the capacity of the Secretariat can be strengthened? 
 
 
I sent the general questions in advance to all interviewee and asked them to provide me 
with a perspective as an individual expert rather than as a representative of their agency. 
Therefore, the data obtained from the interviews cannot be seen as representing the perspectives 
of specific aid agencies. Since I have collected and analyzed the official perspectives of various 
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aid agencies through the document analysis, the data from the interviews can be used to 
complement them. The data from interviews allowed me to unveil the complexity of donors’ 
policies and behaviors in relation to the FTI, something the official donors’ publications do not 
mention.   
During the interviews, I took extra care to creating a relaxed atmosphere in order to 
obtain honest and candid opinions from the interviewees based upon the advice of Merton et al. 
(1990). I used completely unstructured questions during the opening stage and assumed more 
control in the later stages. Moreover, like Fillip (1997), I only used note taking and memory to 
record responses. By not taping the conversation, I could extract the non-superficial responses 
from the aid workers with whom I met. I did not use pre-written questions or a pre-arranged 
order for the questions. Rather, I tried to manage the flow of the interviews by relying on the 
logical evolution of the conversation.  
Since I did not record the conversation during the interviews, my interview notes might 
seem paraphrased or somewhat arbitrary. In order to overcome this weakness, after completing 
the interviews, I sent the draft scripts of the interview notes to each interviewee and asked them 
to correct any notes that did not accurately reflect the contents of the conversation. I finalized the 
interview notes by incorporating the input of the interviewees. In this paper, I present the data 
from the interviews in the text as quoted, based upon these finalized interview notes. 
The following chapters present the results of my research. First, I describe the general 
design and structure of FTI, which includes how the problem is defined, what solutions are 
envisioned, and what mechanisms are forged to implement such solutions. Second, I explain 
some observed patterns of the FTI. Third, I evaluate the strategy of the FTI to make an overall 
judgment regarding to what extent the FTI has thus far contributed to the improvement of UPE. I 
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focus on the cases of a few developing countries in East Asia, which have participated in the 
FTI. In each stage of this discussion, I look into the causal pathways of the effectiveness of the 
FTI by focusing on concerns, contracting problems, and capacity of donor agencies, following 
the procedure of Keohane and Levy. 
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4.0  DESCRIPTION 
The following figure, a flow chart of Chapter 4 is concepts, further clarifies the issues covered. 
Figure 7. Chap r 4 flow chart 
Chapter 4. 
Description of 
the FTI
Problem 
definition
Solutions 
envisaged
Mechanism for 
implementation
Background The Indicative 
Framework
Field level
Leadership of 
the World 
Bank
Commmon 
funding 
channels
Global level
Problems Aid 
effectiveness/ 
Donor 
coordination
 
te
 73 
4.1 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The FTI aims for developing countries with appropriate policy environments to achieve UPE by 
2015; it hopes to succeed by concentrating donors’ resources on those countries on the “fast 
track.” The Meeting of the EFA Fast-Track Partnership in July 2002 at the World Bank launched 
this global initiative to facilitate the effort to achieve UPE by 2015. The concept of FTI stems 
from the following three commitments at the international arena in 2002: 1) “Education for 
Dynamic Economies: Action Plan to Accelerate Progress towards Education for All,” which the 
Development Committee of the World Bank and the IMF endorsed in April 2002 (Development 
Committee, 2002); 2) the Monterrey Consensus, endorsed by the member states of the United 
Nations at the International Conference on Financing for Development in March 2002, designed 
a new partnership between rich and poor countries based on mutual responsibility and 
accountability in order to achieve measurable improvements in sustainable growth and poverty 
reduction (United Nations, 2002, March); and 3) the Report of the G8 Education Task Force, 
endorsed by the heads of the G8 countries at Kananaskis Summit in June 2002, affirmed that G8 
countries supported the achievement of EFA Dakar goals with an emphasis on the UPE and 
gender equality (Kananaskis Summit, 2002). 
The UPE became a critical agenda since the World Conference on Education for All 
(WCEFA) in Jomtien in 1990, although foreign aid agencies had been making an effort to 
improve basic education before Jomtien.34 The U.N. agencies, which had usually taken a human 
                                                 
34 The WCEFA adopted the World Declaration on EFA, which states that all children, young people, and adults have 
the right to benefit from an education that will meet their basic learning needs (UNESCO, 2000, p.74). Despite 
tremendous effort to realize EFA by the international community during the 1990s, it became apparent that the 
policy goals set at the WCEFA in 1990 were overly ambitious. As a follow up to the WCEFA, the U.N. convened 
the World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal, in 2000, and launched the Dakar Framework of Action, which 
refined the commitment made at the WCEFA in 1990, to design the mechanism and strategies for achieving these 
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rights based approach to education, and the World Bank, which believed that investment in basic 
education would contribute to economic growth, unified and confirmed the necessity to support 
basic education in developing countries. 
The World Education Forum, held in Dakar in 2000, ten years after Jomtien, was based 
upon the realities that many developing countries did not achieve UPE, despite the global 
commitment in 1990 and the fact that donor countries did not significantly increase aid for basic 
education. 35  Six EFA goals, which include the UPE, were endorsed by the international 
community in Dakar. 36  World leaders affirmed that “no countries seriously committed to 
education for all will be thwarted in their achievement” due to a lack of resources (UNESCO, 
2000). This statement forms the basis of the FTI.  
The World Bank took the initiative of establishing the FTI in accordance with the request 
of the international community.37 Each year, the EFA High-Level meeting invites leaders of key 
donor and recipient countries to stimulate the political commitment to achieving EFA goals. The 
meeting held in 2001 concluded with the agreement that the World Bank, in collaboration with 
                                                                                                                                                             
goals. It placed EFA within the wider development framework (UNESCO, 2002a). Among six EFA goals, universal 
primary completion and gender equality were incorporated into the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and 
adopted at the U.N. General Assembly in the same year (World Bank, 2002b, pp.8-9). 
 
35 The EFA assessment in 2000 reported that the goals of WCEFA were reached only partially by 2000 (UNESCO, 
2000, p.12). For example, among 800 million children under six years of age, less than a third benefited from early 
childhood education; some 113 million children, 60% of whom were girls, had no access to primary schooling. The 
situation was especially serious in sub-Saharan Africa and South-West Asia; at least 880 million adults were 
illiterate, the majority of whom were women. 
 
36 The six goals include: 1) expanding early childhood care; 2) ensuring free and compulsory primary education of 
good quality by 2015 for all children; 3) meeting the learning needs of all young people and adults; 4) achieving a 
50 percent improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015; 5) eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary 
education by 2005 and achieving gender equality in education by 2015; and 6) improving all aspects of the quality 
of education (UNESCO, 2002a). 
 
37 The participants of the initial EFA High-Level Meeting, recognizing the importance of “partnerships, innovative 
approaches and potential impact of a range of coordinated activities responding directly to specific Dakar goals,” 
asked the World Bank to “take the lead in identifying the resource gaps” of developing countries to reach the goals 
(UNESCO, 2001, p.29). 
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U.N. agencies, needed to seek a new and innovative measure in order to fill the financial gap of 
to achieve universal primary school completion. The World Bank developed a proposal that 
required accelerated actions for achieving the EFA goals. It distributed this proposal to other 
donor agencies to encourage them to take coherent actions toward technical and financial 
requests by developing countries for their national education development (Development 
Committee, 2001). The Bank’s proposal, which attempted to select the recipient countries most 
likely to achieve the goal in order to ensure the program’s effectiveness and efficiency, was 
approved by the Development Committee in 2002 (Development Committee, 2002). 
The Development Committee, a forum of the World Bank and the IMF that facilitates 
intergovernmental consensus-building on development issues, debates ways to strengthen the 
FTI since its launch in 2002.38 Specifically, the Development Committee has called for the Bank 
and other donor agencies to more actively participate in the FTI. The Committee has attempted 
to mobilize more resources for the FTI, even though the FTI was “designed to address the data, 
policy, capacity and resource gaps that constrain progress in achieving Education for All” 
(Development Committee, 2004a). In the latest meeting in 2007, the Committee “recognized that 
more support is needed to finance national education plans” and “encouraged the Bank and other 
donors to play their part” for the FTI (Development Committee, 2007). In 2006, the Committee 
“recognized the importance of country ownership and the quality of education, and the need to 
expand the initiative to larger countries and fragile states” (Development Committee, 2006a). 
Likewise, the Committee “called upon bilateral donors and multilateral agencies to provide 
timely, predictable and sustained financing to support these efforts” and “reconfirmed the 
importance of efforts to help developing countries build capacity and address absorptive capacity 
                                                 
38 The Development Committee consists of 24 members, most of whom are Ministers of Finance or Development 
and represent the full membership of the World Bank and IMF (Development Committee, 2007). 
 76 
constraints” in 2005 (Development Committee, 2005). These institutions indicate that the 
greatest concern for the Development Committee of the World Bank is to fill the financial gap 
for developing countries so they can achieve UPE.  
The top management of the World Bank also emphasizes the necessity of increasing 
resource mobilization by donor agencies for the FTI. James Wolfensohn, the Bank President 
when the FTI was established, pointed out at the Bank’s annual meeting in 2004 that “the 
international community has not yet been able to mobilize the money” for UPE and “we are 
letting the children down – just as we did in 1990 in Jomtien, in Dakar in 2000, and again in 
Monterrey in 2002” (Wolfensohn, 2004). In his speeches at the Bank’s annual meetings, Paul 
Wolfowitz, Wolfensohn’s successor, echoed the necessity of budgeting more money for the 
FTI.39 
The management of the education sector of the World Bank emphasized another aspect 
of the FTI. Prior to the G8 Summit in St. Petersburg in 2006, in which education emerged as a 
key topic, Ruth Kagia, the Bank’s manager in the education sector, stressed that “the EFA is not 
an end in itself but a necessary foundation for dynamic, learning societies” while “FTI and EFA 
more generally remain grossly under funded” (Kagia, 2006, January 6). She asserts that “the 
basic tools provided by primary education are no longer sufficient for people entering the labor 
market.” While a viable secondary educational system is essential for spurring development in 
the 21st century, “about 80 percent of the fastest growing jobs of the future will require some 
                                                 
39 “Through the Education for All Fast Track Initiative, the Bank plans to join other donors to double the enrollment 
of girls in 60 countries over the next five years. We have a plan. Now we need the resources. We will need to raise 
at least $2.5 billion per year to fulfill the dreams of thousands of school children eager for a brighter future” 
(Wolfowitz, 2005). “The Education For All Fast Track Initiative has encouraged a growing number of countries, the 
majority of them in Africa, to develop credible plans for increasing primary school enrollment, especially of girls. 
That initiative could fulfill the dreams of 70 million children in 60 countries who want to go to school if--let me 
underscore that--if donors increase the resources that are needed to match improved performance” (Wolfowitz, 
2006). 
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post secondary education. Countries wishing to become active players in today’s advanced 
societies must cover all levels of education and training—from early childhood development and 
basic education, all the way to secondary and tertiary education and including lifelong learning 
opportunities” (Kagia, 2006, January 6). Her comment confirms that the Bank values education 
more as a means for development and growth than as a tool for human rights.   
Although the FTI owes a great deal to the commitment and dedication of the World Bank, 
it functions independently from the Bank. A staff member of the FTI Secretariat stressed that 
“the Secretariat is independent from the World Bank, and the policy of the FTI is not the same as 
that of the Bank.”40 
Unlike the World Bank, which champions the EFA-FTI and values education as an 
indispensable component for economic development and growth, the EFA views education from 
a human rights perspective. While EFA became widely known in the international community at 
the World Conference on Education for All (WCEFA) in 1990, the human-rights-based principle 
of education had been embedded in the U.N., particularly in UNESCO, since its establishment in 
1945. The phrase “Education for All” was used for the first time in the Constitution of UNESCO 
in 1945. The Constitution spelled out that “the education of humanity for justice, liberty, and 
peace is indispensable to the dignity of man” (UNESCO, 2002b, pp.7-8). A number of U.N. 
General Assembly resolutions claimed the importance of education from the standpoint of 
human dignity or human rights. Adopted in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
stated that everyone has the right to education, at least in the elementary stage (United Nations, 
1998). In 1966, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights stated that 
the right of everyone to an education is a means of strengthening the respect for human rights 
                                                 
40 Interview with a staff member of the FTI Secretariat. 
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and fundamental freedoms (United Nations, 1966). In 1989, the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child insisted that the right of the child to education be recognized (United Nations, 1989). 
These human-rights-based principles of education formed the basis of EFA, whereas the World 
Bank, the largest foreign aid organization, had seen education as an investment in human capital 
for economic growth (World Bank, 1995).  
As the above-mentioned background indicates, the FTI attempts to respond to the 
internationally-recognized agenda of basic education, UPE, by mobilizing additional resources in 
collaboration with other donor agencies and by effectively using such resources effectively. 
While the international community has supported the development of basic education in poor 
countries since the onset of foreign aid in 1950s, the same challenges still remain.41 I discuss 
how the FTI, a new approach of foreign aid for UPE, attempts to overcome those challenges to 
make a difference in the world of international educational development.  
 
4.2 SOLUTIONS ENVISAGED 
At the launch of the FTI, the World Bank designed three solutions for UPE. Initially, the FTI 
introduced the Indicative Framework for developing countries, which was an epoch-making 
event because no educational initiatives had ever taken such an approach. The Indicative 
Framework refers to a set of indicators regarding primary school education that recipient 
                                                 
41 For example, UNESCO organized three international conferences throughout the 1950s and the 1960s with a view 
to expanding elementary education at a continental level at Karach for Asia in 1959, at Addis Ababa for Africa in 
1961, and at Santiago de Chile for Latin America and the Caribbean in 1962 (McLean, 1983, p.261). However, UPE 
was not achieved due to the rapid expansion of population during these periods.  
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countries should aim to reach.42 The FTI asked the developing countries to use this framework to 
monitor their progress toward UPE. The Bank designed these indicators based upon the review 
of educational development in low-income countries. The indicative framework focused on 
universal primary school “completion,” not just “enrollment,” with a view to ensuring that 
children complete primary school education from the perspective of improving the quality of 
education. The FTI specifies that UPE can be achieved through universal primary school 
completion.43  
Secondly, the FTI encourages donor agencies to use common funding channels when 
possible to give flexibility to developing countries. Particularly, the FTI emphasizes that donor 
agencies should finance recurrent costs, such as teacher salaries, and promote budget support 
when donors deliver aid resources (EFA-Fast Track Initiative, 2004b, p.9). This approach is 
based upon the lessons learned from past experiences wherein aid projects were not sustained 
after donor agencies withdrew from the fields because developing countries could not bear 
recurrent costs.44 
Lastly, the FTI takes various measures to improve the effectiveness of foreign aid 
resources from donor agencies. For this purpose, based upon the lessons learned from past 
experiences, the FTI pays attention to how donor countries deliver aid resources. The FTI selects 
                                                 
42 For FTI endorsement, the component of primary school education in the recipients’ education sector plans is 
assessed in consideration of the benchmark of the Indicative Framework. The Indicative Framework is “a limited set 
of educational policy, service delivery and financing benchmarks, drawn from empirical analyses of a set of low-
income countries” (EFA-Fast Track Initiative, 2004b, p.6).  
 
43 However, the annual EFA Global Monitoring Report, published by UNESCO, uses a net enrollment ratio in 
primary school education to monitor and evaluate the progress of UPE (UNESCO, 2005). 
 
44 The review study of key existing research regarding the cost estimate of the education MDGs, which was 
undertaken by the consultants of the World Bank, concludes that the recurrent cost, rather than capital investments, 
represents the bulk of costs to achieve UPE in education (Gurria & Gershberg, 2004, p.20). 
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developing countries which have poverty reduction strategies and credible education sector plans 
as the targets of assistance so that the aid resources are better utilized for UPE (EFA-Fast Track 
Initiative, 2004b). By placing those developing countries on the fast track, the FTI attempts to 
concentrate the aid resources on them to maximize their impact. This strategy is in line with the 
Monterrey Consensus: the rich countries of the world commit to boosting opportunities for 
developing countries with sound policy environments (United Nations, 2002, March).  
Upon the inception of the FTI, the World Bank nominated 18 low-income countries as 
the target of the FTI.45 These countries did not necessarily have a high demand for primary 
school education but had a good policy environment for UPE. A common characteristic of these 
countries is that they are most likely to achieve UPE if donor agencies provide them with 
additional resources, even if not in large volumes, so that donor agencies can demonstrate 
tangible results relatively easily.  
An officer of the FTI Secretariat explained the situation of selecting FTI-eligible 
countries in its initial stage. “Originally, donor agencies invited several developing countries to 
become FTI partners. This procedure was abandoned in 2003 because the donor-driven strategy 
was criticized by the international community and the donor groups wanted to make the FTI to 
be as open as possible.”46 
                                                 
45 This includes Albania, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Tanzania, the Gambia, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zambia (Development 
Committee, 2004b, p.2). Among these countries, Vietnam had already achieved the universal primary completion; 
Vietnam was selected apparently because there were no other Asian countries which were likely to achieve UPE at 
that time, and the FTI preferred to cover all the regions of the world due to the Initiative’s global nature. Even 
though a country achieves the UPE at a certain moment, it may not be able to maintain the UPE with high quality 
unless it has sufficient resources and capacity. In this sense, targeting Vietnam as a recipient of the FTI may be 
justifiable.  
 
46 Interview with an official of the FTI Secretariat. 
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Consequently, the FTI became open to all low-income countries in 2004 (EFA-Fast 
Track Initiative, 2004b, p.4). Since developing countries are required to develop credible poverty 
reduction strategies and education sector plans to receive assistance, the FTI provides aid de 
facto for these countries having a favorable policy environment. Meanwhile, the FTI has helped 
low-income countries develop their capacity to satisfy those requirements by establishing the 
Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) (p.5). 
By the end of 2006, the proposal of 31 developing countries received FTI endorsement 
and are now eligible to receive assistance through the FTI mechanism (EFA-Fast Track 
Initiative, 2005).47  The primary completion rate and donors’ commitment to primary school 
education in these 31 countries before launching the FTI indicate that these neither have a high 
demand for aid in basic education nor a lack of assistance from donor agencies (See Figure 8). 
Some East Asian countries and former communist countries already showed a good performance 
of universal primary school completion at least in terms of educational opportunity if not quality, 
and some countries are expected to receive relatively larger amounts of aid in primary school 
education. Although the FTI is open to all low-income countries, donor support is necessary for 
poor countries to satisfy the requirements to be members of the FTI. Donor agencies seem to 
help the countries that show promising potential to use aid resources to achieve UPE, regardless 
of the current status of primary school completion and available aid resources.  
 
 
 
                                                 
47 These countries include Albania, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Timor Leste, Vietnam, and 
Yemen.  
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Figure 8. FTI recipient countries 
Source: EFA-Fast Track Initiative (2006) 
 
Moreover, the FTI has promoted the concept that donor agencies provide more 
coordinated aid in the context of improving aid effectiveness. This strategy is designed in line 
with a series of discussions of harmonization in OECD. The Rome Declaration on 
Harmonization and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, adopted in 2003 and 2005, 
respectively, highlights the international community’s commitment to working toward aligning 
its assistance with the priorities of recipient countries and to harmonizing donors’ policies 
around the system of developing countries (High Level Forum, 2005; World Bank, 2003, 
February). The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, adopted by over 100 countries in March 
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2005, aims at structuring and coordinating aid more closely in line with the strategies of recipient 
countries, reducing transaction and processing costs, and uniting aid and strengthening the 
accountability of donor and recipient governments to their citizens and parliaments (UNESCO, 
2006, p.86). In line with these commitments, the FTI asks participating donors to place UPE as a 
top priority and to provide coordinated aid in a transparent and predictable manner (EFA-Fast 
Track Initiative, 2004b, pp.9-10). 
These solutions of the FTI, that is, the introduction of an Indicative Framework, the 
preference of common funding channels for distributing donors’ aid resources, and donor 
coordination and harmonization, are all derived from the lessons learned by the World Bank and 
some donor agencies. A series of these solutions is also in accordance with recent key arguments 
in the international community. Because these solutions are not panaceas for developing 
countries to achieve UPE, many challenges still exist.  
4.3 MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
Implementing the FTI requires two mechanisms, one at the field level and the other at the global 
level. The FTI attempts to support UPE in developing countries through regular bilateral and 
multilateral donors’ channels (Development Committee, 2006b, p.4). The Initiative designs 
various mechanisms both in developing countries and in international society so that the donors’ 
aid resources can be used effectively through their existing systems. The FTI Secretariat is 
located in and operated by the World Bank and the seconded staff members from bilateral donor 
agencies. 
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At the field level, local donors interested in joining the FTI select the Lead Coordinating 
Agencies from among themselves (EFA-Fast Track Initiative, 2004b, p.12). The Lead 
Coordinating Agencies could be bilateral and multilateral donors and, in rare cases, even the 
governments of recipient countries (p.6). The Lead Coordinating Agencies take responsibility for 
coordination among donor agencies, which includes organizing the assessment of the education 
sector plan by local donors within recipient countries. These agencies are also in charge of 
reporting the progress of the FTI to the FTI Secretariat. In the absence of Lead Coordinating 
Agencies, the recipient government may contact FTI partners to request assistance (pp.6-7). 
Most of the major donor agencies, including the World Bank and the U.K. Department for 
International Development (DFID), have played an active role as a Lead Coordinating Agency in 
many developing countries (See Table 2). 
Table 2. Lead Coordinating Agencies for FTI 
 
Source: EFA-Fast Track Initiative (2006) 
Donor Agencies Name of Recipients countries 
Australia (AusAID) Lao PDR 
Belgium Tanzania 
Canada Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mozambique 
France Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Niger, Senegal 
Germany Honduras, Yemen 
Ireland Lesotho 
The Netherlands Ethiopia 
New Zealand Tonga 
U.K. (DFID) Guyana, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Vietnam, Zambia 
U.S. (USAID) Mali, Benin 
AfDB Chad 
AsDB Bangladesh, Mongolia 
EU Haiti 
UNESCO Cambodia, Cameroon, Guyana, Vietnam 
UNICEF Angola, Gambia, Ghana, Lao PDR, Liberia, Sierra Leone 
World Bank 
 
Congo Rep., Eritoria, Guyana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, 
Timor-Leste, Uganda 
Recipient Governments Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nigeria 
 
 85 
The important mechanisms for implementing the FTI at the field level include the 
endorsement of a country sector plan, the monitoring and evaluation of its progress, and the 
support of recipient countries by using FTI trust funds and resources (See Figure 9). Under the 
initiative of the Lead Coordinating Agencies, in-country donors review the sector plan of the 
recipient government and endorse it if it is satisfactory, based upon the review guidelines (EFA-
Fast Track Initiative, 2004b, pp.8-9). After the endorsement, the recipient country and its donor 
partners are required to conduct annual sector reviews for monitoring and evaluating the progress 
of FTI (p.11).  
 
 
Figure 9. FTI process 
 
When donor agencies design, implement, and evaluate their aid activities, each 
individ
Low-income countries
The countries prepared a poverty reduction 
strategy and education sector plan
Local Donor Agencies
Capacity development support by using the 
Education Program Development Fund
Lead Coordinating Agency
Submit the proposal
Nominate
Liaises with the Ministry of 
Education and local agencies to 
organize the endorsement process
Submit the conclusion to the FTI 
Secretariat and receive the 
confirmation from the Secretariat Inform the conclusion
Full FTI partnership of the endorsement  
(eligible to receive assistance for UPE)
- Resource mobilization among donors and through 
  other channles
- Use the Catalytic Funds for the countries 
  with few donors
ually negotiates and interacts with the government of developing countries. This 
traditional aid system requires the recipient government to spend a significant amount of time 
and energy negotiating with the donor agencies. Participation in the FTI could reduce the 
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administrative burdens stemming from one-to-one negotiation. Should this liaison occur, donor 
agencies will need to spend additional time and energy to coordinate with one another.  
For developing countries with insufficient capacity and donor resources, the FTI provides 
two typ
Table 3. Outlines of FTI trust funds 
EPDF (Education Program Developm
es of trust funds: the Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) and the Catalytic 
Fund (CF). The EPDF supports the efforts of low-income countries to develop credible education 
sector plans, a requirement for FTI eligibility. The CF provides financial resources for the 
countries that have endorsed the FTI proposal but lack the finances with which to implement the 
plan due to a limited donor presence. Interested donors finance these funds, while the World 
Bank administers them (see Table 3). 
  
ent Fund) 
Established November 2004 
Administered by World Bank 
Managed by Strategy Committee composed of donors to the fund  
Donors Canada, France, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, 
United Kingdom 
Accessing EPDF Government representatives and/or development partners should contact the Lead 
Coordinating Agency in the education sector or the World Bank Task Team leader in 
the country to engage in dialogue and define activities to be presented for support.  
Eligible recipients All low income countries  
Eligible activities 
try 
Technical assistance for country-led development of education policies and a national 
hnical support to share knowledge derived from couneducation sector plan; tec
experience in the preparation and implementation of national policies and education 
sector plans 
Total commitments US$82 million (2005-2009) 
Recipients 60 low-income countries are receiving support from the EPDF 
 
tic FundCF (Cataly ) 
Established November 2003 
Administered by World Bank 
Managed by Strategy Committee composed of donors to the fund 
Donors Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
United Kingdom Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, 
Accessing CF Once a country’s education plan has been endorsed by donors present locally and 
submitted to the FTI Secretariat, any financing gap identified during the endorsement 
process will be presented to the CF Strategy Committee.  The Committee makes 
decisions on CF allocations at least twice a year based on its assessment of countries 
most in need and where the CF resources would be best used. 
Eligible recipients Low income countries endorsed for support in FTI  
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Eligible activities All activities related to implementation of a country’s education sector plan 
Total commitments US$1.2 billion (2003-2009) 
Recipients Benin, Cambodia, Cameroon, Djibouti, the Gambia, Ghana, Guyana, Kenya, 
ongolia, 
iger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Timor Leste, 
Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, M
Mozambique, Nicaragua, N
Yemen  
Source: EFA-Fast Track
 
he Catalytic Fund (CF) creates an incentive for developing countries committed to 
achievi
countri
Table 4. Catalytic Fund pledges made and payment by donors 
Catalytic Fund Pledges made and payment by donor as of October 31, 2006 (in $ million equivalent) 
 Initiative (2007) 
T
ng UPE to join the FTI by providing them with a significant amount of interim funding. 
The CF, launched in 2003, has so far received a cumulative amount of $231 million from donors; 
it has allocated these funds to the 14 FTI endorsed CF-eligible countries (EFA-Fast Track 
Initiative, 2006, p.13). Donors have pledged $1.1 billion for the CF, $996 million of which is for 
2006 through 2008 commitments (p.13). This significant increase of donor pledges amounts to 
about 10% of ODA commitments to basic education in low-income countries from 2006 to 2008.  
The following tables show the pledges and payment for the Catalytic Fund by donor 
es and the funding gap between financing needs and the donors’ pledge and commitment. 
 
Country 
2003-04 2005 2006 2007 2008 
tal pledges 
2003-2008 
Total 
payments 
To
Belgium 1.2  2.5 1.2 1.2 0.0 6.1  3.7 
Ca   20.0  0.0 0 nada 20.0  0.
EC   40.3 20.2 20.2    80.7 0.0
Ireland  1.5 4.5 1 1 31.8 9.2 7.0  1.5 
Italy 2.4 2.4  1.2  0.0 6.0  4.8 
Netherlands 39.5 54.3 1 1 1 6 15   92.0 68.0 68.0 21.8  8.6 
Norway 6.0 2 3  8.1 5.6  0.0 39.7  9.7 
Russia 2.0  1.0  1.0 4.0  1.0 
Spain  6.0 8.9 6.4 6.4 27.7  6.0 
Sweden  5.3 10.4 0.0 0.0 15.7  15.7 
UK   12 12 1 265.3 4.4 6.8 6.5  0.0 
Total 49.1 8 43 33 23 1,1 23  0.1 0.4 4.0 1.6 25.2 1.0 
Source: EFA-Fast Track Initiative (2006) 
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Table 5. FTI Catalytic Fund Funding gap 
Financing needs (in $ million equiv 008 Total alent) 2006 2007 2
Current CF-eligible countries 267 363 436 1066 
Countries endorsed in 2006 66 101 107 274 
Countries pending for 2006 0 71 69 140 
Countries pending for 2007 0 2 291 91 582 
Total 33 23 826 903 062 
Pledges and commitments 430 334 232 996 
Remaining gap -97 492 671 1066 
Source: EFA-Fast Track Initiative (2006) 
Conversely, on the global level, the FTI has the following mechanisms to promote its 
activiti
 
es: the FTI Secretariat, the co-chairs, the annual Partnership Meeting, and the Steering 
Committee. The FTI Secretariat, managed by the World Bank and comprised of a staff of the 
Bank and the member donor agencies, provides technical and administrative support for the FTI 
as a whole (EFA-Fast Track Initiative, 2004b, p.13). Two bilateral donor agencies, one G8 and 
one non-G8 country, co-chair the FTI partnership on the global level.  The co-chairs convene 
during the annual Partnership Meeting, which takes place back-to-back with the annual EFA 
High-Level Group meeting managed by UNESCO, in order to discuss the policy direction of the 
FTI and systematic issues affecting progress toward the UPE (p.12). To give directions to the 
Secretariat between the Partnership Meetings, the Steering Committee has been organized; its 
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members include the current co-chairs, the most recent outgoing co-chair, UNESCO, UNICEF, 
and the World Bank (See Figure 10).  
FTI Partnership Meetings (annual)
-  Attended by donors, recipients, NGOs
-  Sets strategic policy direction of FTI
FTI Steering Committee
- Sets the direction between the Partnership Meetings
- Members
    2 FTI Co-chairs (a G8 and a non-G8 donor country)
    Last outgoing FTI co-chair
    World Bank, UNESCO, UNICEF
FTI Secretariat
- Located in the World Bank
- Operated by the staff of the World 
  Bank and bilateral donors 
Lead Coodinating Donors 
in the field level
Give direction
Give direction
Give direction
Communication for 
endorsement process
Figure 10. FTI governance structure 
 
Both the mechanisms at the global level and that at the country level complement one 
another in the FTI. At the global level, the FTI co-chairs assume leadership to decide the general 
direction of the FTI regarding the Steering Committee and the Secretariat, while most of the 
country-specific decision-making is made at the country level. While mechanism nicely fits 
some donor agencies, it requires others to change their strategies, particularly their aid 
modalities. 
As stated above, the FTI mechanism was designed to ensure multilateralism and 
guarantee that donors’ aid resources are used for developing countries. This mechanism has 
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worked in a number of countries in terms of promoting UPE, but the World Bank-led multilateral 
education initiative still faces many challenges. The next chapter analyzes the observed patterns 
of the FTI.  
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5.0  ANALYSIS OF OBSERVED PATTERNS 
This section analyzes the observed patterns of the FTI from the viewpoints of donor agencies 
regarding the agencies’ concerns, contracting problems, and capacity. The analysis covers the 
FTI-related activities on both the global level and the country level. Since donors’ FTI activities 
in developing countries are quite diverse, after analyzing the observed patterns of the FTI in 
general and on the global level in this chapter, I single out Asia as the target region in order to 
facilitate the country level analysis in the next three chapters.48 Specifically, my analysis on 
country level activities focuses on three Asian FTI countries: Mongolia, Vietnam, and Cambodia. 
Both the status of primary school education and degree of donors’ intervention differs in these 
countries. While the FTI proposal of Vietnam was endorsed in 2002, the proposal of Cambodia 
and Mongolia was not endorsed until 2006. After scrutinizing the structure of the Initiative in 
general, I will analyze how donors’ activities through the FTI mechanism work in these three 
countries. I will first generally describe my observation of the FTI and then focus on the donors’ 
concerns, contracting problems, and capacity in relation to the FTI. 
The following figure outlines the structure of Chapter 5. 
                                                 
48 “Donors’ policies and behaviors are different in the contexts of each developing country and also depend on the 
personalities of individual aid workers” (Interviews with a consultant familiar with the FTI in East Asia). 
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Chapter 5. 
Analysis of 
observed 
patterns
Foreign aid
General 
information
The FTI
Concerns Contracting 
problems
Capacity
NGOs Strenghts
Weaknesses
Japan
The U.S.
Lead 
Coodinating 
Agencies
EU, DFID
Catalytic Fund
International 
Financial 
Institutions
Aid Modality
UNESCO
FTI countries 
and non-FTI 
countries
 
Figure 11. Chapter 5 flow chart 
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5.1 GENERAL INFORMATION 
5.1.1 Foreign aid 
First of all, I explain some of the key characteristics of recent foreign aid trends, both in general 
and within the education sector, to help understand donors’ policies and activities in relation to 
the FTI. Since 2000, ODA has increased; its greater share has been allocated to the poorest 
countries (UNESCO, 2006, p.89).49 The following table and graphs indicate the recent increase 
of ODA from industrialized countries and international organizations. 
 
Table 6. Education ODA commitments as share of total ODA 2000 and 2004 
 ODA Share of total ODA 
Constant 2003 $ billion % 
2000 2004 2000 2004 
Total ODA 70.7 90.8 100.0 100.0 
Total ODA to Low Income 
Countries 27.2 41.0 38.8 45.2 
Total Education ODA 4.6 8.6 6.5 9.6 
Total Education ODA to Low 
Income Countries 2.5 5.5 3.5 6.1 
Basic Education ODA 1.4 3.3 2.0 3.6 
Basic Education ODA to Low 
Income Countries 1.0 2.7 1.4 3.0 
                  Source: EFA-Fast Track Initiative (2006) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 The latest statistics of OECD-DAC shows that, on a gross basis, ODA represented about $116 billion in 2006. The 
United States, the largest donor, disbursed $24 billion in 2006. Following the U.S. were Japan ($18 billion), the 
United Kingdom ($13 billion), Germany and France ($12 billion each), the Netherlands (nearly $6 billion), and 
Spain and Italy (just over $4 billion each). These countries represent 80% of the total ODA disbursement in 2006 
(OECD, 2007d).  
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Source: UNESCO (2006)50 
Figure 12. Trend of ODA from 1999 to 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 IDA stands for the International Development Association. IDA is the part of the World Bank that provides 
interest-free credits and grants for poverty reduction in low-income countries.   
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Source: UNESCO (2006) 
Figure 13. ODA to basic education from 1999 to 2004 
 
The total amount of aid shows a huge increase in the share of education and in the 
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France
Netherlands
UK
US
EC
IDA
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
 directly allocated to basic education. The amount of aid to education is estimated to have 
increased from $5.6 billion in 2000 to $9.5 billion in 2004; for low-income countries, the 
increase rose from $3.4 billion to $6.4 billion (UNESCO, 2006). While this is significant 
progress, the amount remains insufficient. UNESCO estimates that $11 billion a year would be 
“the price tag for the EFA agenda” (p.103). Regarding basic education, aid to all developing 
countries has increased from $2.6 billion to $4.4 billion, while the increase of aid to low-income 
countries went from $1.8 billion to $3.4 billion (p.88). The introduction of new aid modalities in 
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the assistance for basic education has also been promoted. In 2004, direct budget support to all 
developing countries accounted for $4.7 billion, with $4.2 billion provided to low-income 
countries (p.88). The FTI Secretariat estimates that 20% of general budget support goes to the 
education sector and that approximately half of that is allocated to basic education (p.88). These 
facts demonstrate that the donor community has intensified educational aid since the World 
Education Forum in 2000.  
As a political mechanism of the world’s richest countries, G8 has created a momentum 
for don
t of all, OECD-
DAC m
                                                
or agencies to further increase the amount of aid. At the 2005 G8 Summit in Gleneagles, 
G8 countries committed a $50 million annual increase in the ODA by 2010 and further increases 
by 2015 (UNESCO, 2006, p.86). G8 countries at the 2006 summit in St. Petersburg pledged to 
help identify the resources necessary for countries to pursue sustainable educational strategies 
(p.86). 51  However, only about 65% of the aid promised at Gleneagles actually arrived on 
schedule (Economist, 2007, April 7, p.58). The Economist suggests that this lack of predictability 
undermines the effective use of foreign aid resources in developing countries.52 
Three foreign aid realities pose problems for the education sector. Firs
embers provided $ 103.9 billion in aid in 2006, down by 5.1% from 2005, in constant 
2005 dollars. In real terms, this is the first decline in ODA since 1997, though the level is still the 
 
51 At the Gleneagles Summit, the EU pledged to reach 0.7% ODA/GNI (Gross National Income) by 2015 with a new 
interim collective target of 0.56% ODA/GNI by 2010. This will nearly double its ODA between 2004 and 2010. The 
U.K. has announced a timetable to reach 0.7% ODA/GNI by 2013. Japan committed an increase of its ODA volume 
by $10 billion in aggregate over the next five years (G8 Gleneagles, 2005).  
 
52 “Because the aid they receive is such capricious, volatile commodity, governments dare not make full use of it. 
They could hire legions of extra teachers, clinicians and civil servants, but only if they are prepared to fire them 
when the aid spigot is closed” (Economist, 2007, April 7, p.58). 
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highest recorded with the exception of 2005 (OECD, 2007d).53 In addition, the share of ODA 
committed directly to basic education is just 3.6% of the total, with one third of this going to 
middle-income countries (UNESCO, 2006, p.89). Thirdly, only a few donor agencies dominate 
in providing aid in the education sector. From 2003 to 2004, 72% of all bilateral aid to education 
was contributed by France, Germany, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. (p.89). For basic education, 
over two-thirds of external assistance came from Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, the U.K., and 
the U.S. (p.89).54  
5.1.2 FTI 
A donor-driven need created the FTI. Under the leadership of the World Bank, donor agencies 
used a learning-by-doing approach to launch the FTI (Bellew & Dorleans, 2005, p.7). The FTI 
created parallel planning processes in its initial stage, but it also raised questions about ways to 
integrate those FTI plans into the broader education sector programs, planning processes, and 
national poverty reduction strategies of recipient countries (p.7). While mutual accountability of 
both donors and recipients now emerges as a core component of the FTI, it should be noted that 
the donor community created the FTI, like many other foreign aid initiatives. Therefore, in order 
to secure the “mutual accountability” between donors and recipients, donor agencies are required 
to actively address the demands of developing countries.  
                                                 
53 Sixteen out of 22 DAC countries met the 2006 targets for ODA set at the 2002 Monterrey Conference on 
Financing for Development. The only countries to reach or exceed the UN target of 0.7% of GNI were Sweden, 
Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark (OECD, 2007d). 
 
54 UNESCO commented that, in order to increase the amount of aid for education, more donors will either need to 
become more heavily involved or increase their contributions, or do both (UNESCO, 2006, p.89). 
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Rosemary Bellew, the former director of the FTI Secretariat, praises the FTI for 
addressing these “market failures” in the allocation of ODA that constrain an effective use of aid. 
“Market failures” in foreign aid include a lack of aid harmonization, a lack of full and timely 
information for ODA stakeholders, and a lack of criteria to establish aid programs which create 
donor darlings and donor orphans (Bellew & Dorleans, 2005, p.6). Addressing these challenges 
requires collective action that compels all parties to think in terms of their collective impact at 
the country level (p.6). Bellew sees the FTI as a mechanism for this action. The global aid 
effectiveness agenda, such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, shares the same 
question raised by this perspective. Aid effectiveness, i.e., how donor agencies disburse their aid 
resources to developing countries to support basic education, has become an indispensable 
agenda of FTI.  
Bellew also asserts that without the FTI, “Education would be less visible on the 
international donor agenda…There would be less transparency among education 
donors…Progress in donor accountability would be lost as well” (Bellew & Dorleans, 2005, p.9). 
These comments may overestimate the potential of the FTI because some donor agencies, 
especially non-European ones, have significantly contributed to the promotion of primary 
education outside the FTI mechanism. However, the points Bellew mentions, i.e., visibility of 
education in the international society as well as donors’ transparency and accountability, have 
become a recognized agenda not only in the education sector but also in foreign aid in general.  
5.1.2.1 Outcomes and challenges of FTI 
The Partnership Meeting in November 2006 reports the latest achievements of the FTI. 
According to the FTI Secretariat, FTI-endorsed countries have made remarkable progress, yet 
they still face many challenges.  
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Table 7 illustrates most initial FTI countries have demonstrated significant progress in 
terms of universal primary completion. 
 
Table 7. Benchmark and improved outcomes for FTI countries 2000-2004 
Countries 
  
  
Gross intake ratio (%) Primary completion rate (%) 
Girls Boys Girls Boys 
2000 2004/05 2000 2004/05 2000 2004/05 2000 2004/05 
Burkina Faso 39 62 53 70 21 28 30 35 
Gambia 76 83 77 79 62 N/A 77 N/A 
Guinea 56 83 63 95 21 42 45 66 
Guyana 124 140 130 140 114 92 109 99 
Honduras 139 127 139 129 N/A 82 N/A 77 
Mauritania 87 105 86 106 44 41 51 45 
Mozambique 102 129 117 138 13 23 20 35 
Nicaragua 142 135 151 144 70 77 62 70 
Niger 35 51 49 68 13 20 20 30 
Vietnam 105 95 108 101 94 98 99 104 
Yemen 78 117 102 136 39 46 78 78 
Source: EFA-Fast Track Initiative (2006) 
 
Due to the FTI, only three countries among 28 FTI-endorsed ones (as of the 2006 annual 
Partnership Meeting) are considered seriously off track; two years ago, eight of these 28 
countries were in that category, as Table 8 indicates (EFA-Fast Track Initiative, 2006, p.1). 
Between 1999 and 2004, the FTI further helped reduce the number of out-of-school children 
worldwide from 98 million to 77 million, a drop of 21 million (p.1). Expansion of FTI 
membership is also significant. All low-income countries became eligible to apply for FTI 
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membership at the 2005 Partnership Meeting in Beijing. The FTI endorsement process will 
welcome over half of all low-income countries by the end of 2007 (p.1).  
Table 8. On-Track/Off-Track status of current FTI countries 
FTI-
Endorsed 
Countries 
Projected 
Primary 
Completion Rate 
2015 
Projected 
Gender Parity 
Index 2015 
Projected Gross 
Intake Rate 
2010 
Overall 
Progress 
(2004 data) 
Overall 
Progress  
(2002 data) 
Albania Achieved 98 100 Achieved Achieved 
Burkina Faso 41 92 95 
Seriously off 
track 
Seriously off 
track 
Cambodia 100 98 Achieved On track Off track 
Cameroon 91 86 Achieved Off track Off track 
Djibouti 53 90 59 Off track 
Seriously off 
track 
Ethiopia 91 107 Achieved Off track 
Seriously off 
track 
Gambia 70 185 89 Off track Off track 
Ghana 95 98 103 On track Off track 
Guinea 89 97 100 On track 
Seriously off 
track 
Guyana Achieved 86 Achieved Achieved On track 
Honduras 89 95 Achieved Off track Off track 
Kenya 92 87 Achieved Off track 
Seriously off 
track 
Kyrgyz 93 103 100 On track On track 
Lesotho 99 93 Achieved On track Off track 
Madagascar 70 96 Achieved Off track 
Seriously off 
track 
Mali 68 85 76 Off track Off track 
Mauritania 43 107 Achieved 
Seriously off 
track Off track 
Moldova 91 101 Achieved On track Off track 
Mongolia 95 96 Achieved Achieved Achieved 
Mozambique 65 95 Achieved Off track Off track 
Nicaragua 92 92 Achieved Off track Off track 
Niger 47 75 99 
Seriously off 
track 
Seriously off 
track 
Rwanda 79 111 Achieved Off track 
Seriously off 
track 
Senegal 72 111 100 Off track Off track 
Tajikistan 92 102 100 On track Achieved 
Timor-Leste N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Vietnam 101 88 Achieved Achieved Achieved 
Yemen 78 86 Achieved Off track No data 
Seriously off-track: PCR projected to be under 50  
Off-track: PCR projected to reach between 50% and 94% by 2015% by 2015 
On-track: PCR currently from 90-94% or projected to reach 95% or greater by 2015  
Achieved: PCR currently 95% or above 
Source: EFA-Fast Track Initiative (2006) 
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However, the FTI faces a number of challenges. The most serious is the lack of finances 
for developing countries to achieve the UPE. Global estimates of the external financing needs for 
achieving the UPE in low-income countries range from $3.7 billion annually to $10 billion 
(Bruns et al., 2003; EFA-Fast Track Initiative, 2006, p.6). UNESCO’s EFA Global Monitoring 
Report 2007 estimates that reaching the UPE in low-income countries will require an increase in 
aid for basic education to $9 billion per year from a current level of $2.7 billion per year. While 
formidable, this goal is not impossible because aid for basic education in low-income countries 
has tripled since 1999; this amount ($9 billion) could be reached if donors triple their aid (EFA-
Fast Track Initiative, 2006, p.18). Although donor countries have significantly increased their 
amount of aid, their contributions remain insufficient for developing countries to reach the 
UPE.55 The $2.7 million of ODA for basic education in low-income countries in 2004 did not 
satisfy the above-mentioned estimation (p.8). However, ODA for basic education in low-income 
countries increased from $1.0 billion to $2.7 billion between 2000 and 2004.56 The total ODA 
commitment for education also significantly increased from $3.7 billion in 2000 to $9.5 billion in 
2004 (p.8). A further increase of external finance for the UPE is expected due to the April 2006 
pledge by the U.K. to contribute $15 billion for education over the next ten years; about $10 
billion of that figure is allocated for basic education (p.8).  
                                                 
55 From 2000 to 2004, total ODA commitments increased from $62.1 billion annually to $98.5 billion annually, an 
increase of over 50%. Some 46% of total disbursement went to low-income countries. In 2005, the EU announced a 
plan to collectively provide 0.7% of GNI in ODA by 2015 and to achieve an intermediate target of 0.51% by 2010. 
Also, G8 countries committed to increase global assistance by $50 billion by 2010, implying an annual average 
increase of 12.2% in real terms (EFA-Fast Track Initiative, 2006, p.6). 
 
56 The increase in aid results, however, from a small set of donors. Five donors, including Canada, Japan, the 
Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S., account for two-thirds of all bilateral aid for basic education. Continuous 
advocacy toward other bilateral and multilateral donors for increasing aid is necessary (EFA-Fast Track Initiative, 
2006, p.10). 
 
 102 
In addition to the lack of financial resources, the FTI must address internal structural 
challenges to improve the quality of donor finance. While developing countries are required to 
implement a poverty reduction strategy and a credible education sector plan, too little 
information is available in most low-income countries regarding children living in extreme 
poverty, HIV/AIDS orphans, and children with disabilities (EFA-Fast Track Initiative, 2006, 
p.3).  
The FTI, despite attempts to improve its effectiveness by complying with the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, still faces concerns regarding governance and sustainability of 
finance.57 So far, however, recipient countries have not been able to rely on the predictability of 
donor financing over time (p.11). Also, the Partnership Meeting pointed out that “there is likely 
to be a need for flexibility in that the FTI model may not be appropriate for all countries” (p.11). 
Both the external financing for UPE and the quality of donors’ disbursement of aid resources 
have to be improved.  
5.2 CONCERNS 
On the global level, donors share at least two broad concerns in relation to the FTI. First, despite 
different reasons for their concerns, all major donor agencies worry about how to assist 
developing countries so that they may reach UPE. The U.N. agencies basically have taken the 
                                                 
57 At the meeting on Aligning Global Programs at the Country Level in June 2006, multilateral development banks, 
OECD-DAC, and UNDP cited the FTI as a good example of harmonization and alignment. These donor agencies 
commented that the FTI was designed “more as a coordinating vehicle than a financial one, with most of the funding 
associated with the program channeled through country based programs.” While this characteristic of the FTI 
“simplifies alignment, some of its sponsors fear that the lack of a sizeable designated global fund for EFA-FTI may 
hamper the program’s overall development effectiveness” (OECD, 2006a).  
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human rights based approach in supporting UPE.58 International financial institutions, such as 
the World Bank, view education as an indispensable component for economic development.59 
Like multilateral agencies, bilateral donors also hold various perspectives. Such bilateral donor 
agencies as Japan value the transfer of their own experience of educational development to 
developing countries.60 European donors perceive educational support in developing countries 
within the context of national poverty reduction, rather than viewing education as a human right 
or as an indispensable component of economic growth (European Commission, 2004b). Despite 
these different motivations, donor agencies, in collaboration with recipient countries and other 
entities such as NGOs, have become committed to assisting basic education in developing 
countries. A series of international conferences, such as The World Conference on Education for 
All in 1990 and the World Education Forum in 2000, explicitly exemplify this commitment. The 
FTI operationalizes this concern for basic education.  
Moreover, aid effectiveness is also a common concern among donor agencies. Bilateral 
donor countries have multiple incentives in providing foreign aid: for the sake of developing 
countries and for the donors’ own interests. The OECD moderated a series of discussions in aid 
effectiveness in the international community. The resulting consensus, known as the Rome 
Declaration on Harmonization and the Paris Declarations of Aid Effectiveness, indicates that all 
donor agencies have committed themselves to aligning their foreign aid toward recipient 
                                                 
58 For example, Peter Smith, the former Assistant Director-General of the Education Sector of UNESCO, 
commented that “the existence of UNESCO is predicated upon commitment to education as human rights” (Sutton 
et al., 2007, p.229). 
 
59 See Chapter 4. The human rights-based principle of education had been embedded in the U.N., particularly in 
UNESCO since its establishment, whereas the World Bank, the largest foreign aid organization, has seen education 
as an investment in human capital for economic growth (World Bank, 1995) 
 
60 Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter spells out that “Japan will utilize its own experience in 
economic and social development as well as in economic cooperation when assisting the development of developing 
countries” (Government of Japan, 2003). 
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countries’ priorities, harmonizing their procedures, and coordinating donors’ policies and 
priorities around recipient countries’ systems. Because of the multiplicity of incentives in 
providing foreign aid, the magnitude of commitment to aid effectiveness differs depending on 
respective donor’s policies. However, the alignment toward developing countries’ policies and 
donor coordination now becomes a critical consensus for all donor agencies. The FTI takes 
advantage of this consensual environment in the international community.  
Since the World Bank has taken the initiative to establish the FTI and has played a 
leadership role in operating the Initiative, some donor partners tend to regard the FTI as a World 
Bank-led initiative. Theoretically, the FTI is independent from the World Bank and within one of 
the global initiative to promote EFA. According to a World Bank economist, “a problem of the 
FTI is that other donor agencies lack knowledge of FTI. The World Bank acts as the FTI 
secretariat and the Trustee of FTI funds, and thus it has fiduciary responsibility for FTI funds. 
Likewise, other donors do not want to jeopardize their initiatives by participating in FTI.”61 This 
feeling of other donor agencies sometimes makes it difficult for them to have a positive stance 
towards FTI participation.  
According to an officer of the FTI Secretariat, “Many donor agencies support EFA goals” 
because “the goals [of UPE] were difficult to achieve in some developing countries, and 
participating in the FTI may facilitate donors’ efforts to achieve these goals.” The officer said 
that “FTI used to be a ‘club’ for donor agencies, but some donors wanted to change this closed 
nature and show a stronger commitment to achieving UPE in developing countries. Donors have 
                                                 
61 Interview with a World Bank economist. 
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attempted to take a more harmonized approach in accordance with the Paris Declaration of Aid 
Effectiveness.”62 
5.2.1 NGOs 
Some NGOs insist that donor agencies should contribute more resources to help developing 
countries reach the UPE in a proper manner. The Global Campaign for Education (GCE) points 
out that bilateral donor agencies have used aid “not to address poverty, but to further their own 
geo-political interests (Global Campaign for Education, 2007, p.18).63 The GCE further asserts 
that donors must commit their fair share of the $9 billion needed each year to get every girl and 
boy into school, and they must back EFA-FTI with real, upfront resources to encourage truly 
ambitious planning by developing countries (p.4).64 
Likewise, the Reality of Aid reports that new aid pledges made in 2005 still fall far short 
of the urgently needed financing to meet the MDGs; how donor agencies provide aid resources 
also poses a problem (Reality of Aid Management Committee, 2006, p.40).65 According to this 
not-for-profit initiative, while foreign aid has been a catalyst in poverty reduction, “donors’ self-
interest and some recipient countries’ misuse of aid have undermined the potential for aid to 
                                                 
62 Interview with an officer of the FTI Secretariat. 
 
63 The Global Campaign for Education, founded in 1999, consists of major NGOs and teachers’ unions in over 150 
countries. It aims to promote education as a basic human right and to mobilize public pressure on governments and 
the international community to fulfill their promises to provide free, compulsory public basic education for all 
people (Global Campaign for Education, 2007). 
 
64 UNESCO’s EFA Global Monitoring Report in 2007 estimates that $9 billion per year of foreign aid is necessary 
for low-income countries to achieve the UPC goal (UNESCO, 2006).  
 
65 The Reality of Aid was established in 1993 as a collaborative, not-for-profit initiative, involving NGOs from both 
industrialized and developing countries to promote national and international policies for poverty reduction in 
impoverished countries (Reality of Aid Management Committee, 2006, p.viii).  
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contribute to poverty alleviation” (pp.39-40). To illustrate the donors’ “misuse” of foreign aid, 
the Reality of Aid cites the relationship between development and counter-terrorism. 66  It 
criticizes donor countries for “addressing the interests of poor and marginalized people in so-
called ‘failing states,’ through the lens of ‘security’” rather than recognizing the rights of the 
poor people (p.33).  
An NGO Action Aid also points out the necessity of improving foreign aid. It states that 
in 2003, “Two-thirds of donor money is ‘phantom’ aid that is not genuinely available for poverty 
reduction in developing countries” (Action Aid International, 2005, p.3).67 In total, at least 61% 
of all donor assistance was phantom in 2003. When phantom aid is eliminated, the G7 countries 
are only 10% of the way to the 0.7% target. Eighty-six cents in every dollar of American aid is 
phantom—heavily tied to the purchase of U.S. goods and services (p.17). While meeting the 
official 0.7% target is important, it is far more imperative that donors reach a “real 0.7%,” a 
target that no OECD donors currently obtain (p.28). 
The above-mentioned perspectives from NGOs sound fair, although the definition of 
“phantom” seems to be somewhat arbitrary.68 NGOs could pressure official aid agencies into 
adopting more recipient-oriented aid delivery. However, considering that NGOs per se 
implement a number of aid programs, NGOs should more actively participate in the donor 
                                                 
66 “In the post 9/11 security-centric era, poverty and violent conflict in the South are viewed increasingly as ’threats’ 
to the security of the North. Development assistance is once again increasingly seen through the lens of Northern 
foreign policy interests, as a tool for rich countries to defend themselves against these ‘threats’” (Reality of Aid 
Management Committee, 2006, p.9). 
 
67 For example, according to Action Aid, almost 90% of aid activities by the U.S. and France are “phantom,” which 
does not aim at reducing poverty in developing countries (Action Aid International, 2005, p.3). 
 
68 According to Action Aid, phantom aid includes 1) aid not targeted for poverty reduction, 2) overpriced and 
ineffective technical assistance tied to goods and services from donors, 3) poorly coordinated aid with high 
transaction costs, 4) aid unpredictable to be useful to the recipient, etc. (Action Aid International, 2005, p.17). 
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coordination mechanism as a partner of donors, not only as a critic of the policies and behaviors 
of official donor agencies. 
Each official donor agency has different positions on the FTI. The following sections 
present the concerns of major donor agencies in East Asia in relation to the FTI. 
5.2.2 Japan 
Japan emerges as one of the most influential donor countries in East Asia due to its generous 
foreign aid disbursement. While its foreign aid policies and activities significantly influence the 
FTI, a severe budget prevented Japan from making any announcement of a target for its ODA in 
2006 (OECD, 2007d).69 An important shift in the Japanese ODA Charter in 2003 occurred when 
Japan made its security and prosperity part of the Japanese ODA and the “prevention of 
terrorism” included in the principles of ODA implementation (Reality of Aid Management 
Committee, 2006, p.10). Also, in the wake of former Prime Minister Koizumi’s restructure of 
governmental financial institutions, a new Cabinet council will be created to make coordinated 
decisions regarding foreign aid. Now, the three major implementation arms, the  International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), the ODA division of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
(JBIC), and the grant aid division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), will be integrated 
into one. Prior to this, Japan’s ODA had been handled by 13 line ministries with little 
coordination among them (Watanabe, 2006, p.306).  
                                                 
69 Fifteen EU members committed to collectively reaching an ODA level of 0.39% of their combined GNI, with a 
minimum country target of 0.33% by 2006. Net ODA from the United States in 2006 reached higher levels than 
expected due to large debt relief programs and increased aid to sub-Saharan Africa, Afghanistan, and Iraq (OECD, 
2007d). 
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However, Japan’s foreign aid system is not necessarily moving in the right direction. An 
NGO worker argues that, even after the reshuffle of governmental aid agencies, the 13 ministries 
continue to be involved in the governmental technical cooperation for developing countries; 
because of this, the new cabinet council is likely to be plagued with conflicting interests of three 
major ministries, MOFA, MOF, and METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) 
(Watanabe, 2006, pp. 306-7 ). Above all, it is a problem that “Koizumi and a new cadre of 
Japanese political leaders are more concerned with national interest than with genuine 
developmental needs” (p.307). 
In addition, Japan has started to downsize its ODA. According to the OECD-DAC, 
Japan’s net ODA has been on a downward trend since 2000, except for an increase in 2005 due 
to debt relief (OECD, 2007d). Japan, which had been the largest donor country during the 1990s, 
is now third among bilateral donor countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. in terms of quantity of 
aid. 
A Japanese official aid worker explained the concerns of Japan in providing foreign aid 
in the context of a discussion of aid effectiveness as follows: 
The Japanese government has not only provided foreign aid to meet the requests 
of developing countries. A core philosophy of Japan’s foreign aid is to support the 
self-help of poor countries by developing local human resources. In line with this 
belief, Japan will participate in harmonization and donor coordination and use 
budget support complementarily to implementing its traditional projects and 
technical assistance.70 Foreign aid should not be supply-driven, i.e., donor-driven, 
                                                 
70 This position was reflected in paragraph five of the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness: “We acknowledge that 
enhancing the effectiveness of aid is feasible and necessary across all aid modalities. In determining the most 
effective modalities of aid delivery, we will be guided by development strategies and priorities established by 
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nor demand-driven, i.e., recipient-driven. Donor agencies must check whether 
their foreign aid can contribute to the development of recipient countries. Ideally, 
bilateral foreign aid activities should contribute to benefiting recipients and 
thereby satisfying the interests of donor countries. (Interview with a Japanese 
official aid worker) 
A challenge for Japan to proactively participate in the FTI stems from the Japanese 
foreign aid system.  
Participating in harmonization and budget support which primarily uses the 
system of the recipient countries may not enable Japan to operationalize its 
philosophies such as enlightening developing countries on the ethos of labor. 
Since official development assistance is not charity, it is important to show 
Japan’s face and to deliver its voices to the recipients. Recipients would thereby 
appreciate the aid activities of Japan, and foreign aid could contribute to 
improving the welfare of both recipients and Japan. (Interview with a Japanese 
official aid worker) 
This perspective is entirely different from that of European countries and international 
financial institutions, which attempt to improve the effectiveness of foreign aid in the light of the 
fungibility of aid resources. “Showing Japan’s face and to deliver its voices to the recipients” 
sounds fine as long as delivered aid resource is consistent with the policies and plans of recipient 
countries.  
                                                                                                                                                             
partner countries. Individually and collectively, we will choose and design appropriate and complementary 
modalities so as to maximize their combined effectiveness” (High Level Forum, 2005). 
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The Japanese government has supported the FTI at the global policy level by launching 
the Basic Education for Growth Initiative presented at the G8 summit in Kananaskis in 2002 and 
by pledging new funds to the FTI-related Trust Fund at the G8 summit in St. Petersburg in 2006. 
Japan committed $2.4 million to the FTI at the High-level Education Conference in 2007 (High-
level Education Conference, 2007). A government official explained the significance of the FTI 
to Japan from a technical point of view.  
The participation in FTI has given Japan one additional tool for assisting primary 
school education in developing countries. The increase of donors’ tools for 
implementing foreign aid is in line with the principles of FTI, which are found in 
the Monterrey Consensus. Japan has an incentive to contribute to the FTI Trust 
Funds. Generally speaking, developing countries use approximately 90% of their 
educational budget for financing recurrent cost, including personnel expenses. 
Consequently, in many developing countries, there is an absolute lack of budget 
for operations to improve the quality of education, which is indispensable to reach 
the EFA goals. Huge initial costs are necessary to launch activities which will 
improve the quality of education, such as educating teacher-trainers, and this 
makes it difficult for developing countries to address the challenge of the quality 
of education. The Catalytic Fund of the FTI intends to finance the initial cost 
necessary for improving the quality of education. Japan’s contribution to the 
Catalytic Fund will enable the FTI to support more developing countries, and this 
will also generate synergy with Japan’s existing aid activities. For example, 
school buildings constructed by Japan’s bilateral aid could be better utilized, and 
in-service teacher training projects supported by JICA could be disseminated to 
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other regions in the country. (Interview with a Japanese official aid worker in 
Tokyo) 
5.2.3 The United States 
As the largest bilateral donor, the U.S. has influential the FTI, particularly at the international 
level, although its presence in the education sector in East Asia has been modest. The U.S. has 
played a role as co-chair of the FTI from 2003 to 2005. Similar to Japan, the U.S. tends to take a 
different position from European donors in providing foreign aid.71 In this section, I review the 
concern of U.S. foreign aid in general and then analyze its concern with regard to the FTI. 
Historically, the U.S. has justified its development assistance policies based upon the 
needs of recipient country and its own foreign policy objectives (OECD, 2006b, p.10). Carol 
Lancaster, the former Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) defines the traditional diplomatic uses of U.S. foreign aid as a way to reward friends, 
provide incentives for desired actions, and fortify alliances. However, the end of the Cold War 
changed these rationales (Lancaster & Dusen, 2005, p.12). After 9/11, the U.S. has increasingly 
viewed its development assistance through the lens of U.S. security interests and the “war on 
terror.” For example, USAID investment in counterterrorism in 2005 represents a nearly seven-
fold increase over 2004 (Reality of Aid Management Committee, 2006, p.10). Lancaster 
concludes that the America’s “war on terror” has undoubtedly heightened the importance of 
diplomatically driven aid. This leads to a decrease in aid to Israel and Egypt but an increase in 
assistance to Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan (Lancaster & Dusen, 
                                                 
71 “Japan and the U.S. have a similar aid philosophy. Both countries use foreign aid strategically under their 
diplomatic policy” (Interview with a Japanese official aid worker). 
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2005, pp.12-3). The OECD-DAC reports that, in 2006, the net ODA flows of the U.S., the largest 
bilateral donor, to Iraq remained substantial ($4.8 billion) and increased to Afghanistan ($1.6 
billion); the LDC were at their highest level ever ($5.5 billion) (OECD, 2007d). 
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), founded in 2002, advocates sound 
governance and poverty reduction through economic growth contained in “compacts” signed 
with developing countries. Despite these laudable principles, the MCC’s progress has been inert 
because Congress refused to meet the President’s earlier funding pledge (Johnes & Nickinson, 
2006, p.351). The MCC received $1 billion in its 2004 budget. This amount increased to $1.488 
billion in the 2005 budget, but still remains far below the administration’s request of $2.5 billion 
(p.351). The OECD-DAC points out that the creation of the MCC does not contribute to 
promoting aid effectiveness.72 
In September 2002, the White House published a new National Security Strategy for the 
United States; it is the first fundamental restatement of American foreign policy since the end of 
the Cold War. The U.S. National Security Strategy, aiming to “help make the world not just safer 
but better,” seeks “political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and 
respect for human dignity. To this end, the U.S. attempts to “expand the circle of development by 
opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy” (White House, 2002). 
In 2006, the U.S. government significantly reformed its system of foreign aid by 
restructuring and integrating USAID into the Department of State. The State Department shaped 
a policy of Transformational Diplomacy, aimed at working “with our many partners around the 
world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their 
                                                 
72 “Integration of MCC strategy and resources into the overall US development effort has yet to be addressed fully. 
In addition, the US Government runs the risk of giving rise to an expensive parallel mechanism at country level, 
which may add to transaction costs” (OECD, 2006b, pp. 13-14). 
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people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system” (U.S. Department of 
State, 2006, p.10). 
The Director of Foreign Assistance, a new position created by Secretary of State 
Condoleeza Rice, will serve concurrently as USAID Administrator while carrying out the duties 
of Director of Foreign Assistance in the State Department. This change was made to “ensure that 
foreign assistance is used as effectively as possible to meet our broad foreign policy objectives,” 
to “more fully align the foreign assistance activities carried out by the Department of State and 
USAID,” and to “demonstrate that we are responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars” (USAID, 
2006a). It is noteworthy that the Secretary’s statements did not address ways to improve the 
effectiveness of American foreign aid for developing countries. Apparently, the U.S. is making it 
more difficult for other donor agencies to collaborate.  
This new U.S. policy framework establishes five core strategic goals: 1) promote 
transformational development; 2) strengthen fragile states; 3) support strategic states; 4) provide 
humanitarian relief; and 5) address global issues and other special, self-standing concerns 
(USAID, 2006b, pp.1-2). The framework points out that the critics of U.S. foreign aid emphasize 
that policy incoherence, i.e., “multiple and competing goals and objectives that pull in different 
directions,” has led to the ineffectiveness of foreign aid (p.21). While the new policy framework 
hopes to address this problem, it still lacks a focus on development. 
Just like Japan, American has a complex and fragmented foreign aid structure.73 The 
Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance in the Department of State was created in 2006 to 
address this problem. Yet, according to Lancaster, this highly fragmented has some advantages. 
                                                 
73 This includes 26 government institutions in providing ODA. Among those organizations, five institutions, i.e., 
USAID and the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, State, and Treasury, accounted for over 90% of the ODA 
funding in 2005 (OECD, 2006b, p.13). 
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She states that the involvement of many different institutions in foreign aid expands “ownership” 
within the federal government for maintaining a safe and prosperous place for the U.S. in the 
world (Lancaster & Dusen, 2005, p.22). Lancaster also explains that domestic agencies can bring 
new constituencies to the table in support of U.S. international engagement and assistance abroad 
(pp.22-3). These comments sound reasonable as long as there is an agency that can play a strong 
coordinator’s role. However, if the government does not change the current aid system, 
Lancaster warns that “robust and authoritative coordination and leadership from somewhere 
within the U.S. government” will be required (pp.50-51). This perspective is relevant to some 
other donor countries, like Japan, which also have a less-coordinated foreign aid system.   
U.S. foreign aid policy, therefore, is a complicated one rooted in the country’s diplomatic 
policy. Lancaster points out that the mission of American foreign aid is unclear. While USAID 
“provides economic, development, and humanitarian assistance around the world in support of 
the foreign policy goals of the Unites States,” the State Department “creates a more secure, 
democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international 
community” (Lancaster & Dusen, 2005, p.8).  
A retired U.S. aid worker recalls the complex position of the U.S. on the FTI and its 
reluctance to join the Initiative in its early stage as follows: 
The U.S. does not have a well-focused position on FTI. While USAID is a very 
decentralized organization, U.S. foreign aid is provided not only by USAID but 
also by the State Department and other federal departments.74 The FTI Secretariat 
                                                 
74 The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) also provides larger sums of money for developing countries to 
take a “quantum leap” in their programs over five years. These funds could be used for the FTI. However, the MCC 
is highly infrastructure-oriented and does not understand the value of education, i.e., capacity development, teacher 
quality, curriculum, etc. (Interview with a retired U.S. aid worker). 
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is housed in the World Bank, and the Bank is influenced by the U.S. Treasury 
Department. Before the U.S. became a co-chair, thereby controlling the FTI’s 
agenda, its position on the Initiative was unclear, seeing the FTI as ambiguous. It 
was not clear what the FTI really was. The U.S. has been skeptical about the FTI, 
stating, “Why should we care about education? Everybody cares about 
education.” There is tension between the EU, which prefers harmonization, and 
some bilateral donors such as the U.S. and Japan, both of which have domestic 
constraints in providing foreign aid. Regarding the goal of UPC, the U.S. has seen 
that this goal is not attainable. It is impractical to set a goal that is impossible to 
achieve considering what is really being provided to developing countries. 
(Interview with a retired U.S. aid worker) 
This American aid worker details the skepticism within the USAID concerning joining a 
global multilateral initiative such as the FTI. 
The World Bank committed to the EFA goals presented in Dakar in 2000, but the 
U.S. has never committed to them. The Bank’s perspective is different from that 
of the U.S. The U.S., like Japan, has its own domestic constraints in providing 
foreign aid. Likewise, the U.S. has never committed to increasing its amount of 
foreign aid nor filling the resource gap for education in developing countries, 
although many other donor agencies have made this commitment. While the U.S. 
President has indicated at various conferences his willingness to support the 
educational development of poor countries, the U.S. Congress has never promised 
to provide more funding for EFA. The World Bank has announced that the U.S. 
has made this commitment, but, in fact, the U.S. has never promised anything. 
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The U.S. has been trapped by the “promise.” Many donor agencies also believe 
that the U.S. has fully committed to the MDGs, but this is not true. (Interview 
with a retired U.S. aid worker) 
The change of American politics seems to affect the concern of the U.S. toward the FTI. 
According to this official aid worker, two political leverages motivated the U.S. to transform its 
negative sentiment towards the FTI into a cooperative one and, in turn, drove the U.S. to become 
the co-chair of the FTI: 1) The Bush administration is pro-education; domestically, it has 
launched the No Child Left Behind Act, and 2) The U.S. Congress increased the funds 
earmarked for basic education in developing countries, enabling the U.S. to influence basic 
education in poor countries.75 These policy environments have created the atmosphere in which 
many believe that “the U.S. will not gain by destroying FTI, although FTI is not a perfect 
mechanism.”76 
Consequently, the U.S. took up the position of the FTI co-chair in 2003. During its tenure, 
according to a retired U.S. aid worker, the U.S. attempted to further its two priorities in the 
context of the FTI. The first priority of the U.S. is quality in education, specifically, not only 
expanding the opportunity of education, but also that the purpose of learning should be taken 
more into consideration. The second priority is resource mobilization for the FTI. European 
countries seem to have an overly limited vision of resource mobilization, looking only at official 
development assistance. The U.S. considers that the private sector, such as the Gates Foundation, 
has enormous potential for the FTI. The U.S. has brought the idea of public-private-partnership 
                                                 
75 Interview with a retired U.S. aid worker. 
 
76 Interview with a retired U.S. aid worker. 
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(PPP) to the table, but has never set forth its PPP ideologically except from a pragmatic 
standpoint, that is, it wants to explore every possible resource for the FTI.77 
The U.S. attempted to make the public-private-partnership for primary school education 
in developing countries a main element of the FTI; the UNESCO-convened annual EFA 
conferences focused on this effect. However, other partners seemed not to welcome the idea of 
business sector involvement in the FTI. A retired U.S. aid worker explained his perspective as 
follows: 
The private sector has the potential to affect the FTI. For example, when 
Governor Pataki tried to cut the budget for early childhood education in New 
York, people from the business sector asked him not to, because today’s children 
will be its future workers. Pratham has a direct channel with the prime minister of 
India and can change the educational system in India more quickly than the 
official donor agencies can.78 The FTI’s country plan should look at all sectors, 
not only public donor agencies; the business community should be a part of the 
FTI. The World Bank and the U.N. pulled back on the idea of PPP since this is 
not their mandate, but the U.S. recognizes that aid comes from more than just the 
official donors. (Interview with a retired U.S. aid worker) 
However, it seems that some private companies are interested in this topic. At the High-
Level Education Conference in 2007, private sector representatives, i.e., Cisco Systems, Intel, 
Microsoft, and AMD, announced that they would work through the World Economic Forum’s 
                                                 
77 Interview with a retired U.S. aid worker. 
 
78 Pratham is an Indian non-profit organization established for supporting universal primary education in India.  
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Partnership for Education in support of a country’s education plans (High-level Education 
Conference, 2007). 
5.2.4 EU and DFID 
The distribution of the European Commission’s aid reflects a defining political trade-off among 
the EU member states. While the Nordics, the Netherlands, and the U.K. argue for a poverty-
focus in overall allocations and within programs, southern EU member states tend to favor more 
politically-based allocations to address domestic political concerns (e.g., migration) or to pursue 
external political goals (Gavas, 2006, p.270). Aid provided by the EC rose by 5.7% to $10.2 
billion from 2005 to 2006, reflecting an increased budget support and improved disbursement 
capacity due to recent higher levels of commitment (OECD, 2007d).  
Safeguarded by the International Development Act, the primary focus of U.K. official 
development assistance remains the eradication of poverty and the achievement of the MDGs 
(Rosa, 2006, p.343). The current U.K. aid system reflects the perspective that “Britain shifted its 
approach after Labour came to power a decade ago, separating aid from foreign policy and the 
financial interests of British firms, and developing many decisions about how assistance is 
delivered from London to increasingly powerful officials on the ground” (McGreal, 2007, 
February 16). However, global security concerns are having an impact on U.K. aid allocations; 
from 2003 to 2005, Afghanistan and Iraq ranked among the top 10 recipients of DFID’s bilateral 
aid. Also, U.K. aid to Pakistan rose significantly from 2001 to 2004 (Rosa, 2006, p.345). 
The U.K., as the chair of the G8 and the holder of the EU presidency, took an initiative to 
create an international momentum in development in 2005. This includes setting up the 
Commission for Africa and putting international development at the top of the G8 Gleneagles 
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summit agenda. The U.K. used “behind-the-scene diplomacy to persuade other G8 countries to 
agree to more aid and debt relief” (Rosa, 2006, p.345). International development emerged as a 
major concern in domestic politics of the U.K. in 2005.79 
DFID provides support to several FTI countries through its country programs. DFID has 
committed £145 million to a Catalytic Fund that provides a quick injection of money to help 
those countries with limited donor support meet the education MDGs. The overall support form 
the U.K. to the FTI is £150 million (DFID, 2006). In March 2006, the U.K. also “promised the 
equivalent of US$15 billion over the next ten years for education and called upon other 
governments to contribute similarly to provide the external aid required to reach the EFA goals” 
(UNESCO, 2006, p.86). 
Regarding the aid effectiveness agenda, the U.K. has actively engaged in the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and has urged other donors to improve their support for 
country-led development and aid predictability. Furthermore, the U.K. has encouraged donors to 
use country systems for procurement and financial management, to harmonize in-country work 
more effectively, to untie their aid, and to increase aid allocation to the poorest countries (Rosa, 
2006, p.344). 
5.2.5 International Financial Institutions 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank, two of the largest financial 
institutions for the education sector in East Asia, provide lending programs as well as grant 
                                                 
79 “Nationally, following 2005, there is increased support for development issues and for the 0.7% ODA target 
across the main political parties, and unprecedented visibility of development concerns in public debates in Britain” 
(Rosa, 2006, p.345). 
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projects. In terms of the FTI, the ADB and the World Bank have different concerns. Moreover, 
within the World Bank, there seems to be a substantial difference between those who seek to 
foster the FTI in its headquarters and those who manage activities in the field. 
An ADB officer explained that, from a technical point of view, the ADB values 
collaboration with other donor agencies and, thereby, participation in the FTI. “ADB has about 
seventy new projects each year. Among them, only six or seven are for the education sector. It is 
important to leverage resources in the education sector. It is challenging to increase the number 
of new projects considering the absorptive capacity of recipient countries.”80  Regarding aid 
modality, “ADB seems to prefer stand-alone projects to SWAps, but actual collaboration 
depends on the individual personality of Country Directors in the field.”81 
The World Bank has taken the initiative to play a critical role in promoting the FTI. 
Nancy Birdsall, the former director of the Policy Research Department of the World Bank, 
explains the reason for this. Birdsall asserts that a raison d'être of the World Bank is to provide 
global public goods. Just as governments need to ensure that even well-functioning markets 
provide for national public goods, so is it necessary to have a global cooperative “where the 
nations of the world commit themselves jointly to do what no state would undertake on its own” 
(Birdsall, 2007). Birdsall concludes that the World Bank can play the role of this global 
cooperative; the worlds need a strong and effective bank to finance and coordinate the provision 
of global public goods. This idea fits the desire of the World Bank to launch and manage the FTI, 
although not all stakeholders of the FTI welcome an excessive influence from the Bank.  
                                                 
80 Interview with a staff member of ADB. 
 
81 Interview with a staff member of ADB. 
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However, executive level staff and those who actually operate the Bank’s field activities 
seem to differ in their concerns about their FTI relationship. A World Bank economist explained 
this situation as follows:  
At the World Bank, there is a disparity between the objectives at the top level and 
those at the officer level. Senior management has said that the World Bank should 
promote country ownership, donor harmonization and SWAps. However, at the 
project level, World Bank teams operate under the constraint of rigid rules of 
procurement, financial management, and disbursement that are not designed to 
promote the above objectives but to run bank-driven projects. (Interview with a 
World Bank economist) 
Admitting both the potential and the limitations of the FTI, an officer of the FTI 
Secretariat concluded that, all in all, donor agencies are moving in the right direction despite 
their respective constraints. An officer of the FTI Secretariat presents the following perspective: 
I recognize that the biggest three bilateral donors (i.e., the U.S., Japan, and 
Germany) have strong foreign aid interest groups at home. Donors must satisfy 
their constituencies at home. We [the FTI Secretariat] need to balance between 
the real political goals and our own goals. We can change the donors’ policies, 
assuming their goodwill. We, as well as the recipient countries, would love to see 
a much more demand-driven approach by donor agencies. FTI does not have a 
concrete mechanism for determining donors’ delivery of foreign aid. FTI provides 
a place for donors to meet and communicate with each other without 
confrontation. FTI plans to organize regional seminars to provide a prototype. 
(Interview with an officer of the FTI Secretariat) 
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Considering the significant diversity of concerns for providing aid resources among 
donor agencies, it is realistic and reasonable for the FTI Secretariat to take the position of 
coordinator and mediator, rather than leading donors’ policies in a certain direction. However, 
since the “goodwill” of donor agencies may be fragile and not always existent, the FTI needs 
continuous advocacy as well as pressure from the international society in order to stimulate the 
donors’ “goodwill.”  
On the country level, donor agencies’ concerns can be more explicitly observed. No 
donor countries deny the importance of internationally agreed upon objectives such as EFA, UPE, 
the MDGs, and aid harmonization. Meanwhile, aid agencies operate their business so that their 
altruistic goals, such as supporting UPE in developing countries, will be compatible with their 
own interests. Donors’ activities at the country level will be spelled out in the section consisting 
of the case studies of Mongolia, Vietnam, and Cambodia.  
5.2.6 UNESCO 
UNESCO, a champion in international educational development, has played an influential role in 
promoting EFA, particularly as the global coordinator. However, when it comes to the FTI, 
UNESCO’s contribution has not been palpable mainly because of its weak field presence. For 
example, the number of UNESCO’s field offices is far less than other multilateral donor agencies 
active in the education sector.82  
Peter Smith, the former Assistant Director General of UNESCO, mentions that 
“UNESCO can fulfill its role as intellectual leader, honest broker, and clearinghouse for ideas, 
                                                 
82 UNESCO has 52 field offices, while UNDP has 166 offices, UNICEF has 190 offices, and the World Bank has 
117 offices, respectively, according to their web sites in 2007. 
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thereby propelling both countries and the international community in the right direction.” He 
adds that “UNESCO’s unique role has an added value that money cannot buy” (Sutton, Smith, 
Piggozzi, Tomasevski, Bhola, Kuroda, & Mundy, 2007, p.231).  
The strategies of UNESCO and the World Bank overlap. While the Bank established the 
FTI and has had a strong influence on its management and operation, UNESCO has contributed 
to the FTI as an initial permanent member of its Steering Committee in the role of the EFA 
global coordinator. The Bank’s latest Education Sector Strategy Update spells out that a key role 
of the Bank in low-income countries “will be to bring donors together to establish a coherent 
multidonor framework for the development of the education sector” (World Bank, 2005b, p.78). 
The Strategy Update also stresses that the Bank is “able to take a comprehensive view of needs 
in the education sector and thus help clients to integrate education into a country’s policy and 
institutional context” (p.79). Karen Mundy of the University of Toronto concludes that the 
Bank’s education strategy, which places the Bank as the lead coordinator of education sector 
policies, is the same as the UNESCO mandate and role expressed in its EFA Global Action Plan 
(Sutton et al., 2007, p.237). It is good that two major champions of the FTI, the Bank and 
UNESCO, share the same strategy. Applying different comparative advantages to the FTI, the 
Bank and UNESCO can play a mutually complementary role in leading the FTI and its global 
coordination.83  
It is important to note that the comparative advantages of aid agencies vary with different 
perspectives. For example, Karen Mundy considers UNESCO’s comparative advantage lying not 
in leading and coordinating EFA efforts but in expanding its monitoring and evaluation of the 
                                                 
83 The World Bank has viewed education as “a cost-effective investment sector for development” and has 
emphasized the value of education as a means of promoting poverty reduction and economic growth, while the UN 
agencies have seen education as an integral part of human rights (Sutton et al., 2007, p.243). 
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EFA effort and in establishing itself as a center of independent technical excellence (Sutton et 
al., 2007, p.238). However, Mary Joy Pigozzi, former Director of UNESCO, comments that the 
annual EFA Global Monitoring Report, published by UNESCO, is independent from UNESCO’s 
policies and beliefs; the report does not necessarily reflect UNESCO positions (p.241). Citing the 
Global Action Plan that maps out UNESCO’s role as an intellectual partner, provider of open 
and free forums, and trusted convenor, Pigozzi emphasizes that an important comparative 
advantage of UNESCO stems from its role as the standard setter that addresses normative issues 
in education. This essential part of its human rights approach is closely linked to the quality of 
education (p.232). Despite the argument of organizational comparative advantages, UNESCO 
has a number of facilities which can make a difference in enriching the FTI. It is necessary for 
UNESCO to proactively use those mechanisms, both in the field and at the international levels, 
and for other donor agencies to collaborate with UNESCO.  
 
5.3 CONTRACTING PROBLEMS 
Although the FTI relies on existing donors’ channels in mobilizing resources for UPE, some 
donor countries contribute their financial resources to the FTI; this forms the Trust Fund to 
provide interim financial needs of developing countries. The dependence on donors’ resources 
through donors’ regular channels is both a strength and weakness of the contract in relation to the 
FTI.  
Rosemary Bellew, former Director of the FTI Secretariat, notes that the FTI is anchored 
at the country level. 
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Country level staff take on the responsibility of supporting the country to develop 
a sound sector strategy to scale up efforts to achieve the education MDGs, of 
appraising and endorsing the soundness and financial sustainability of the 
program, and mobilizing resources in the first instance. This facilitates alignment 
with country priorities. A lead coordinating agency helps to coordinate the donors 
around this process. (Bellew & Dorleans, 2005, p.7) 
While this perspective may fit well with some aid agencies that have decentralized 
organizational structures, some other aid agencies with centralized headquarters may have 
difficulty adjusting to this perspective.   
Bellew explains that the FTI has increased short term transaction costs for both donors 
and recipients by requiring them to participate in additional meetings, prepare papers for these 
meetings, and change their behaviors (Bellew & Dorleans, 2005, p.9). However, the FTI’s 
approach, which fosters comprehensive dialogues on sector policy and its priorities and 
collective action among donors and recipients, lowers transaction costs in the medium term 
rather than employing separate arrangements with individual donors (p.9). Also, “donors have 
gained in terms of better mutual transparency and trust that has made it possible to move towards 
common analysis and common financing mechanisms” (p.9).  
Judging from the candid comments garnered from interviews, Bellew’s perspective 
seems to be wishful thinking. A number of aid workers mention that FTI participation increases 
administrative burdens; they do not predict that the transaction costs will be lowered in the long 
run.  
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5.3.1 Strengths 
The FTI’s flexibility, which allows donors to use their existing mechanisms, results in greater 
donor agency participation in the FTI. Since the international community, which includes donor 
countries, has committed to supporting UPE and aid harmonization, there is no resistance among 
donor agencies to cooperate with the FTI. On the other hand, it is challenging for donors to 
change their ways of aid resource disbursement, especially since the global trend toward 
harmonization and alignment with recipients’ system requires some donors to change their 
delivery or modality of foreign aid. Changing aid modality will alter the principal-agent structure, 
or the accountability structure of foreign aid, that respective donors have established among 
voters, taxpayers, politicians, and aid workers.84 Responding to harmonization and alignment is a 
challenging task for donor agencies because donors’ domestic politics matter: donor agencies 
usually have to negotiate with the stakeholders in the field of developing countries and, 
simultaneously, the stakeholders in their home countries as well. Although ultimately many 
donors have made an effort to change their delivery of aid in accordance with the international 
consensus of aid effectiveness, the FTI encourages donor agencies to join the Initiative by 
allowing them to use their existing mechanisms.  
In addition, the FTI promotes the trend of aid effectiveness on the field level, particularly 
the trend of Sector Program Approaches (SWAps), with its donor coordination function in the 
education sector. SWAps do not represent a certain modality of foreign aid; instead, they stand 
                                                 
84 In the bilateral foreign aid, the chain of the principal-agent relationship starts with taxpayers as principals who 
wish to disburse their income to recipients in developing countries (Martens et al., 2002, p.18). In the multilateral 
setting, the principal-agent relationship also starts with taxpayers of the countries that contribute finances to 
international organizations. Since aid modalities are usually affected by the interests of taxpayers, changing aid 
modality requires substantive discussion and decision-making in donors’ home countries, as well as in the 
developing countries.  
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for the approach which emphasizes designing the comprehensive sector plan and implementing it 
through coordination with various donor agencies and NGOs.85 While the FTI favors the support 
of recurrent costs through budget support, the Lead Coordinating Agencies play the role of 
mediator among donors. Their role also extends to creating links between donors and recipient 
governments, taking into account harmonization and donor coordination.86 This function of the 
FTI, which facilitates the trend of SWAps in developing countries, is considered a solution for 
improving aid effectiveness by stakeholders.  
5.3.2 Weaknesses 
The FTI’s current contracting environment has weaknesses that stem from its strengths. While 
the FTI can exert power over the recipient countries by asking them to fulfill its requirements to 
receive assistance, the Initiative cannot force donor countries to take steps which it considers 
favorable, such as financing recurrent costs and budget support. The FTI Secretariat asserts that 
the Initiative is built on mutual accountability of both donors and recipients. According to the 
Secretariat, donors are expected to provide coordinated and increased technical and financial 
support in a transparent and predictable manner. Yet, this expectation seems to be beyond the 
control of the FTI; predictability of foreign aid resources depends upon the politics of donor 
countries rather than the pressure from the international development community. It is true that 
                                                 
85 The definition of SWAps differs depending on the donor agencies. Two case studies in Africa and interviews of 
14 donor agencies concluded that the education SWAps “provide a means of co-ordination of the different 
contributions to the development of the education sector” and “there seems to be consensus about the desirability of 
using SWAps as a means of ensuring country ownership of educational reforming policies” (Riddell, 2001, p.10).  
 
86 At the annual Partner Meeting in 2004, donors and recipients “agreed that the use of general budget support was 
valuable, but that it should be used in conjunction with other modalities.” They concluded that while “most of the 
country partners present agreed that DBS [Direct Budget Support] is preferable…regular projects are also welcome 
if the government and other actors in a country-led process are involved at all stages” (EFA-Fast Track Initiative, 
2004a, p.8). 
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the FTI’s advocacy of the donor community for more harmonized and coordinated aid has 
contributed to raising the awareness of the challenge of UPE in rich countries; many of those 
from such countries have become more committed to supporting UPE. However, whether or not 
donor countries provide foreign aid in a consistent manner depends on their politicians and 
voters. This uncertainty limits the FTI effectiveness. 
Moreover, in order to reduce the transaction cost of aid in the FTI, the donor community 
proposed the idea of “silent partnership,” which stands for the system that donors with no 
programs in a country would allocate funds for basic education through a donor that did have a 
presence. However, this “silent partnership” has proven more complicated than expected 
(UNESCO, 2006, pp.99-100). One of the reasons for this is that donor countries favor providing 
aid to those countries in which donors have a strategic interest or historical link. Less than 20% 
of aid to education is available for the conflict-affected countries and fragile states (Global 
Campaign for Education, 2007, p.9). 
In the context of the FTI, donor agencies require recipient countries to develop a credible 
strategy for education and poverty reduction in order to verify their capacity to properly use aid 
money. The FTI then tries to concentrate aid resources on those countries that have the potential 
to be good performers. This contracting structure of the FTI seems to be in line with the advice 
Allan Meltzer of Carnegie Mellon University gives for reforming the World Bank. In 2000, 
Meltzer suggested that grants should replace the traditional World Bank tools of loans and 
guarantees for physical infrastructure and social service projects (Meltzer, 2000, p.12). He 
asserted that grant funding should be increased if grants are used effectively, because aid money 
is fungible (p.12). He also mentioned that the Bank staff should be rewarded for developing 
programs that raise living standards and improve the quality of life (Meltzer, 2005, March 18). 
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The FTI may be the initial step needed to turn the proposal of Meltzer into an actual operation. 
Although the FTI does not explicitly encourage donor agencies to provide grants rather than loan 
projects, the Initiative does attempt to concentrate aid resources on these countries able to 
properly use donors’ aid resources in view of the fungibility of aid money.  
Furthermore, the weaknesses of the FTI are derived from the policies and priorities of 
each donor agency. For example, the OECD-DAC points out the following about U.S. foreign 
aid: Although polls show that the American public supports aid which can efficiently promote 
the better welfare of the world’s poor, American society has a cynicism toward aid, which 
includes the “perceptions that only a small percentage of aid reaches the poor and concern that 
aid is diverted for more political objectives, such as supporting regimes friendly to the U.S.” 
partners (OECD, 2006b, p.11). In order to mitigate this misunderstanding, the OECD-DAC 
proposed that public awareness of foreign aid should be a priority task for the government and its 
development partners (p.11). Since sustainability and predictability of donor funding is critical in 
the FTI, the lack of public support in a donor’s home country is a serious challenge.  
That some donor agencies are not active in promoting the aid effectiveness agenda also 
causes concern for the FTI. For example, a World Bank officer observed the reluctance of Japan, 
as well as some other bilateral donor agencies, towards confronting the aid effectiveness issue at 
the field level: “Japan seems to buy into the idea of general budget support and harmonization, 
but in reality, Japan keeps its distance from them and does not want to use the recipient country’s 
system. Bilateral donors usually have a special relationship with and interest in recipient 
countries, and, therefore, it is difficult to change their systems.”87 
                                                 
87 Interview with a World Bank economist. 
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On the other hand, European countries have actively promoted the aid effectiveness 
agenda. The EU has introduced budget support, one of the ideal modalities for the FTI, in 
developing countries.88 In line with the EU’s policy, the U.K. also has attempted to introduce 
budget support as much as possible. By 2007/08, the U.K. promises that more than half of its 
bilateral aid will be provided in the form of a poverty reduction budget support or a sector-wide 
support (Rosa, 2006, p.344). 
5.3.3 Lead Coordinating Agencies 
On the country level, the FTI resolves the contracting problems among donor agencies by 
playing the mediator’s role. The Lead Coordinating Agency, selected democratically in 
developing countries, takes responsibility for coordinating local donors’ aid activities for UPE so 
that the donors disburse their aid resources in line with recipient countries’ priorities and in a 
harmonized manner (See Table 2 in Chapter 4).89 In this way, the FTI plays a mediator’s role 
among local donor agencies and developing countries for UPE. 
 The existence of the Lead Coordinating Agencies indicates the conversion of transaction 
costs in relation to foreign aid from recipient governments to specific donor agencies. Therefore, 
“donors are willing to play the role as Lead Coordinating Agency (LCA) on a temporary, 
                                                 
88 For example, The EU strategy for the Pacific Islands proposes a greater use of budget support when possible 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2006, p.10). The EU strategy for the Pacific Islands spells out that the 
EU “intends to apply more systematically the budget support instrument in its cooperation with the Pacific ACP 
[Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific] countries” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006, p.11). The EU 
strategy for Africa states that “the EU should foster more general budget and sectoral budget support. This will not 
only make aid delivery more transparent, predictable and result-oriented but will also enhance the EU’s collective 
political leverage” (Commission of the European Communities, 2005, p.6). 
 
89 Interview with a World Bank staff. This officer points out that “the incentives for donor agencies to be LCA 
include: 1) being more engaged in the sector; 2) being able to be visible in the processes; 3) being able to show their 
commitment to harmonization; and 4) being able to influence the recipient countries.” 
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rotating basis.”90  The Lead Coordinating Agencies contribute to facilitating harmonized and 
coordinated foreign aid delivery, such as SWAps, on the country level. This reduces the 
administrative costs of developing countries; in other words, those agencies which function as 
the Lead Coordinating Agencies shoulder the cost previously borne by developing countries. 
Consequently, only these donor agencies with an incentive to be a Lead Coordinating 
Agency are likely to play this role. In practice, multilateral donors and European countries have 
performed as Lead Coordinating Agencies in the field. This is because a philosophy of the FTI, 
particularly the promotion of budget support where possible and available, is also the priority of 
some multilateral agencies and many European like-minded donors; those donor agencies can 
improve the effectiveness of their regular aid activities by being directly involved in the 
management of the FTI on the field level. Meanwhile, the two largest bilateral donor agencies, 
the Unites States and Japan, seem to have a different perspective in relation to aid modality from 
that of European donor agencies, although both the U.S. and Japan have endorsed the idea of the 
FTI and contributed to the Initiative by employing their existing aid mechanisms.  
The role of LCA remains ambiguous. At the FTI Partnership Meeting in Cairo in 2006, a 
number of FTI participating donor agencies pointed out that the role of LCA needs to be clarified 
and the LCAs should take a more proactive role in the FTI.91 Accordingly, the FTI Secretariat 
plans to organize regional seminars in order to “clarify the LCA’s role, promote coordination 
among field level staff, and strengthen the linkage between the central and local levels.”92 
                                                 
90 Interview with an officer of the FTI Secretariat. This officer mentions that “there is a hierarchy among donors in 
the field and a certain donor plays the de facto leader’s role. It is important for LCA that donors’ ‘selfish interests’ 
do not interfere with the FTI.”  
 
91 Interview with an officer of the FTI Secretariat. 
 
92 Interview with an officer of the FTI Secretariat. 
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5.3.4 Catalytic Fund 
Initially, the FTI expected that good performance of recipient countries would attract additional 
donor finance. However, new donor funding has not been forthcoming; since there is a trend 
among donor agencies to reduce the number of countries they support, this problem is likely to 
grow (UNESCO, 2006, p.99). Also, the Global Campaign for Education criticizes donors 
because “as more poor countries pass the stringent tests’ viability and political commitment 
required to get the FTI stamp of approval, donors dawdle and dissemble instead of coughing up 
the cash (Global Campaign for Education, 2007, p.91). While the financing gap to achieve the 
UPE goal is still huge and the donors’ aid provision through their regular channel is not 
sufficient, the contribution from some donor agencies to the Catalytic Fund has increased. 
However, the Catalytic Fund holds a number of problems.  
A contracting environment around the Catalytic Fund seems to affect the incentives of 
the FTI stakeholders and influence the effectiveness of the FTI. The FTI has attempted to make 
itself attractive to developing countries by improving the quality of the donors’ existing aid 
disbursement mechanisms. For the countries eligible to receive the Catalytic Fund, this grant 
funding creates a huge motivation for them to participate in the FTI. In the light of the limited 
amount of donor resources, as well as the rigidity of donor policies and activities, being eligible 
to receive the Catalytic Fund is very attractive for some developing countries. The Catalytic 
Fund caters to the developing countries with minimal donor countries (a.k.a. “donor orphans”) in 
order to provide an interim financial source for a few of years.  
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However, the contracting environment around the Catalytic Fund is neither necessarily 
transparent nor clear.93 A consultant says that “as a requirement of receiving the Catalytic Fund, 
the FTI Secretariat requested the donors to prepare an estimate of external financing for UPE up 
until 2015.”94 This consultant argues that “this makes little sense, because money is fungible and 
few donor agencies can show the exact amount of disbursement for primary school education 
alone (as distinct from support for the education sector more broadly), and few can project 
disbursements for more than two or three years into the future.”95  
Likewise, a World Bank economist points out that a problem of the Catalytic Fund, 
which currently provides funding for three years, is that “it does not care about the recipients 
after its three-year commitment.”96 This officer insists that longer-term commitment by donor 
agencies is indispensable for the education development of recipient countries.97 
The greater the number of developing countries that join the FTI and increase the number 
of Catalytic Fund recipients, the more competitive it becomes for those countries to receive this 
grant funding. To properly distribute limited resources to eligible recipients, the FTI Secretariat 
asks countries to submit additional information such as the projection of external finances; the 
nature of foreign aid makes this hard to calculate. This additional request even undermines the 
ownership of recipient countries. While donor agencies in recipient countries usually draft this 
                                                 
93 “In considering the incentives of stakeholders to join the FTI, it is important to pay attention to the fact that the 
rules of FTI, such as the criteria of eligibility to receive funding from the Catalytic Fund, have changed frequently” 
(Interview with a consultant familiar with the FTI appraisal process in East Asia). 
 
94 Interview with a consultant familiar with the FTI appraisal process in East Asia. 
 
95 Interview with a consultant familiar with the FTI appraisal process in East Asia. 
 
96 Interview with a World Bank economist. 
 
97 “The Catalytic Fund should become a Global Fund. FTI should declare, ‘We will support developing countries as 
long as they manage and reform the education sector based on the master plan’” (Interview with a World Bank 
economist). 
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kind of document, a World Bank economist bemoans the time restraints in preparing the 
documents due to the short notice by the FTI Secretariat and the FTI’s frequently changing 
guidelines.98 
An officer of the FTI Secretariat explains that “the Fund’s committee, which consists of 
donor agencies, makes decisions about how to use the Catalytic Fund.”99 Participating donor 
agencies, rather than the World Bank, operate the Fund, and apparently the diversity among aid 
agencies sometimes makes decision-making regarding the Fund complex and frequently-
changing.100 
Currently, the Catalytic Fund provides monetary resources for up to three years to 
developing countries that, thus far, have only had a few donors. However, at the FTI Partnership 
Meeting in Cairo in 2006, the partners agreed that the FTI should provide the Catalytic Fund for 
a longer term. At the meeting, donor countries made significant commitments to increasing their 
contributions to the Catalytic Fund. The Catalytic Fund does not support recurrent costs such as 
teachers’ salaries. FTI is cautious of assuring its sustainability.”101 
                                                 
98 “The Catalytic Fund steering committee postponed the decision regarding country allocation for the first time, 
recently. The Fund is becoming more competitive since the number of applicants is increasing. To this point, the 
liability of the fund has been manageable. FTI started to require the submission of additional documents. So far, the 
endorsed FTI document, including the financial gap of entire education sector, was necessary. But now, FTI requests 
the submission of the funding shortfall for basic education only, along with other information. FTI now pays special 
attention to the projected trend in external financing in order to avoid the substitution of FTI funding for other 
sources of donor financing. However, in practice many donors cannot make multiple year commitments, so it is 
difficult to estimate external financing accurately.” (Interview with a World Bank economist) 
 
99 Interview with an officer of the FTI Secretariat.  
 
100 “Although the World Bank chairs the committee [of the Catalytic Fund], the Bank essentially plays a silent role. 
The funds are disbursed by the Bank staff in accordance with the decisions made by the committee.” (Interview with 
an officer of the FTI Secretariat) 
 
101 Interview with staff members of the FTI Secretariat. 
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5.3.5 Aid modality 
An increasing shift occurs from projects to program aid and budget support. This trend reflects 
the policy of donors to reduce the number of staff members with education sector skills while the 
ODA commitment for education increases. Some of the benefits gained from budget support by 
using the recipients’ national system could be undermined if donors’ aid in the form of budget 
support reduces capacity-building efforts in developing countries (UNESCO, 2006, p.98). This 
UNESCO perspective emphasizes the importance of the capacity development of recipient 
countries, which some donor agencies have implemented through technical assistance projects. 
It is imperative to promote aid harmonization and donor coordination in order to improve 
aid effectiveness. Richard Manning, the Chair of OECD-DAC, points out that the transaction 
costs from donors’ aid provision undermine the effectiveness of aid. “Each year, some 35,000 
new [foreign aid] transactions are reported to the DAC, 85% of them under $1 million in value. 
This is at least one new activity per developing country per day. It is therefore hardly surprising 
that there are concerns over the burdens, particularly to developing countries, of the way donors 
do business” (Manning, 2004, p.13). 
Technical assistance (TA) is sometimes a useful modality for developing the capacity of 
recipient countries.102 Yet, the problem remains that many aid stakeholders have seen some non-
transparency in the donors’ aid resources disbursed in the form of TA. The World Bank reports 
that about 70% of education ODA is extended as TA, which is much higher than the 30% share 
for ODA in general (World Bank, 2005c, p.93). The Bank also points out that TA is often badly 
                                                 
102 However, the Global Campaign for Education, the group of major NGOs and teachers’ unions in over 150 
countries, indicates that capacity building and technical assistance is disproportionately high, compared with budget 
support (Global Campaign for Education, 2007, p.13).  
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coordinated among donors and poorly prioritized: “One hundred days of consultancy support 
could equal the annual cost of paying 100 teachers or keeping 5,000 children in school (World 
Bank, 2006a, p.60). Donor agencies do not have to convert TA to budget support, because TA 
per se is necessary for development cooperation. However, in the light of these voices, donor 
agencies must be sensitive to the transparency and effectiveness of TA. 
Budget support is still an unexplored area. It delivers a positive result in the countries 
where donors and recipients have built mutual trust and transparency. The main question is 
whether recipients can rely on budget support to be maintained in the long run, while 
constitutional constraints prevent many donor governments from committing to long-term aid. 
(Global Campaign for Education, 2007, pp.28-9). The FTI calls for its member donor agencies to 
make predictable aid provisions for the UPE, but this does not necessarily mean that all donors 
should introduce budget support.103 
While all donor agencies endorsed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and 
thereby committed to promoting harmonization, alignment, and using the system of recipient 
countries as much as possible in delivering their aid resources, the application of this agenda to 
the respective donors’ actual activities in the field differs depending on donor agencies. In order 
to clarify the contracting problem in relation to FTI’s aid resources, I describe how major donor 
agencies decide which aid modalities to adopt. 
A Japanese aid worker in Tokyo shared insights regarding the significance of the FTI in 
terms of donor coordination. The approach to donor coordination is different between 1) 
pursuing collaboration among donors’ activities in developing countries and 2) aiming at 
                                                 
103 The former Director of the FTI Secretariat mentioned that “the FTI encourages common and simplified channels 
wherever possible, giving maximum flexibility to national governments, particularly to finance recurrent costs, 
while also making efficient use of complementary modalities” (Bellew & Dorleans, 2005, p.7). 
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reaching consensus on policy, financial arrangements, and procedures. Regarding the former 
purpose, aid workers in the field have dialogued to promote donor coordination at the national 
level in order to coordinate each other’s activities, no matter whether the country is or is not a 
member of the FTI. However, at the policy level, the latter type of collaboration may be more 
important in the context of the FTI.104 Regarding the aid modality, this officer also insists that “it 
is inappropriate to assert that the introduction of SWAps and budget support is an objective of 
the FTI,” indicating that the FTI should be regarded as a part of SWAp, which the recipient 
country develops.105  
It seems that Japan places a higher priority on implementing its philosophy of 
international development via its foreign aid activities. A Japanese official aid worker explains 
that it is important for Japan’s foreign aid to convey “the ethos of labor” to developing countries 
and that, therefore, delivering aid in a “hand-in-hand” manner is preferred.106 This officer adds 
that Japan would selectively introduce budget support to its aid system as long as it is useful in 
realizing its aid philosophy.107  
                                                 
104 Interview with a Japanese official aid worker in Tokyo. 
 
105 Interview with a Japanese official aid worker in Tokyo. 
 
106 “Japan has applied the know-how of its own reconstruction after World War II to supporting poor countries’ 
development. As [former] Foreign Minister Aso pointed out, Japan has attempted to enlighten developing countries 
on ‘the ethos of labor,’ which includes maintenance of infrastructure and hardware, technology, and management. In 
order to convey this spirit, Japan prefers delivering its foreign aid in a ‘hand-in-hand’ manner while using the 
recipient countries’ system. Each donor has different strengths and advantages, and different approaches among 
donor agencies should therefore be respected.” (Interview with a Japanese official aid worker) 
 
107 “Harmonization can be useful to improve the effectiveness of foreign aid, but the international community should 
not impose a certain aid modality on all donor countries. In relation to harmonization, Japan has asserted that the 
ownership of recipient governments is critical to better implement its aid activities, but this does not necessarily 
mean sector-wide approaches and budget support are ideal means of disbursing aid resources. Japan will continue 
using projects, including technical assistance, as its core aid modality. When providing foreign aid, Japan values 
supporting recipients’ self-help efforts, developing human resources and capacity, and investing in socio-economic 
infrastructure of developing countries. These can better be materialized through traditional bilateral projects. 
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The ADB is willing to promote alignment and harmonization, including donor 
coordination and budget support, where available and possible. The mentality of the ADB staff 
members seems to have changed toward being more open to collaborating with other agencies; 
still, difference exist between pro-donor-coordination senior level staff and those who seek to 
implement projects in a traditional manner in the field.108 
The World Bank has been particularly supportive towards the FTI, at least at the policy 
level. A senior World Bank officer concluded that “the FTI brings the World Bank closer to ideal 
harmonization rather than individual work in countries;” although some non-FTI developing 
countries show good performance in educational development.109 
The U.S., which takes a conservative position with regard to aid modalities, would like to 
use its own mechanism in disbursing the aid resources rather than introducing new aid modalities. 
A retired U.S. aid worker concludes that the new aid trends, such as the Paris Declaration of Aid 
Effectiveness, SWAps, harmonization, and donor coordination, are “not magic;” he views the 
challenges of international development differently from his European counterparts. “These new 
aid modalities may be an easy way to give money for Europe, but they make no difference to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
However, learning from other donor agencies, Japan will selectively use budget support to complement to its project 
approach.” (Interview with a Japanese official aid worker) 
 
108 “Regarding budget support, many ADB staff members were suspicious of this modality as much as 15 years ago 
because of the leakage of money and fiscal shortfalls of recipient governments. The consciousness of staff members 
is changing. They are willing to accept more budget support only if there are transparent trackings of resources and 
that it does not distort the fiscal capacity and debt overhang. Working with the World Bank is challenging but 
improving. ADB and the World Bank have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for collaboration between 
institutions. Senior level staff agreed to promote collaboration, but at the officer level, it is patchy but improving. 
Collaboration depends on the personalities of the officers on the ground.” (Interview with a staff member of ADB) 
 
109 Interview with a World Bank officer. This officer explains as follows: “Some non-FTI countries have a 
framework similar to FTI. India has its own plan and donor agencies in India have done business in a more 
integrated way. FTI has provided a more structured mechanism for foreign aid. FTI defines and replaces the 
country’s education plan.” Also, UNESCO’s EFA Global Monitoring Report 2007 cited India as a positive example 
of the development of basic education (UNESCO, 2006, pp.94, 96). 
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U.S.”110 To explain why the U.S. is reluctant to adopt the new aid modalities, this officer points 
out that the USAID has its own successful experiences in developing countries.111 Moreover, this 
officer argues that “European countries seem to consider the aid modalities from a political 
perspective, but the U.S. considers them from a technical standpoint.”112 
The U.S. made a change to the FTI by promoting dialogue and discussion among 
stakeholders, rather than instigating participating donor agencies to disburse their aid in a more 
harmonized way.113 A former U.S. aid worker recalls “the U.S.’s participation as an FTI co-chair 
created an informal atmosphere to encourage open discussion of problems and challenges.”114 
The officer concludes, “Thanks to the FTI, partners can deepen their mutual understanding and 
can explain why other donors take the positions that they do; this is the best benefit of FTI.”115 
An officer of the FTI Secretariat reported that “the U.S. has become more open to FTI after 
having served as its co-chair.”116 Although the contribution of the U.S. does not necessarily 
fulfill the initial objectives of the FTI, this observation clarifies its current situation.  
                                                 
110 Interview with a retired U.S. aid worker. 
 
111 “The U.S. has had sophisticated procedures for delivering foreign aid and considers them to work well. 
Harmonization may be fine, but everybody does not have to deliver aid in exactly the same way. This is not because 
visibility in developing countries is important to the U.S.; visibility is not the issue for, at least, USAID.” (Interview 
with a retired U.S. aid worker) 
 
112 Interview with a retired U.S. aid worker. 
 
113 “Many [aid agencies] thought that the U.S. was trying to sabotage FTI when it became a co-chair, but the reality 
was the opposite. As FTI co-chair, the U.S. has promoted honest discussion among partners, attempting to build a 
positive relationship among participants and a frank exchange of opinions so that every partner feels comfortable. 
Not only the U.S., but everybody participating in the FTI deserves this credit.” (Interview with a former U.S. aid 
worker) 
 
114 “The U.S. encourages an attitude of ‘let’s think FTI, rather than rattle and knock each other.’ The U.S. has 
contributed to building a constructive and trusting relationship among FTI partners.” (Interview with a former U.S. 
aid worker) 
 
115 Interview with a retired U.S. aid worker. 
 
116 Interview with a staff member of the FTI Secretariat.  
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The FTI Secretariat seems to welcome donors’ diversified approaches, as long as those 
approaches respect the spirit of the FTI. The Secretariat supports the decisions made 
democratically by donor agencies at the country level and their resultant activities. An officer of 
the Secretariat mentioned that “technical assistance from stand-alone projects is not necessarily 
bad as long as it fills the technical and resource gap of the recipients to achieve UPE.”117 
Another officer of the FTI Secretariat described the situation by stating, “By signing FTI 
documents, donors agree to the spirit of FTI, i.e., they agree to work within the framework of 
FTI, its appraisal guidelines, its indicative framework, etc.”118 According to this officer, the FTI 
will not become a “brand name.” Instead, the Initiative remains low key and supports the 
activities in the field by putting questions on the table, such as why FTI focuses on the 
framework, appraisal guidelines, and indicative framework and then discussing these issues.119  
The FTI Secretariat values the participation in the FTI by various stakeholders. For 
example, NGOs and civil society have had seats on the Steering Committee since 2005. The 
membership of Global Campaign for Education has been confirmed, and more NGO members 
are expected. Since some NGOs have criticized the activities of the World Bank and other 
official donors, the donor group would like to bring them into the FTI to facilitate cooperation 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
117 Interview with an officer of the FTI Secretariat. He also explains as follows: “The FTI has never said, ‘You have 
to do this’ to donor countries. The FTI is always neutral and respects the discussion and decisions made at the 
country level. The FTI does not promote any specific aid modalities while it emphasizes the importance of recipient 
countries’ ownership. The FTI supports decisions made at the country level and considers that aid modality should 
be decided on a case-by-case basis depending on the situations of recipient countries. The FTI is only concerned 
about the progress toward achieving the UPE goal by 2015.” 
 
118 Interview with an officer of the FTI Secretariat. He also mentions “The general intent of FTI is the same as the 
Paris Declaration, which intends to reduce transaction costs for developing countries.” 
 
119 “The FTI is not an elaborate model, and it is not intended as an alternative model” (Interview with an officer of 
the FTI Secretariat). 
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among them. Like other donors, these NGOs endorse the FTI documents.120 Similarly, the FTI 
Secretariat believes that it is important to incorporate well-established institutions such as 
UNESCO and UNICEF into the FTI process since UNESCO focuses on technical support for the 
FTI and the assessment of cross-country comparisons, while UNICEF acts as a Lead 
Coordinating Agency in many developing countries.121 
Regarding aid modality, this officer concludes that “reaching UPE requires a broader 
sector-wide approach, but you cannot say which approach is the best. We [the FTI Secretariat] 
want to work through donors, not try to replace them.”122 The officer also mentions that “SWAps, 
including budget support, are an ideal modality for FTI, and the project implementation unit 
should be reduced.”123 
5.3.6 FTI countries and non-FTI countries 
Because foreign aid does not function as the sole determinant of education development, it is 
difficult to prove the direct cause-and-effect relationship between the FTI and the performance of 
UPE. However, there does seem to be a palpable difference between FTI and non-FTI countries.  
An official of the FTI Secretariat observes differences in donors’ activities when 
comparing FTI countries and non-FTI countries, although the progress of harmonization still lags. 
This officer explains his observations as follows: 
                                                 
120 Interview with an officer of the FTI Secretariat. 
 
121 Interview with an officer of the FTI Secretariat. 
 
122 Interview with an officer of the FTI Secretariat. “FTI plays the role of a broker through the local donor 
community.” 
 
123 Interview with an officer of the FTI Secretariat. He continues that “but there are exceptions. Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Credit (PRSC) cannot be applied to all developing countries. Parallel implementation is a starting point.” 
 
 142 
Donors have tried to align their lending programs with recipient countries’ plans; 
this tendency is significant in FTI countries. Consequently, transaction costs have 
decreased in FTI countries. Changes in donors’ approaches have enabled recipient 
countries to simplify their dealings with donors. In all FTI countries, donors now 
have joint supervision programs, although the alignment of these programs is not 
perfect. There are some separate bilateral activities, but cooperation among donor 
agencies has improved and alignment has been promoted. On the other hand, 
harmonization is still lagging. It is hard to change the big international 
bureaucracies of donor agencies. It is even risky to push harmonization on donor 
countries. Some donors are able to make multi-year commitments, while other 
donors can only make single year commitments. FTI is trying to accommodate 
these differences among donor agencies. Some specific changes include 1) 
France’s introduction of pooled funding and 2) Nordic donors’ ability to make 
multi-year commitments. (Interview with an official of the FTI Secretariat) 
The World Bank’s Annual Meeting in 2006 reported that FTI countries exhibit higher 
progress in UPE than non-FTI countries. This report presents a preliminary evaluation of the FTI. 
Since the FTI was only established in 2002, more time is required until its results can be 
observed. The Global Forum on Development, co-organized by OECD-DAC and the World 
Bank in December 2006, also concluded that donor agencies have taken more harmonized 
approaches in delivering foreign aid since the launch of the FTI, although one cannot say that 
this trend can be attributed solely to the FTI. At the meeting, Nicaragua and Rwanda expressed 
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their appreciation to the FTI because 1) the quality of aid has improved and 2) recipient countries 
and donors have worked well together, even though the amount of aid has not increased.124 
5.4 CAPACITY 
Donor agencies need to develop their capacity to improve the effectiveness of their aid resources 
as well as the success of the FTI. First of all, the absorptive capacity of low-income countries 
receiving aid from donor countries presents a challenge. Donor agencies should attempt to 
improve the recipient countries’ absorptive capacity so that developing countries can achieve the 
UPE goal by accepting sufficient aid resources from donor countries.  
Action Aid, an NGO network, argues that the limited aid absorptive capacity of recipient 
countries is “often a consequence of administratively cumbersome aid” (Action Aid 
International, 2005, p.9). Rosemary Bellew, former Director of the FTI Secretariat, echoes this 
position. She asserts that “absorptive capacity constraints with respect to absorbing increased 
ODA are often created by the donors themselves, through their expenditure eligibility 
requirements and procedures,” and “the financing modality itself can increase ODA absorptive 
capacity” (Bellew & Dorleans, 2005, p.8). These remarks imply that donor agencies can resolve 
the problem of low aid absorptive capacity of developing countries by promoting donor 
coordination, harmonization, and alignment. Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia University, who 
served as a member of former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's advisory group on Africa, 
insists that a graduated increase on foreign aid is more appropriate than a substantial and sudden 
                                                 
124 Interview with officials of the FTI Secretariat. 
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one, citing the case of Africa.125 All of these comments indicate that donor agencies cannot 
blame the decrease in aid on the lack of the recipient countries’ absorptive capacity. Donor 
countries have to develop their capacity to ensure that recipient countries have sufficient 
absorptive capacity to receive the necessary aid.  
In addition, the FTI makes a difference in the field of foreign aid for UPE with its 
capacity of resource mobilization and coordination. The FTI Partnership Meeting, the FTI 
Secretariat, and the Steering Committee, as well as other participating donors, play critical roles 
in resource mobilization with other bilateral and multilateral donor agencies for UPE. Since the 
FTI per se does not mobilize resources from financial markets, its main task includes building 
awareness of the importance of UPE and maintaining its momentum by taking every opportunity, 
so that donor agencies may disburse more financial and/or in-kind resources for UPE. Properly 
managing the trust funds (EPDF and CF) is also an important task for the FTI. In order to update 
and improve the capacity of resource mobilization and coordination among the stakeholders of 
the FTI, three working groups, i.e., harmonization, communications, and finance, were 
established in 2004 on the global level. A number of aid workers from various aid agencies share 
their knowledge of these capacities through the working groups. 
On the field level, the capacity of coordination is more important for the FTI. The 
processes which directly affect recipient countries are conducted on the country level. These 
include providing various guidance to developing countries, mobilizing in-country resources, 
                                                 
125 “The large amounts of aid given to Africa and the small results that have generally accrued from them require us 
to look at the absorptive capacity question with a critical eye. We should disregard the hysterical charge that 
everyone who questions the effectiveness of a sudden and substantial increase in aid flows is a heartless reactionary. 
The increase in the number of democratic governments in Africa, and some bold initiatives by the African Union in 
places such as Darfur, have increased the absorptive capacity of a growing number of African nations. But that 
justifies a graduated increase on spending in Africa rather than a substantial and sudden one” (Bhagwati, 2006, 
February 28). 
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bridging the gap between recipient governments and donor agencies and among donor agencies, 
and providing a forum for donor coordination. This capacity of the FTI contributes to reducing 
the recipients’ transaction costs, i.e., the administrative costs borne by developing countries to 
address various donors’ different approaches. Conversely, the trend toward donor coordination 
and harmonization requires donor agencies to have the capacity to address this new business 
environment in which donors bear the administrative costs of developing countries. 126 It is also 
critical to find out to what extent donor agencies decentralize their foreign aid management, 
because a number of important decisions regarding the FTI tend to be made on the field level in a 
timely manner.  
Regarding the capacity of donor agencies, a number of professionals shared their 
reflections on what kind of abilities and skills they feel should be strengthened in order to 
improve the result-based management of aid activities. A staff member of ADB emphasized that 
donor agencies should allocate more human resources in the stage of implementation, while 
strong international financial institutions tend to attach more importance to project preparation 
and appraisal.127  
                                                 
126 Rothmann and Have (2004) analyze four major aid modalities to provide support to developing country’s 
governments in the education sector: 1) general budget supports; 2) education sector budget support; 3) pooled 
funding or basket funding; and 4) project aid. While donors increasingly shift from traditional project aid toward 
direct support for the recipients’ national budget, the success of budget support depends upon the level of 
government capacity to plan, execute, and account for its public spending (p.25-26). They state that project aid “may 
be preferred if the budget process is weak and impedes an effective allocation of general and sector budget support” 
(p.29). However, the project aid is not merely a complementary or second-best modality, considering the fact that 
some major donors such as the U.S. and Japan have employed it as a core modality.   
 
127 “Regarding donors’ capacities, more emphasis should be placed on implementation. A reality is that once the 
project appraisal process (including proposal, pre-feasibility study, and approval) is completed, very few officers 
included for implementation. This is a problem from the standpoint of results-based management. Donors’ 
capacities for implementation and monitoring using process indicators should be strengthened, because donors will 
be blamed if problems arise during project implementation.” (Interview with an ADB officer) 
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A former U.S. aid worker claimed the necessity for more educators to become involved 
in educational aid programs such as the FTI. The officer observed that economists and 
bureaucrats are predominant among those who are engaged in the FTI, which is problematic 
because those professionals do not necessarily have a good understanding of teaching and 
learning.128 
UNESCO echoes the view of the American aid worker. It points out that “while ODA 
commitment for education are increasing, donors are reducing the number of their staff with 
sector skills,” that is, those familiar with teaching and learning (UNESCO, 2006, p.98). This 
results from the recent shift from traditional projects toward SWAps and budget support. Since 
donors are expected to use the recipient countries’ system, donors tend to focus on monitoring 
and evaluating the recipient countries’ policies and practices. UNESCO warns that “some of the 
benefits gained from emphasizing the maximum use of national systems and providing sector-
wide support could be undermined” in the FTI if the donors’ staff lacks the expertise of 
education (p.98). In addition to the knowledge of economists and aid modalities, the specialty of 
education remains critical for donor agencies.  
The FTI Secretariat believes that donor agencies need to strengthen their capacity for 
working within the FTI’s objectives, that is, in the spirit of the FTI, the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, and donor coordination and harmonization. The G8 co-chair of the FTI exerts 
                                                 
128 “In contrast to the health care sector that is represented primarily by health care professionals, the education 
sector is represented primarily by bureaucrats and economists. We need fewer economists, who emphasize 
measurable results, and more educators, who focus directly on children, learning, and teaching. Unlike many other 
donors, USAID has a cadre of educators. Other donors also should pay more attention to actual learning. In addition, 
one should also look at the whole education sector, not just the UPE: experts in higher education care about primary 
school education, because primary school pupils are their future students.” (Interview with a former U.S. aid 
worker) 
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political pressure on rich countries, causing peer pressure among industrial countries, so that the 
FTI member donors develop the capacity to contribute to the goal of the FTI.129 
An officer of the FTI Secretariat presents the necessity of strengthening the capacity of 
donor agencies’ staff members at the field level. “It is important to ensure the donor’s staff, 
especially its front-line staff, receives adequate support, because local staff members have little 
capacity, especially sector-specific knowledge such as abolishing school fees and which 
language of instruction to use, to influence the finance of donor agencies.”130 According to this 
officer, this environment of aid (agencies’ staffs covering more than one sector) gives the 
economist the advantage of dealing with any sector, like a salesman. However, the ideal donor 
agency’s staff is somewhere between the salesman and the specialist, i.e., “those who have 
general expertise in development and specific sector knowledge.”131  
It is critical to recognize that donor agencies should develop the capacity of their 
organizations and staff members in order to improve the effectiveness of the FTI. Unlike 
developing countries, donors’ capacity development depends on their spontaneous efforts since 
no external organizations force donors to develop a certain capacity. However, donor agencies 
need to pay more attention to developing their own capacity in order to assume the responsibility 
to fulfill “mutual accountability” of the FTI.  
                                                 
129 Interview with an officer of the FTI Secretariat.  
 
130 The officer continues that “donor agencies have their own institutional position, but the field decision process 
depends on the front line staff’s personal belief, usually lacking the opportunity to acquire knowledge from the 
sector” (Interview with an officer of the FTI Secretariat). 
 
131 “It is preferable to have an economist who has solid sector knowledge in the field. Above all, policy comes first. 
Even if significant amounts of money are provided, if the policy is bad, good results cannot be expected.” (Interview 
with an officer of the FTI Secretariat) 
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have analyzed the observed patterns of the FTI from the perspectives of donor 
agencies’ concerns, contracting problems, and capacity. First, all donor agencies share common 
concerns of assisting developing countries to reach the goal of UPE and improving aid 
effectiveness by promoting aid harmonization, alignment, and donor coordination. However, the 
magnitude of commitment to these concerns differs among donor agencies and between the staff 
members at the headquarters level and at the field level even within individual donor agencies. 
Second, in relation to contracting problems, the FTI has promoted the participation of 
donor agencies by using donors’ existing mechanisms rather than establishing new systems in 
the field. The exception is the Trust Fund, managed by the Secretariat and the World Bank; this 
Fund helps those developing countries which receive a sufficient number of donor agencies 
support. Nevertheless, some donors recognize that participating in the FTI generates additional 
administrative burdens for them. Furthermore, while developing countries comply with the 
requirements of the FTI in order to receive aid from donors, the FTI cannot force donor agencies 
to implement the plans and/or to disburse the amount of aid money that they commit. Mutual 
accountability of donors and recipients, which is a basis of the FTI, is not necessarily assured 
because their relationship is not equal. 
Third, in order to make the FTI workable, donor agencies need to develop their capacity 
to improve recipients’ absorption of aid. It is also critical for donors to improve their resource 
mobilization and coordination with various stakeholders, especially with other donor agencies. 
While I have analyzed the observed patterns of the FTI in general, a study focusing on 
the unique context of individual countries is useful for clarifying the complexity of the causal 
pathway of the effectiveness of the FTI. As I have reviewed, it is donor agencies in the field and 
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the officers of recipient governments who have made decisions and implemented activities to 
achieve the UPE goal in line with the FTI. The performance of the FTI depends upon the 
capacity and personality of aid workers and recipient government officials in the field. I focus on 
the country-specific situations of FTI by focusing on the cases of Mongolia, Vietnam, and 
Cambodia in the next three chapters.  
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6.0  MONGOLIA132 
Mongolia, a country in East Asia, became a member of the FTI in 2006. A consultant familiar 
with the FTI appraisal process in East Asia alludes to an initial conflict among donor agencies in 
Mongolia, but in 2006, “The donor agencies became increasingly supportive of the FTI and, in 
the end, all endorsed the FTI proposal.”133  
The following table shows the current condition of ODA in Mongolia.  
 
Table 9. ODA in Mongolia 
Receipts 2003 2004 2005 
Net ODA ($ million) 249 262 212 
Net ODA/GNI 19.7% 16.4% 11.6% 
Net private flows ($ million) 57 413 - 17 
Top 10 donors of gross ODA  
(2004-05 average) ($ million) 
Japan (67), AsDF (35)134, IDA (31), Germany (28), U.S. (22), Netherlands 
(9), Turkey (8), France (6), EC (5), Arab countries (4) 
Source: OECD (2007b) 
 
Before the country joined the FTI, Mongolia already enjoyed a high primary completion 
rate. In 2003/04, it was 95.5%, with that of girls being 96.3%. According to the education master 
                                                 
132 Initially, I was going to conduct the case study targeting Vietnam and Cambodia. However, as a result of the 
interview research focusing on foreign aid workers who have been involved in supporting primary education 
development in Asia, I have obtained data regarding the FTI in Mongolia. I briefly touch upon the case of Mongolia 
to get a sense of how donors’ concerns are reflected within the policies and activities regarding the FTI in the field.  
 
133 Interview with a consultant familiar with the FTI appraisal process in Cambodia, Mongolia, and Vietnam. 
 
134 The AsDF (the Asian Development Fund), the ADB’s lending window for the poorest countries, provides 
interest-free loan programs.  
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plan from 2006-2015, the Mongolian government hopes to reduce the disparities in academic 
opportunities so all students can obtain a quality education and enjoy the right to study 
(Government of Mongolia, 2006, p.xi).  
Many donor agencies provide aid to support education. Table 10 and 11 show recent 
foreign aid projects in the education sector in Mongolia.135 In the following section, I explain 
and analyze the challenges in relation to donor coordination. 
 
Table 10. Donors’ education projects administered by Mongolia in 2005 
Donors Year Amount  
(US$ 000) 
Contents 
Japan (grants) 2002 - 2007 53,480 Human resource development,  
Elementary school building, Teacher education 
ADB (loan) 2003 - 2007 23,140 Secondary education development program 
ADB (grant) 2004 - 2006 1,000 ICT for innovating rural education 
UNESCO (grants) 2004 - 2005 762 Cultural education, Human rights education,  
Literacy education, Primary education 
UNFPA (grant) 2002 - 2006      403 Reproductive health for adolescents 
Switzerland (grant) 2004 - 2007 397 Education for disabled children 
UNICEF (grant) 2003 - 2006      22 Inclusive development of children 
    Source: Asian Development Bank (2006b, p.39) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
135 In addition to these activities, the Millennium Challenge Account of the U.S. has approved a $25.51 million grant 
project to Mongolia for developing a vocational education system in 2007 (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 
2007). 
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Table 11. Other donors’ education projects in Mongolia 2007-2009 
Donors Activities 
Australia (AusAID) Capacity building, scholarships for postgraduate students,  
community based development initiatives 
Denmark Rural secondary teacher training, rural school heating,  
non-formal basic distance education 
EU National university management, libraries, curriculum development,  
teacher and student training 
Germany (GTZ) Vocational education 
India IT, management, accounting, communication, rural development training in India, 
vocational training, post-graduate scholarship program 
Japan Policy and planning support, school facilities, ICT in partnership with ADB,  
human development scholarship program 
Nordic Development 
Fund 
Secondary education (co-financing with ADB), science and vocational education, 
upgrading kindergartens and primary schools 
Soros Foundation 
Open Society Forum 
Basic education and capacity building, ICT  
Republic of Korea Distance education, upgrading facilities of higher education institutions 
U.K. Post graduate scholarships, pre-school education 
UNICEF School renovation, community-based primary education, teacher development,  
early childhood development, community participation in education, life skills,  
non-formal education 
UNFPA/Finland Capacity for population training, research center in population, development, gender 
USAID Graduate degree scholarships for economic studies and ICT,  
vocational training center 
World Bank Human resource development, education privatization 
World Vision Pre-school education for children of poor households 
    Source: Asian Development Bank (2006a, pp.15-6) 
6.1 CONCERNS 
There has been an ongoing competition among three major education donor agencies in 
Mongolia: the World Bank, the ADB, and Japan. The ADB and Japan, the largest donors in the 
education sector in Mongolia, represent the local education donors as the lead coordinating 
agencies for the FTI. In 2004, a working group on improving aid effectiveness in the education 
sector was set up under the auspices of the Mongolian government; Japan and the ADB became 
vice-chair of the working group on education. Japan’s country assistant program for Mongolia 
describes that “as Japan has been the top donor in Mongolia, it is expected to take the lead in 
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donor coordination and partnership” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004a, p.29). However, both 
Japan and the ADB did not attempt to promote the FTI in Mongolia.  
A consultant gave an example of the conflict of concerns in Mongolia, particularly 
among multilateral donor agencies, the ADB, and the World Bank, in Mongolia. 
While the World Bank and some other donors attempted to promote FTI in 
Mongolia, the ADB may have had initial misgivings about FTI. There was a 
potential conflict between ADB and other donors in relation to FTI. The ADB 
supported Mongolia in developing the education master plan intended as the 
primary vehicle for achieving the EFA goals, and the ADB prepared a succession 
of very large loan projects for Mongolia’s education sector. Other donors, with 
urging from the World Bank, tried to invite Mongolia to be a FTI member in 
order for Mongolia to qualify potentially for grant money under the FTI Catalytic 
Fund, considering that the country did not need, nor did it plan to continue 
borrowing funds for education, in the light of its rapidly growing economy. The 
prospect of FTI funding could have placed the ADB’s loan project at risk since, 
naturally, grant money is preferred to a loan project, but the Government 
[Ministry of Finance] honored its earlier promise to the ADB to accept one last 
loan project [the Third Education Development Project]. (Interview with a 
consultant familiar with the FTI appraisal process in Cambodia, Mongolia, and 
Vietnam) 
Likewise, a World Bank officer analyzes the background of the FTI in Mongolia.  
The MOE [the Ministry of Education in Mongolia] was working on a new master 
plan (M/P) for its education sector. The ADB has supported MOE in developing 
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its M/P and preparing the ADB’s third educational project.  The ADB also had 
supported the previous master plan which had limited data on financial 
projections. MOE welcomed the World Bank team to contribute to the 
development process sharing information and findings from analytical work and 
participating in review meetings. (Interview with a World Bank officer) 
According to this World Bank officer, the ADB was not supportive of the FTI when the 
World Bank attempted to introduce it in Mongolia. ADB’s role was to support the master plan 
and develop a new project while the World Bank’s role was to also respond to the government’s 
needs. The World Bank team wanted to contribute to the master plan process, promote a working 
donor group that had been called for in the last CG (Consultative Group) meeting but had not 
materialized, and share experiences concerning the FTI and sector-wide approaches from other 
countries. The MOE welcomed the World Bank’s involvement in the education sector analysis 
and learning about the FTI. Initially, the ADB task team leader had no interest in the FTI and 
was only concerned with the development of a third ADB project and the need to have a master 
plan in place as a condition of the project; while the government welcomed contributions to the 
master plan process and the Bank team worked well with the ADB consultant team, the ADB 
task team leader was resistant to the joint collaboration and efforts at economic analysis. While 
the Bank team spoke about the challenges of donor fragmentation and the FTI as a way to 
promote harmonization, ADB did not concur in the early discussions.136 
The World Bank officer stated that the FTI could provide an impetus for Mongolia to 
improve the effectiveness of foreign aid for basic education. The officer felt Mongolia could 
potentially be a recipient of the FTI. He explains his analysis as follows: 
                                                 
136 Interview with a World Bank officer. 
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Although its enrollment rates are already high, Mongolia has challenges with a 
funding gap for supporting UPE and is one of the few countries that have children 
starting school at a late age. Thus the challenge for Mongolia is the successful 
transition to going from serving eight years old with ten years of education to 
brining the system down to serve younger children. The FTI is good for Mongolia, 
because 1) the country can get grant resources and can avoid additional borrowing 
from donor agencies; 2) leverage can be expected through greater donor 
coordination and an acceptance of common assessments by local donor agencies 
of the master plan; Discussions on the FTI also gave the World Bank team an 
avenue to contribute to the work on the Master Plan and share data and findings 
from World Bank analytical work. (Interview with a World Bank officer) 
Japan, the largest bilateral donor in Mongolia, was also not as cooperative in introducing 
the FTI as the ADB. A consultant indicated that one cause of this may also explain Japan’s 
foreign aid policy in other countries: “Japan, or at least those managing its aid program in the 
country, was cautious in the beginning with respect to FTI. Japan’s decision-making is 
complicated by the existence of multiple agencies.137 Also, since Japanese aid workers in the 
field are granted limited delegation from the headquarters, it took longer for Japan to sign the 
FTI endorsement than it did for some of the other smaller donors with greater country-level 
autonomy.”138 In addition, a World Bank officer said that “the Japanese Embassy [in Mongolia] 
                                                 
137 JBIC, JICA, and MOFA 
 
138 Interview with a consultant familiar with the FTI appraisal process in Cambodia, Mongolia, and Vietnam 
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had limited understanding of FTI and a lot of effort went to helping the embassy staff understand 
FTI and the importance of the role that Japan would need to play as a lead donor.”139 
6.2 CONTRACTING PROBLEMS AND CAPACITY 
The World Bank’s approaches to the government and major donors in Mongolia formed the basis 
to launch the FTI and enabled the stakeholders to take action for the FTI.140 In March 2005, the 
MOE invited donor agencies to hear a presentation about the FTI and SWAps by the World Bank 
team and to begin a conversation about coordination and the potential gains of the FTI.141 The 
preparation for the FTI facilitated donor coordination in Mongolia, where the aid delivery 
mechanisms had been fragmented.142 
In the wake of the preparation for participating in the FTI, a division of labor was 
established as follows: 
The ADB team, consisting of economists and educators, supported the MOE to 
develop the M/P. The MOE made its own analysis, looking backward and forward 
at the education sector in Mongolia for developing the M/P. The World Bank 
                                                 
139 Interview with a World Bank officer. 
 
140 “In the FTI endorsement process, usually the ministry of the recipient government develops the education sector 
plan, then local donors assess it, and finally the FTI Secretariat approves it. The World Bank took a different 
approach in Mongolia. The World Bank started the assessment of sector issues as part of preparing FTI documents 
and as a way needed TA to the Master Plan Process. The World Bank had no problem in sharing its analytical 
documents with ADB.” (Interview with a World Bank officer) 
 
141 Interview with a World Bank officer. 
 
142 “Within MOE, there were two groups: one group was working on the M/P with the ADB and the other group was 
working on the EFA plan with UNESCO. While there was some communication between the two efforts they were 
distinct and early on were not integrated.” (Interview with a World Bank officer) 
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developed two databases based upon its analytical work concerning 1) all donor 
activities and 2) school by school data regarding which donors did what in each 
school. The World Bank also engaged in work on enrollment and cost projections 
and joined the ADB consultant in this work. The ADB project officer seemed 
unhappy with the World Bank’s involvement. (Interview with a World Bank 
officer) 
However, a member of ADB’s technical assistance team mentioned that the ADB 
consultant team leader did welcome and encourage cooperation with the World Bank task team 
in preparation for the sector study and master plan during the summer of 2005. There seems to be 
a perception gap in relation to donor coordination among aid workers.  
Afterwards, in accordance with global agreements on harmonization, the Minister of 
Education asked the World Bank to coordinate efforts with the ADB’s project preparation 
process.143 Then the Bank responded with the following statement: 
The World Bank proposed with urging from the MOE to the ADB the idea of 
joint preparation and using ADB’s project documents as the appraisal documents 
for the World Bank’s grant project. The ADB’s Resident Representative was open 
to this idea. The World Bank agreed that this could be done saving the 
government time and energy for the project preparation process. The ADB project 
officer and staff from ADB in Manila would not agree to a joint project nor even a 
joint PMU for the new World Bank project with the existing ADB PMU. 
(Interview with a World Bank officer) 
                                                 
143 Interview with a World Bank officer. 
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According to this officer, the World Bank’s contributions to the FTI [in Mongolia] 
include: 1) taking the initiative to promote the potential of the FTI for Mongolia and working 
with the donors to understand and accept the endorsement process; 2) working with the MOF 
(Ministry of Finance) and MOE to fully grasp the meaning of FTI; 3) providing TA to help with 
the master plan; 4) completing the FTI assessment document; and 5) working to have Japan and 
the ADB take the needed leadership to call other donors together. He concludes that neither the 
ADB nor Japan took leadership for significant donor coordination in Mongolia prior to the point 
at which the World Bank increased their participation in the sector.144 Without the World Bank, 
the FTI could not have been realized in Mongolia. 
The above-mentioned opinions of aid workers in Mongolia show that the World Bank has 
attempted to create a recipient-friendly mechanism to support UPE in Mongolia via the FTI, 
while other major donors, the ADB and Japan, have been reluctant to join the FTI due to their 
existing aid mechanisms.145 The World Bank can play the leading role in preparing for the FTI in 
Mongolia because its scale of assistance to the country’s education sector is relatively small 
                                                 
144 “FTI process has been moving forward. In September 2005, the annual EFA High-Level Group meeting and FTI 
Partnership meeting were held in Beijing. The meeting’s opening statement was given by the President of Mongolia. 
The Minister of Education of Mongolia understood what FTI was at this Meeting. In 2005, the World Bank and the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) organized a meeting (just like a CG meeting) in Mongolia, which featured the education 
sector. At the meeting, the key persons including the MOF and the Ministry of Education representatives, the 
Japanese Ambassador, and the ADB Resident Representative all mentioned FTI. The World Bank facilitated the 
meeting to assure that all the key persons supported FTI. This meeting gave Mongolia the leverage to join the FTI. 
The documents necessary to become an FTI partner had been prepared for the meeting.” (Interview with a World 
Bank officer) 
 
145 The following comments demonstrate the recipient-friendly stance of the World Bank in Mongolia. “Mongolia 
should not borrow when grant resources can be available…While the Paris Declaration insisted that establishment of 
PIU be minimized and the recipients’ systems be used, PIU is still necessary in Mongolia due to the limited capacity 
of its government line departments.” (Interview with a World Bank officer) “FTI’s steering committee in Mongolia 
has been chaired by the World Bank, ADB, and Japan. The World Bank has insisted that NGOs and other small 
donors join the meeting and have them review FTI’s technical proposal, which would create a true leverage of aid 
effectiveness. But, in reality, the meeting is primarily informational with little consultation.” (Interview with a 
World Bank economist) 
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when compared with that of other donor agencies. This enables the Bank to take a recipient-
friendly stance, as well as to make an impact despite a minimal degree of input.   
While an informant of the World Bank has provided useful observations to understand 
the reality of the FTI in Mongolia, it is important to recognize that nuances still exist in the 
relationship among donor agencies. The World Bank has taken a leadership position to promote 
the FTI in Mongolia; other major donor agencies may not necessarily be reluctant to participate 
in the FTI. As I described, a consultant who worked as a member of ADB team asserted that 
ADB was willing to work with the World Bank to assist primary education in Mongolia.  
To understand Japan and its aid policy in Mongolia, it is imperative to comprehend the 
complexity of the Japanese foreign aid institutions, particularly the difference between the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. Japan has had a significant influence on 
the policies of ADB: Japan is the largest shareholder of ADB; since its establishment all of its 
presidents have been Japanese nationals. While the Ministry of Finance of Japan has influence 
on ADB, the Japanese foreign aid agency has been under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance do not necessarily share a 
common interest regarding the provision of foreign aid. Consequently, in order to analyze 
Japan’s contribution to the FTI in Mongolia, it may be necessary to understand the perspectives 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. Analyzing the internal politics 
among stakeholder ministries and organizations in donors’ home countries plays a formidable 
but critical role when examining the effectiveness of foreign aid. The analysis of different 
ministries’ perspectives within donors’ home countries in providing aid to promote basic 
education should be taken into account as a future research topic. 
 
 160 
7.0  VIETNAM 
As a successful case of the FTI, Vietnam is moving toward achieving UPE and having sufficient 
capacity to make necessary arrangements for that goal. A staff member of the ADB explains the 
situation of Vietnam as follows: 
 In Vietnam, primary enrollment is already high. Donors are focusing on the 
quality of education. The ADB’s focus shifts from primary to secondary and 
higher education. The government of Vietnam has high ownership; they are not a 
“price taker,” like China and India. They are very clear about what they want. 
(Interview with a staff member of ADB) 
Currently, the DFID and UNESCO jointly play the role of Lead Coordinating Agencies 
for the FTI. Major local donors lending the volume of foreign aid to Vietnam are Japan, the 
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the United Kingdom; in 2005, these donors 
provided $667.0 million, $390.8 million, $232.1 million, and $104.5 million, respectively, for 
their aid activities in Vietnam (Partnership Group for Aid Effectiveness, 2005). Although 
UNESCO only spent $1.0 million in Vietnam in 2005, it still made a difference in the FTI by 
coordinating various stakeholders in the education sector with DFID. 
The following tables (Table 12, 13, and 14) show the current condition of ODA in 
Vietnam, while Figure 14 depicts donors’ grouping in Vietnam in relation to EFA. 
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Table 12. ODA in Vietnam 
Receipts 2003 2004 2005 
Net ODA ($ million) 1765 1840 1905 
Net ODA/GNI 4.5% 4.1% 3.7% 
Net private flows ($ million) 657 611 517 
Top 10 donors of gross ODA  
(2004-05 average) ($ million) 
Japan (670), IDA (418), AsDF (207), France (116), U.K. (82),  
Germany (79), Denmark (73), Netherlands (55), Australia (50),  EC (35) 
Source: OECD (2007c) 
 
Table 13. Donors’ Commitment to Primary Education in Vietnam 
Year 
Total Amount 
(US $ 000, 
2004 price) Breakdown 
2000 16,375 Japan 13,409, Norway 1,974, UNICEF 730, UK 254, Australia 9 
2001 31,339 
World Bank (loan) 25,719, Norway 2,227, Canada 1,386, Australia 1,353,  
UNICEF 604, Belgium 50 
2002 16,739 UK 15,878, UNICEF 489, Belgium 270, US 89, Italy 5 
2003 232,747 
World Bank (loan) 151,388, UK 48,797, Norway 15,668, Canada 11,879, Japan 4,516, 
UNICEF 467, Ireland 31 
2004 19,938 
EC 14,909, Japan 3,182, Luxembourg 699, UNICEF 429, New Zealand 336,  
Canada 153, Germany 149, Norway 65, Belgium 15 
Source: OECD-DAC’s Creditor Reporting System (not include general budget support) 
 
Table 14. Donors' Disbursement to Primary Education in Vietnam 
Year 
Total Amount 
(US $ 000, 
2004 price) Breakdown 
2000 5,958 Japan 5,083, UNICEF 588, UK 282, Australia 6 
2001 825 Norway 612, UK 180, Belgium 34 
2002 2,364 Japan 1,413, UNICEF 400, Australia 248, New Zealand 303,  
2003 5,322 Norway 2,665, UK 1,256, Canada 641, UNICEF 428, Australia 304, Ireland 28,  
2004 17,317 
UK 8,945, Japan 3,091, Norway 2,974, Canada 1,517, Luxembourg 699, Germany 75, 
Belgium 16,  
Source: OECD-DAC’s Creditor Reporting System (not include general budget support) 
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1) Implementing the EFA-related projects: World Bank, Belgium, EC, Japan (JICA), Norway (NORAD), UNICEF
2) Involved in the policy dialogue in the education sector for PRSC 4 in 2005: ADB, Belgium, Canada (CIDA), Norway, UNDP
3) Supporting the "Targeted budget support for National EFA Plan Implementation": World Bank, Belgium, Canada, EC, NZ, UK
4) Supporting the National EFA Plan and other EFA-related agenda: UNESCO
5) Managing campaign and keeping score for the MDGs: UNDP
U.N.
UNICEF 
UNESCO
5-Banks
World Bank
ADB
Japan
PRSC-4: policy dialogue in education
Like-Minded
Donor Groups
Partnership Group for Aid Effectiveness
EU
Belgium
EC
Luxemboug
Norway
New Zealand
U.K.
Germany
Ireland
UNDP
Canada
Australia
U.S.A.
EFA - FTI
NGOs
Oxfam 
Save the Children
Source: Based upon the information on Partnership Group for Aid Effectiveness (2004, 2005) 
Figure 14. Donor grouping in Vietnam in relation to EFA 
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The following figure is a flow chart of Chapter 7.  
 
Figure 15. Chapter 7 flow chart 
Chapter 7. 
Vietnam
Concerns Contracting 
problems
Capacity
Radicals Traditionalists Realists
Targeted budget support for EFA
FTI countries and non-FTI 
countries
General tendency of aid effectiveness
The Hanoi Action Plan and the Program-Based Approaches
Transaction costs
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7.1 CONCERNS 
One of the donors’ concerns in relation to the FTI is supporting Vietnam so that it can achieve 
UPE. 146  In cooperation with donor agencies, the Government of Vietnam has developed a 
number of positive policy documents. Donors have maintained their foreign aid activities to 
assist basic education to align with these strategies implemented by Vietnam.  
Donor agencies attempt to harmonize their aid activities with three policy documents 
developed by the Government of Vietnam: the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Strategy (CPRGS), the Education Development Strategic Plan (EDSP) for 2001-2010, and the 
National EFA Action Plan 2003-2015. First, the CPRGS, the Vietnamese version of PRSP, 
places a particular emphasis on both growth and poverty reduction; it, therefore, focuses on the 
development of the infrastructure and the industrial sectors, giving a succinct description, 
focuses on the education sector. The current CPRGS covers the period from 2003 to 2010, while 
the FTI envisages the strategy lasting to 2015. Second, the EDSP serves as a supplemental 
document to the CPRGS for the education sector. Third, the National EFA Action Plan is the 
only policy document covering the strategy until 2015. This Plan, which extends the UPE as well 
as other EFA goals, is significant to the FTI in terms of the cost estimation to achieve the EFA 
goals; it explicitly indicates the necessary amount of donors’ resources. Donors usually align 
their strategies of the FTI toward these three policy documents of the Vietnamese government.  
In 2002, the Government of Vietnam, in collaboration with donor agencies and NGOs, 
identified a core set of development goals, known as the Vietnam Development Goals (VDGs). 
                                                 
146 While the primary completion rate in Vietnam has reached approximately 95%, the FTI Secretariat encourages 
the country and local donors to reach the goal as early as possible so that it could be a model for other countries and 
remaining EFA goals could be addressed (EFA-Fast Track Initiative, 2003). 
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The VDGs expand the MDGs to reflect Vietnam’s unique circumstances; its goals are 
incorporated into the CPRGS (Poverty Task Force, 2002, p.1). Since Vietnam’s net enrollment in 
primary education reached 91% in 1998, a very positive outlier by low-income country standards, 
the VDGs have revised the UPE goal of the MDGs as follows: a) Increase the net enrollment in 
primary school to 97% in 2005 and to 99% in 2010; b) Eliminate the gender gap in primary 
education by 2005 and the gap with ethnic minorities by 2010; and c) Improve the quality of 
education and increase full-day schooling at the primary level (exact target depends on funding) 
by 2010 (pp.13-15). The VDGs attempt to complete UPE while paying attention to ensuring the 
quality of teaching and learning outcomes.  
Although all donor agencies of the FTI seem to share the common goal of supporting 
Vietnam’s effort to achieve the UPE by 2015, various aid modalities employed by the respective 
donors exemplify the diverse concerns regarding the FTI. Japan, the largest donor among 
bilateral and multilateral agencies in Vietnam, has primarily taken the project-type approach, 
which produces good results in Asia and enables a donor agency to undertake the accountability 
of aid resources. However, Japan clearly states its concern in “Japan’s Country Assistance 
Program for Vietnam.” It perceives the stability and economic growth of Vietnam as important 
factors in ensuring Japan’s security and prosperity; also due to the geopolitical environment of 
Vietnam, Japan defines Vietnam in the context of the Japanese foreign policy toward China 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004b, p.1). Although Japan also indicates the necessity of 
supporting the development of education in Vietnam from the viewpoints of poverty reduction 
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and human security, Japan’s primary emphasis is to support Vietnam’s economic growth, 
including large-scale infrastructure development.147  
Regarding aid modality, Japan’s strategy for Vietnam does not discuss the possibility of 
employing budget support or pooling funds. Japan does, however, mention education as a sector 
in which Japan may utilize “new assistance schemes” in the context of donor coordination 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004b, p.28). On the whole, Japan has attempted to facilitate 
Vietnam’s economic growth through the traditional project-type approach. Since 2004, Japan has 
provided the budget support for Vietnam as a co-financier of the World Bank’s budget 
support.148 This only represents one of a few pilot cases of Japan’s budget support in the world, 
and Japan will not unconditionally employ budget support as its core scheme. Based upon the 
fact that the project-type approach has thus far resulted an impressive socio-economic 
performance in East Asia, Japan asserts that no single model exists for enhancing aid: donor 
agencies should pay attention to the local characteristics of recipient countries and to the capacity 
development of recipient’s budget expenditure system (Arakawa, 2005, p.10).149  
Japan and the U.K. have worked together to draft a paper on the role of new aid 
modalities in the Vietnamese context (OECD, 2005b, p.139). It is significant that Japan, the 
largest bilateral donor in Vietnam, and the DFID of the U.K., the most influential donor in 
promoting new aid modalities such as budget support, took a step to discuss aid harmonization in 
                                                 
147 After the initial CPRGS was developed in 1999, Japan took an initiative to review it; in 2003, the Strategy was 
revised in a more growth-oriented manner by adding the chapter of large-scale infrastructure (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2004b, p.16). 
 
148 Japan has supported the World Bank’s budget support scheme, Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit (PRSC), since 
2004. The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) has operated the budget support, but JBIC has not been 
involved in the policy dialogue in the education sector (World Bank, 2006b, p.56). 
 
149 The Director General of the JBIC mentions that “the efficiency of the entire public disbursement system of the 
particular countries may be more important than facilitation of fund transfer to the partner countries” (Arakawa, 
2005, p.10).  
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Vietnam. Both the Japanese team, which consists of the Embassy, JICA, and JBIC, and the DFID 
agreed that PRSC, which is the budget support facility managed by the World Bank and other 
donor agencies, is complemented by a range of project interventions (DFID Vietnam and 
Embassy of Japan in Vietnam, 2004, p.2). In other words, the DFID admitted that some other aid 
modalities besides budget support, including technical assistance, could be useful in improving 
aid effectiveness. Both parties confirmed that donor agencies would face the risks in providing 
budget support if their aid money could “no longer be tracked or accounted for separately” and if 
it was not used for the intended purpose (p.4). The Japanese team and the DFID agreed that 
donor agencies need to assure that the “recipient government is both committed to, and capable 
of, achieving poverty reductions in the level of risk over time” (p.4). That two influential donor 
agencies can compromise in their organizational beliefs and attempt to introduce other donor’s 
good practices in their policy and operation is a positive trend. 
DFID, a Lead Coordinating Agency of the FTI, does not describe the interests of the U.K. 
in its Country Assistance Plan 2004-2006. The goal of DFID is to support the CPRGS and to 
operationalize the policies and programs mentioned in the Strategy. The DFID’s plan explicitly 
mentions that it will promote the channeling of aid resources into the government budget to 
support Vietnam’s strategies wherever possible (DFID, 2004, p.2). One of the DFID’s strategic 
objectives in Vietnam explains that it will help the Ministry of Finance (MOF) of Vietnam “to 
identify and introduce the main requirements of a modern system for managing budget and 
public finances” (p.5). Although the DFID’s strategy seems to be a recipient-country-oriented 
one, this statement implies that the DFID could intervene in the decision-makings of the MOF in 
order to protect the interests of the U.K.. This stance of the U.K. affects the resource 
mobilization of the FTI in Vietnam. 
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The World Bank, the second largest donor in Vietnam, has taken an approach to that of  
the U.K. Because the Bank’s concern lies in supporting the progress of CPRGS, it designs its 
Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) as a response to each item of the CPRGS.150 The latest CAS 
describes a division of labor between the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank in 
Vietnam: the former focuses on primary and tertiary education, and the latter concentrates on 
secondary education and vocational training (World Bank, 2002a, p.22). Yet, the CAS does not 
address coordination with other donor agencies.  
The World Bank implements two activities in relation to the FTI; these activities attempt 
to improve aid effectiveness in order to coordinate the local donor agencies. Poverty Reduction 
Support Credit (PRSC), one of the activities, provides direct support to the budget of the 
Government of Vietnam to facilitate the implementation of Vietnam’s poverty reduction 
strategies (World Bank, 2006b). The Bank has provided PRSC annually since 2001 with the 
contribution of a number of donor agencies.151 The Bank has further attempted to involve other 
donor agencies in the policy dialogue in the preparation of PRSC. The Credit has functioned as a 
donor coordination mechanism: PRSC enables the Vietnamese government to reduce transaction 
costs and donors to increase the coherence of the support of economic reform (p.21). However, 
due to the nature of the budget support, it is difficult to track exactly how many resources have 
been disbursed for primary education.  
                                                 
150 The CPRGS, the Vietnamese PRSP, is developed as a requirement for debt relief and mobilization of IDA 
resources for Vietnam. The CPRGS is reviewed by the staff of the World Bank and the IMF and endorsed by the 
Board of the Bank.  
 
151 The following donor agencies either co-finance or implement parallel lending with PRSC in 2006: ADB, 
Australia, Denmark, the European Commission, Germany, Ireland, Japan (JBIC), the Netherlands, Spain, and the 
U.K., although not all donors provide support for UPE (World Bank, 2006b). The DFID announced that the U.K. 
would continue to finance the PRSC and expect the Credit to be used for the education sector (DFID, 2004).  
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The Bank’s other activity, a targeted budgetary support to assists Vietnam, is planning 
and implementing the National EFA Plan, is analyzed later in this section (World Bank, 2005d). 
A staff member of the ADB analyzes that, in Vietnam, the presence of the ADB and the World 
Bank is significant in the donor community. He explains the collaboration of the Banks as 
follows: 
Due to the bureaucracy of each organization, collaboration is timely but 
productive. However, there is much more joint sector work than before, although 
sharing project implementation units is rare. The joint sector road map and the 
joint sector work have much more in common now than they did five years ago. 
(Interview with a staff member of ADB) 
Local U.N. agencies continue to develop the United Nations Development Assistance 
Framework (UNDAF) and set concrete development objectives.152 The latest UNDAF, covering 
the period from 2006 to 2010, addresses primary education as one of the three pillars of its 
objectives (United Nations & Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2005).153 Both the World Bank and 
DFID state that they support Vietnam’s poverty reduction and growth strategy. However, the 
UNDAF explicitly asserts that the U.N. agencies attach importance to the rights-based approach 
to build a society in which all Vietnamese have the means to achieve their human potential and 
the freedom to express their intellectual and cultural creativity (p.10) 
Among the local U.N. agencies, UNESCO, the other Lead Coordinating Agency for the 
FTI, has a strong concern about promoting all the EFA goals in Vietnam because EFA is one of 
its organizational mandates. Although the volume of UNESCO’s aid is relatively small ($1.0 
                                                 
152 Current UNDAF was designed based upon the conclusions of assessment conducted by the local U.N. agencies in 
2004 (United Nations Country Team, 2004).  
 
153 The pillar is that the quality of delivery and equity in access to social and protection services must improve.  
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million in 2005), it has made a difference in the FTI by establishing a framework and by 
coordinating donor agencies. The Government of Vietnam completed the National EFA Action 
Plan with a technical support of UNESCO; the FTI Secretariat uses this document in estimating 
the costs and financial gaps to achieve UPE in Vietnam. In addition, the Consultative Group 
meeting applauded the support for EFA by donor agencies as a good example of operationalizing 
the spirit of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Partnership Group on Aid Effectiveness, 
2006, p.3).154 
7.2 CONTRACTING PROBLEMS AND CAPACITY 
The contracting problems and the challenges of donors’ capacity in Vietnam are closely linked 
with the above-mentioned concerns and aid modalities. The contracting structure of donors’ aid 
provision is a diverse one. Roughly speaking, two types of contracts exist in Vietnam: one type 
actively uses the procurement system of the Government of Vietnam, while the other mainly 
uses donors’ systems. The former system attaches the variable of recipient government to the 
donors’ principal-agent structure. Conversely, in the latter system, donor agencies are likely to 
disburse their aid resources as their principals (i.e., policymakers or politicians in donor 
countries) intend them to do. 
The former group consists of many European donors and the World Bank; in 2004, the 
U.K. and the Bank disbursed 50% and 23%, respectively, of their aid resources by using 
                                                 
154 In 2005, the government of Vietnam and local donor agencies designed the framework called  “Hanoi Core 
Statement on Aid Effectiveness” (HCS). HCS aims to localize the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. It adopts 
ownership of Vietnam, alignment of donors’ activities with Vietnam’s strategies, and harmonization among donors’ 
aid activities (Government of Vietnam & Development Partners, 2005).  
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recipient governmental procurement system; this included the budget support and PRSC. Other 
major donors used the donors’ own system in disbursing their resources: the share of using the 
local governmental procurement system in disbursing the aid of Japan and the ADB are both 
only 4% (Partnership Group for Aid Effectiveness, 2005, p.54).  
Donors’ capacity is a critical agenda in discussing the modality of foreign aid. When a 
donor attempts to employ a new aid modality such as the budget support, various transaction 
costs arise. For example, if a donor converts its main aid modality from project to budget support, 
the donor needs to have a capacity to monitor the budget of the recipient government and to 
make a proper intervention to the Ministry of Finance of developing countries. Simultaneously, 
the donor needs to create a new architecture to ensure the accountability of its aid resources, 
which includes building consensus about introducing the budget support among politicians, 
bureaucrats, and other interest groups of foreign aid in the donor’s home countries. The FTI 
intends to encourage donors to fill the resource gap of developing countries through the budget 
support to finance the recurrent cost of the primary education. Yet, donors, particularly late 
comers, face a huge initial cost when acquiring the necessary capacity for the new aid modality. 
It is understandable that a donor does not embrace a change in its approach if it has enjoyed 
some success with its traditional approaches.155 
It is important to recognize the difference between Vietnam and many aid-dependent 
countries in Africa, in which the idea of using the recipients’ system to improve aid effectiveness 
has emerged. The percentage of foreign aid in the Gross National Income of Vietnam was as low 
as 4.5% in 2003, which indicates that Vietnam is not an aid-dependent country (OECD, 2005a). 
                                                 
155 Japan is an example of such a donor country. Some of its recipients in Asia, such as the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, and Brunei, have already “graduated” from the status of developing country, according to the OECD-
DAC.  
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In addition, the country’s performance of economic growth and poverty reduction is far better 
than that of many African countries.156 One can infer that there is no reason to automatically 
apply the new aid modality to the context of Vietnam, although the international community 
agrees that budget support is an effective prescription for solving the problems of Africa. 
Diversity of aid modality should be more tolerated in Vietnam because each donor agency has 
built its optimum principal-agent structure with its respective current aid modality. Thus far, 
Vietnam has demonstrated a good performance, even though it has not received budget support 
from some major donors.  
7.3 INTERNATIONAL AID WORKERS’ PERSPECTIVES 
In relation to the aid effectiveness agenda, a number of aid agencies and researchers recently 
conducted survey studies targeting international aid workers in Vietnam. Drawing on those 
materials, I analyze various perspectives of donor agencies in Vietnam regarding the aid 
effectiveness agenda. This examination is significant in considering the effectiveness of the FTI, 
because the FTI is concerned with how donor agencies deliver their aid resources for UPE, and 
donor agencies usually apply their general rules to the approach for UPE. 
I use many secondary sources for my research: 
1) The Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support, which is commissioned by a 
consortium of donor agencies and seven partner governments under the auspices of OECD-DAC, 
provided useful insights for my study. The schemes of budget support, including the targeted 
                                                 
156 However, it is difficult to prove the causal relationship between the project-type foreign aid and the impressive 
performance of Vietnam. 
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budget support for EFA and Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC), have made a difference 
in UPE. Bartholomew, Leurs, and McCarty (2006) describe the findings from this evaluation 
study based upon the fieldwork that took place in 2004 and 2005. 
2) The Partnership Group on Aid Effectiveness (PGAE) organized the survey on the 
ODA activities of donors in Vietnam for 2005 to monitor the implementation of the Hanoi Core 
Statement (HCS) (Partnership Group on Aid Effectiveness, 2006, p.70, p.26). Thirty donors 
responded to the questionnaire distributed by the PGAE, and these 30 donors account for over 
97% of the ODA received by Vietnam (p.70). In 2004, the PGAE became the prime forum for 
dialogue between the Vietnamese and donors on the issues of aid effectiveness (Partnership 
Group for Aid Effectiveness, 2004, p.2). 
3) Bartholomew and Lister (2002) conduct interviews targeting aid workers in Vietnam 
with a view to drawing on knowledge that has already been accumulated. They use the 
interviews as a means of checking, updating, and supplementing the existing material (p.5).  
I also use the studies such as Jacquemin and Bainbridge (2005) which demonstrate the 
perspectives of international donor agencies in Vietnam by conducting anonymous interviews in 
2005, Rose (2002), which provides an NGO perspective regarding aid effectiveness in the 
education sector, and OECD (2005b), which reports the result of the survey on harmonization 
and alignment undertaken from May to September 2004 by OECD.  
Based upon the above-mentioned secondary information, I categorize and analytically 
describe three types of aid workers’ perspectives in Vietnam: 1) radicals, 2) traditionalists, and 3) 
realists. I borrow the terminology of “radicals” and “traditionalists,” which stands for the 
agencies’ strategy on employing new aid modalities such as budget support or using the 
Vietnamese government’s systems, from Bartholomew and Lister (2002). I create the category 
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“realists” to describe those donors’ positions that attempt to employ both radical and traditional 
perspectives selectively depending on situations. The analyses of the transactions costs of aid 
resources and World Bank-led targeted budget support for EFA follow.  
7.3.1 General tendency of aid effectiveness in Vietnam 
Normalization of Vietnam’s diplomatic relation with Western countries after the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, as well as its higher growth rate during the 1990s, motivated donor agencies to 
increase the amount of foreign aid for Vietnam (Bartholomew & Lister, 2002, p.8). It is worth 
emphasizing that the economic reform process originated in Vietnam; it was not imposed from 
outside, nor was it “bought” with aid (p.8). The following illustrates some general trends of 
foreign aid in Vietnam. 
While most donors highlight the need to move from broad statements to actions, some 
feel a sense of fatigue with the aid effectiveness agenda and an impatience to see concrete 
actions emerge (Jacquemin & Bainbridge, 2005, p.4). Virtually, all donors are making 
determined efforts to align their assistance strategies with the Vietnamese government’s plan 
(Partnership Group on Aid Effectiveness, 2006, p.24). Most donors are taking positive steps to 
eliminate parallel project management units (PMUs). 
It is reported that even after having signed off the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 
the culture of many donor agencies has not changed sufficiently to allow for positions that are 
fully supportive of aid effectiveness (Jacquemin & Bainbridge, 2005, p.14). This fact may 
exemplify the difference between those donor agencies engaged in policy making at the 
headquarters level and those who actually operate projects and programs in the field. 
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Bartholomew et al. (2006) echo this point. “There have been a variety of harmonization 
and alignment initiatives, but progress has been slower than anticipated and has focused more on 
harmonizing procedures and aligning with the government’s policy, rather than aligning with 
government’s systems” (p.S3). This is an understandable tendency, because each donor agency 
attempts to contribute to the aid harmonization agenda by using the mechanisms that are 
available, and the governance and capacity of the Vietnamese government are not necessarily 
satisfactory systems for donor agencies to use them.  
Jacquemin and Bainbridge (2005) conclude that there is diversity among donor agencies 
and among individual workers in terms of the stance toward aid harmonization. Since the aid 
effectiveness agenda was endorsed in the international society, no donor agencies deny its value. 
However, there is a significant variation in operationalizing harmonization and alignment.  
Rose (2002) comments on the foreign aid in Vietnam from Oxfam’s NGO point of view. 
In order to be eligible to receive support from the FTI, developing countries need to develop 
PRSP and the credible education sector strategy. Rose problematizes this point, suggesting that 
this requirement may create new forms of conditionality.157 The integration of internationally-
agreed targets into national plans and poverty reduction strategies has potential dangers. These 
targets might be used as a new form of aid conditionality, with questions arising about the 
consequences for those countries which do not abide by the international agenda (p.12). Also, 
while the EFA Dakar Framework of Action recommends that the country’s EFA plan be 
integrated into a broader poverty reduction and democratic framework, Rose expresses concern 
                                                 
157 “The FTI raises the questions about what countries are included and why.” While FTI eligible countries are 
selected on the basis of compliance with the PRSP, “this raises questions about the extent of genuine ‘partnership’ 
between international agencies and national governments and whether the countries indeed own the programme, or 
are following directives of the international community in order to gain support--suggestive of new forms of aid 
conditionality” (Rose, 2002, p.11). 
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that this “one size fits all” approach fails to take into consideration local conditions and needs 
(p.12). This seems to be a fair concern. However, considering that the PRSP preparation process 
is open to the public and the participation of NGOs and civil society in developing PRSP is 
possible, the creation of “new forms of conditionality” per se may not be a problem. The 
“conditionality” should be problematized so that it could be recipient-friendly.  
The ownership of the Vietnamese Government has extended its management of foreign 
aid resources. In 2006, the ODA database was transferred from UNDP to the MPI, which 
established the Development Assistance database (Partnership Group for Aid Effectiveness, 
2005, p.26). 
7.3.2 The Hanoi Action Plan and Program-Based Approaches 
The Vietnamese government developed the Hanoi Action Plan (HAP) through the Partnership 
Group on Aid Effectiveness (Partnership Group for Aid Effectiveness, 2004, p.2). Also, the 
Hanoi Core Statement (HCS) “localizes” the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The 
adoption of the HCS reflects the commitment of the government and donor community in 
Vietnam to improving aid effectiveness (Partnership Group for Aid Effectiveness, 2005, p.1). 
The HCS significantly influences the donors’ aid delivery for the FTI in Vietnam. 
The HCS aims for 75% of ODA being delivered through Program-Based Approaches 
(PBAs) by 2010; as of November 2005, more than 41% of the total ODA was program-based 
(Partnership Group for Aid Effectiveness, 2005, p.22). However, “the term Program-Based 
Approaches (PBAs) is often misunderstood or used inaccurately to refer to a particular financing 
modality” (Partnership Group for Aid Effectiveness, 2005, p.21). The PBAs can be provided 
through various aid modalities including 1) a series of projects in the relevant sector, 2) a mix of 
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project and joint donor support for a particular sector, and 3) budgetary support for government 
projects/programs (p.21). Therefore, even traditional project-oriented donor agencies can use 
PBAs to contribute to the HCS. 
The PBAs’ features include leadership by the host country, a single comprehensive 
program and budget framework, a formalized process for donor coordination and harmonization, 
a harmonization of procedures, and efforts to increase use of local systems for the whole project 
cycle (Partnership Group for Aid Effectiveness, 2005, p.21). The progress toward PBAs has been 
strong in the education sector which already has an established framework for donors’ alignment 
and for a sector support program (i.e. EFA plans) (p.22) 
7.3.3 Radicals 
Generally speaking, European donors are considered as radicals. They are active in promoting 
aid effectiveness in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The EC has played a 
strong role in organizing a donor coordination mechanism; the Like-Minded Donor Group 
(LMDG) is a leader in piloting and advocating harmonized approaches and the use of the system 
of the Vietnamese government (Jacquemin & Bainbridge, 2005, p.4).158 
In opposition to the “traditionalists” donor agencies, an aid worker in Vietnam stressed 
that an alternative of doing nothing was unacceptable; because the Vietnamese government has a 
                                                 
158 LMDG refers to Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K. 
LMDG, which emerged from the Ustein group, comprises these six bilateral donor agencies to support improved 
ODA management and to promote harmonization among themselves. Originally, the LMDG focused on “developing 
a common framework for ODA in Vietnam,” but recently shifted away from this approach toward the identification 
of new aid mechanisms that can be more easily harmonized as they are not restricted by inflexible rules and 
procedures (Bartholomew & Lister, 2002, p.27). 
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high burden, so something needs to be done (Jacquemin & Bainbridge, 2005, p.16). The 
approximate 400 donor missions the Vietnamese government received in 2003 generated high 
transaction costs to the government (p.16). 
Above all, DFID has played a central role in providing aid with new aid modalities, 
including budget support which is viewed as both “a progressive and high risk approach” 
(Jacquemin & Bainbridge, 2005, pp.11-12). While DFID, a leading radical donor, has based its 
position upon its belief that the history of project-aid had neither “worked well” nor appeared 
sustainable in Vietnam, some local donor agencies criticize DFID for not viewing other donors 
as equal partners (p.11). Some donors observe that, in order to fulfill its own agenda, DFID 
attempts to rapidly shift its aid system to budget support, without considering the reservations of 
other donors about the timing of this move (p.12). DFID acknowledges that budget support could 
diminish donor influence, but it also suggests creating a “much healthier partnership” with the 
government in the driver’s seat (p.12). However, the donor community in Vietnam has not 
necessarily shared this perspective; a healthy partnership may be undermined if those in the 
“back seats” are too commanding.  
Coordination among donor agencies becomes more challenging as the number of 
participating donors in budget support increases. For example, “some donors perceive that co-
financing the PRSC is the way in which they can further their individual agendas” (Bartholomew 
et al., 2006, p.S5). This may be a favorable change, because this tendency will strengthen the 
capacity of donor agencies in terms of negotiating policy issues with the recipient government 
and other donor agencies. Above all, PRSC, a facility that supports developing countries in the 
implementation of PRSP, has nothing to do with the donors’ national interests. In order for donor 
agencies to “further their individual agendas” through PRSC, donor agencies need to have a 
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sufficient capacity to proactively participate in the policy dialogue in the context of PRSP. By so 
doing, donor agencies may be able to strengthen their capacity to moderate policy discussion, not 
only to conduct operations.159 
An officer of the European Commission (EC) Social Development Programmes in Asia 
explicitly states that project approach is losing validity; it focuses on a narrow technical 
paradigm, such as the relationship between input and output only, showing little or no concern 
for the domestic system of recipient countries (Jonckers, 2004). He asserts that development 
cooperation is essentially becoming a process of 1) assessing policies and institutions in partner 
countries, 2) dialoguing and negotiating improvements of policies and institutions, and 3) 
supporting change to policies and institutions through providing financial and technical resources. 
Although many donors participate in multiple donor groups in Vietnam, there is concern 
amongst donors that the number of groups and sub-groups is excessive and that the time 
committed to participating in those groups could be better used in other ways (Partnership Group 
on Aid Effectiveness, 2006, p.18). Without some changes, the risk of aid fatigue remains a threat 
(p.19). 
Bartholomew and Lister (2002) assert that uncoordinated aid undermines the ownership 
of the Vietnamese government. The high transaction costs from donors’ traditional projects 
create incentives that rely on donor implementation units, which accompany various 
requirements. Due to the opaque donor requirements, the Vietnamese government’s capacity to 
better utilize externally provided resources may be hampered. This complexity of donor 
requirement is often accrued by multiple and uncoordinated donor requirements. (p.5) 
                                                 
159 When Vietnam reaches its expected middle-income status in 2010, it will no longer receive PRSC through soft 
loans. The government may prefer the more attractive option of borrowing on external markets, rather than going 
through the comparatively time-consuming process of negotiating a PRSC (Bartholomew et al., 2006, p.S6). 
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On the other hand, traditionalists observe that radicals, especially LMDGs, seem recently 
to have dominated the agenda in discussion forums, despite the fact that the more vociferous 
radicals have been providing a rather small share of total aid to Vietnam (Bartholomew & Lister, 
2002, p.21). Aid coordination could can be seen as a way to ensure the visibility of some radical 
donor agencies which provide a relatively small scale of aid.  
A perspective of the government of Vietnam seems to support the view of radicals. The 
government asserts that the problems of aid effectiveness are related to “lengthy and 
cumbersome donor procedures” at the project prep stage; these procedures cause delays and 
often result in projects taking several years to come to fruition. Although projects are often out of 
date by the time they begin, the lengthy and complexity of the procedures inhibit those involved 
from making the necessary changes (Bartholomew & Lister, 2002, p.22). The government of 
Vietnam also observes that many donor-specified procedures, which are not Vietnam specific 
and thus not appropriate to the local contexts, support the radicals’ perspective and, therefore, the 
government’s systems in delivering aid.160 
All Vietnamese government interviewees target technical assistance as the least useful 
form of aid (Bartholomew & Lister, 2002, p.22). Due to the inexperience of foreign consultants 
and their lack of knowledge of the local context, in most cases local consultants are more suited 
to the context of Vietnam. Even when the donors’ technical assistance projects have high quality, 
knowledge is not necessarily transferred to project staff and, therefore, local capacity does not 
enhance (p.23). This shows a very strong counterargument to traditionalist, such as Japan, which 
                                                 
160 For example, a donor required the government to provide its contribution in U.S. dollars. Dong, the Vietnamese 
local currency, had to be changed into U.S. dollar and then changed back into dong to pay local contractors 
(Bartholomew & Lister, 2002, p.22). The government also pointed out that the number of missions from donors’ 
headquarters often had duplicate requirements (p.22). 
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highly value technical assistance. Interviewees also cite differences between the policies of 
donors and the government as a cause of friction (p.23). 
Many interviewees stress the difficulty the Vietnamese government faces when dealing 
with numerous donors and their individual requirements. They assert that budget support such as 
PRSC is ideal as this modality streamlines procedures and improves local ownership. In addition, 
co-funded projects were seen as less burdensome as Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps), since 
they ensure that all donors work towards the same sector goals (Bartholomew & Lister, 2002, 
p.23). These donors’ voices may endorse the implementation of targeted budget support for EFA 
and PRSC in Vietnam. An underlying principle for providing foreign aid in Vietnam should be to 
build government capacities, not substitute for them (p.25). Donors with strong in-country 
representation and the flexibility to adapt headquarters’ requirements to country circumstances 
are likely to be more effective (p.31). 
OECD (2005b) analyzes the current situation regarding donors’ activities in Vietnam. A 
wide range of donors has either joined the PRSC or is considering whether to do so in the future. 
As a result, PRSC was worth around $220 million in 2004 (p.140). Regarding delegation, 45% of 
donors in Vietnam claim to be party to an agreement to perform tasks on behalf of other donors 
(p.140).161 Approximately 400 missions took place in Vietnam in 2003. Seven donor agencies—
the World Bank, NGOs, Japan, Germany, Denmark, the ADB, and the U.K.—accounted for 75% 
of the total number of missions (p.140-141).  
In conclusion, some European countries have embraced the initiative to introduce new 
aid modalities. While this initiative proactively uses the system of the Vietnamese government in 
delivering foreign aid, its magnitude differs depending on the agencies’ policy.  
                                                 
161 The LMDG, EC, the U.N., and the World Bank accepted this idea, while Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, the 
U.S., the ADB, and the IMF rejected it (OECD, 2005b). 
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7.3.4 Traditionalists 
Traditionalists consider a project-oriented approach as fundamentally appropriate. Japan and 
some other donors fit this category. Traditionalists prefer approaches that reduce unnecessary 
burdens for the recipients to: 1) strengthening government capacity and systems; 2) making the 
donor more responsible for a larger share of the transaction costs that arise, either directly or 
through consultants; and 3) encouraging donors to work together with governments to eliminate 
differences in rules and procedures are arbitrary and unnecessary procedures to achieve 
convergence (Bartholomew & Lister, 2002, p.20). Traditionalists tend to emphasize the 
importance of cross-country procedures laid down by their donor headquarters; there is a lack of 
local discretion to depart from centrally determined rules (p.20).  
Japan stands out as one of the major donor countries whose position opposes that of 
European donors, especially DFID. A Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) 
representative describes Japan as the “most cautious and prudent” harmonizer (Jacquemin & 
Bainbridge, 2005, p.4). A Japanese professional emphasizes the significance of diversity in terms 
of how aid is provided in Vietnam. According to the officer, it is not in the interest of the 
government of Vietnam to have too few voices from the donor community (Jacquemin & 
Bainbridge, 2005, p.16).  
Diversity of donors gives the government a wider portfolio to choose from and 
mitigates against the fluctuations of ODA volumes. If donors speak with one 
voice then there is a monopoly. This might be good for donors but not for the 
development of the country. It is a question of balance, 20 donors might be too 
many, but one is too few. (Jacquemin & Bainbridge, 2005, p.16) 
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This Japanese perspective significantly differs from the spirit of the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness, which attempts to simplify and streamline the donors’ policies and activities 
in order to reduce the transaction cost of the government.  
Furthermore, other Japanese aid workers in Vietnam indicate a situation brought about by 
introducing the aid effectiveness agenda, which includes its negative byproducts. According to a 
representative of a Japanese aid agency, “The aid effectiveness agenda had in fact slowed the 
delivery of aid” (Jacquemin & Bainbridge, 2005, p.11). Another Japanese aid worker confesses 
that the adjustment to an internationally agreed-upon agenda of aid harmonization would be 
“very costly and time consuming,” because the aid effectiveness agenda “tends to dominate our 
[aid agencies’] work and produce a lot of paperwork but very little on the ground” (p.11).  
A professional of other aid agencies in Vietnam echoes this perspective. Because the aid 
effectiveness agenda is based on the experiences of donors in Africa, it is not entirely applicable 
to the Vietnam or Asian context (Jacquemin & Bainbridge, 2005, p.11). Also, several donor 
agencies’ staff suggests that modalities that emphasize government ownership should not be 
implemented at the expense of technical assistance (p.12). An expert of an anonymous donor 
agency asserts that “the government needs a range of resources, not just financial, what donors 
can bring is technical expertise” (p.12). It should be noted that these comments stem from the 
desire to provide better aid for Vietnam, not for the benefit of donor agencies.  
Even among the European donors, many of which are “radicals,” some agencies argue 
that the new aid modality is neither a workable nor feasible option. Belgium, along with the 
international financial institutions and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), faces 
policy obstacles at the headquarters level and some contradictory internal policies in introducing 
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new aid modalities (Jacquemin & Bainbridge, 2005, p.4). An aid worker of the EC eloquently 
spells out the discrepancy between its headquarters and its field office in Vietnam.  
Brussels [i.e., the EC’s headquarters] says whenever possible we need to align 
with the [Vietnamese] government and to harmonize. However a lot of people in 
Brussels still think in project mode and therefore, the preparation of sector budget 
support is not always easy. In the field, everyone recognizes that harmonization 
and alignment is the only way to go but back at the headquarters they are still 
contradictory. Every project document has guidelines on visibility but that is 
impossible to do in a harmonized approach. (Jacquemin & Bainbridge, 2005, 
p.14) 
It is noteworthy that the EC, one of the leaders of a radical pro-aid effectiveness donor, 
has a similar challenge, such as the visibility of donor agency, that traditionalists like Japan and 
the U.S. face. However, this officer concludes that “the only visibility should be that of the 
government of Vietnam” (Jacquemin & Bainbridge, 2005, p.14). 
A European aid worker points out that aid harmonization does not benefit the Vietnamese 
government. “It was not in the interest of MPI (Ministry of Planning and Investment) [of 
Vietnam] in general to promote alignment to donors to sectors, especially via sector budget 
support” (Jacquemin & Bainbridge, 2005, p.13). While the World Bank and some bilateral 
donors have launched the sector budget support for EFA with the Ministry of Education, the MPI 
loses a lot of power since the line ministry manages the funds. This European officer predicts 
that the MPI of the Vietnamese government will be “the key stumbling block to moving toward 
greater harmonization and alignment” (p.13). 
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A U.N. staff member also stresses that the Vietnamese government does not necessarily 
welcome new aid modalities. While the U.N. would like to move away from parallel structures, 
“it is not the interests of line ministries to get rid of PMUs [project management units]” 
(Jacquemin & Bainbridge, 2005, p.14). The Vietnamese staff members at PMUs earn higher 
salaries, and “a contradiction exists between the goal of government ownership and of alignment 
with government structures because elements of the government had a strong desire to maintain 
parallel structures” (p.14). 
The traditionalist’s approach may have an advantage over the radical pro-harmonization 
approach. For example, the expansion of co-financiers has led to growing difficulties within the 
coordination and cohesion of the process (Bartholomew et al., 2006, p.S8). Also, little 
coordination with other aid modalities and inadequate attention to technical assistance and 
capacity building harm the implementation of policy actions (p.S8). This point may explain why 
some donors like Japan, which have strength in providing technical assistance, have been 
occasionally reluctant to join the budget support program. 
A JBIC officer states that project type financing will remain a principle for JBIC’s 
operation in Asia, while JBIC has co-financed the World Bank’s PRSC (but not in the education 
sector). PBAs will be promoted as far as they are effective for JBIC (Iijima, 2004). 
Use of the government system is a major challenge. Aside from funds provided by budget 
support, most donors are required to meet prescribed standards that are incompatible with the 
government’s standards (Partnership Group on Aid Effectiveness, 2006, p.25). Donors are 
concerned that the Vietnamese governmental systems do not adequately meet international 
standards in terms of the level of transparency, fiduciary risk, and corruption in the government. 
The rate of disbursement for projects and specific programs remains very slow (p.25). Most 
 186 
donors use the core diagnostic work prepared by the major international agencies (such as the 
World Bank, the ADB, UNDP, and the Vietnamese government), but the extent of sharing 
individual country analysis is limited (p.25). Most donors use similar analysis and management 
tools (such as log-frame analysis, project appraisal formats, monitoring and evaluation processes, 
and procurement processes), but modification to suit the particular agency needs makes these 
tools not readily adaptable by other donors (p.25). The use of PBAs is increasing, but confusion 
regarding approaches and modalities, concerns about limited transparency, fiduciary risk, and 
corruption make it difficult for many bilateral donors to increase support through budget support 
modalities (p.25). These facts demonstrate that there is still a long way to go until new aid 
modalities are properly introduced in Vietnam; the costs and potential benefits from employing 
new modalities should be carefully examined. 
OECD (2005b) reports that, from a German perspective, Vietnam’s fiscal and 
administrative systems are not transparent or accountable enough, although this view may also 
be linked to the question about whether budget support is an effective approach (p.137). 
Traditional modalities provide considerable scope to reduce inconsistencies in donor approaches, 
both by systematic headquarters-level harmonization and by ad hoc country-level harmonization 
(Bartholomew & Lister, 2002, p.31). This implies that individual aid workers in the field can 
make a difference in improving aid effectiveness, regardless of the aid agencies’ overall policy at 
the headquarters level.  
In conclusion, not only Japan, a lead donor in Vietnam, but also some European donor 
agencies have taken the position of traditionalists. These agencies are not necessarily obsessed 
with implementing their traditional project-approaches, but they are willing to selectively and 
complementarily employ new aid modalities, such as PRSC, where available. However, these 
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agencies continue to value the traditional project approaches by placing priority over new aid 
modalities. 
7.4 REALISTS 
Some donor agencies in Vietnam are neither radicals nor traditionalists. Such donor agencies as 
CIDA, AusAID, and USAID have taken pragmatic and case-by-case approaches to 
harmonization (Jacquemin & Bainbridge, 2005, p.4). 
The five bilateral and multilateral financial institutions, including ADB, AFD (Agence 
Française de Développement, France), JBIC, KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, Germany), 
and the World Bank, have taken the lead in supporting the Vietnamese government in its work 
on harmonization and alignment of procedures, including project preparation and reporting 
(Partnership Group for Aid Effectiveness, 2004, p.13). 162  However, the magnitude of 
commitment varies. In reality, a large group of donors, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Japan, the Netherlands, the U.S., the ADB, EC, and the World Bank, are either currently 
planning (through PRSC), or preparing budget support to Vietnam (OECD, 2005b, p.137). 
Japan and DFID, the most radical donor and the most traditional donor, have worked 
together to draft a paper of new aid modalities in the Vietnamese context. This cooperation has 
become the agreed upon format for future discussions on the diversification of aid modalities 
(OECD, 2005b, p.136; Partnership Group for Aid Effectiveness, 2004, p.15).  
                                                 
162 The World Bank, ADB, JBIC, KfW, and AFD make up the Five Bank Harmonisation Initiative (OECD, 2005b, 
p.135). 
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The World Bank’s role in this aid effectiveness debate is pivotal. The Bank is a major 
exponent both of the traditional project approaches and, increasingly, of non-project approaches 
in Vietnam. By making deliberate use of its ability, the Bank has attempted to engage with all 
parties in pursuit of non-project modalities and in strengthening the delivery of project aid 
(Bartholomew & Lister, 2002, p.21). 
A tendency to exaggerate differences can undermine how to address the diverse 
perspectives of aid agencies regarding the means of aid disbursement. Both radical and 
traditional sides discuss SWAps as if un-earmarked budget support is the essence of SWAps. 
However, both sides need to consider how to increase the donors’ and partners’ understanding of 
the subtlety of alternatives in order to recognize the potential common ground that their 
approaches share. A better understanding of sector approaches and other technology is one of the 
outcomes sought from LMDG work programs (Bartholomew & Lister, 2002, p.21). 
One bilateral donor’s comment in relation to aid modality, which implies a realistic 
solution to aid effectiveness, states that there is no “right” aid modality for every circumstance 
(OECD, 2005b, p.136): 
There is a common understanding among both the donor community and the 
government in Vietnam that a diversification of aid modalities is important for 
efficient and effective ODA mobilisation and it is necessary to utilise the most 
appropriate aid modalities in response to varying development needs. (OECD, 
2005b, p.136) 
The Vietnamese government has also expressed increasing concerns about the high 
transaction costs associated with the multiplicity of donor agencies’ operational policies, 
procedures, and practices (OECD, 2005b, p.140). In Vietnam, the “majority of donors tend to 
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agree that a mix of different aid modalities will result in the most effective implementation of 
assistance to achieve sector coherence in the work of a government-led strategy” (p.140). 
The difference, among donor agencies in Vietnam, in terms of harmonization, can be 
depicted as follows: 
 
Table 15. Differences among donor agencies in Vietnam 
1) Enthusiastic 
harmonizers 
(Radicals) 
- Norway: Having set the goal of fully aligning its programs with government 
programs. 
- DFID: Champion of harmonization. Having led the way in using government 
systems through the budget support. 
2)  Cautious 
harmonizers 
- Japanese grant aid: Providing in-kind (different from most other donors’ grant aid). 
- JBIC: Viewing its position as cautious and prudent harmonizer. Shifting 
significantly to a more favorable approach to harmonization. 
3) Limited 
harmonizers 
- AusAID, NZAID, CIDA, USAID, UN: Taking pragmatic and practical approaches 
to harmonization. Modest ambitions and achievable targets in harmonization both 
in international agreements and in the Vietnamese context. 
- AusAID: While moving toward harmonization, reserving the right to go with a 
stand-alone project. Australian national interest is a goal as well as poverty 
reduction. 
- USAID: Newcomer to harmonization agenda. Has been instructed to significantly 
increase the use of local contracts and grants to fund host country experts, NGOs 
and firms in providing technical assistance, and to program funds through the host 
government, where appropriate policies and accountability exist. 
4) Constrained 
harmonizers 
(Traditionalists) 
- International Financial Institutions (IFI): Constrained by headquarters’ policy. 
- JICA: Trying to transfer the “Japanese model” of development.  
Source: Jacquemin & Bainbridge (2005, pp.17-18) 
 
Some European donors, particularly those from LMDG countries, have been promoting 
aid harmonization with emphasis on using the system of the Vietnamese government and 
minimizing the traditional project approaches. Similarly, many other donors have attempted to 
contribute to the harmonization where appropriate and available, depending on each 
organization’s judgment. The international financial institutions (IFIs) and Japan seem to 
distance themselves from the aid harmonization movement. Since such IFIs as the ADB and the 
World Bank conduct lending projects and have fiduciary responsibility, it is understandable that 
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their resource transfer is constrained by their headquarters. However, the situation of Japan, 
especially JICA, seems to be different from any other international donor agencies. 
One JICA representative eloquently explains the organization’s unique stance among 
donor agencies in Vietnam as follows: 
It is rather difficult for JICA to harmonize its operational procedures with other 
donors. Compared with procedural similarity among the banks or the LMDG, 
JICA has a unique procedure because we give in-kind assistance so it would be 
not cost-effective to harmonize with other grant donors in the short term. Thus we 
are taking a bilateral approach to rationalize and simplify our procedures based on 
the request of the Vietnamese government, which we consider more practical and 
cost effective to reduce procedural transaction costs in the short term. (Jacquemin 
& Bainbridge, 2005, p.19) 
It is important to recognize that the Vietnamese government has a strong ownership in 
foreign aid activities. A Vietnamese government official explicitly states that “it is our duty to 
show which modalities work best for which sectors” (Jacquemin & Bainbridge, 2005, p.20). This 
statement, not an obsession with the achievement of internationally agreed upon objectives, 
should be the basis in discussing aid effectiveness in Vietnam. 
7.5 TRANSACTION COSTS 
Transaction costs include all the costs arising from the preparation, negotiation, 
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of an agreement in the delivery of overseas 
development aid. Transaction costs take three forms: 1) administrative costs, which arise from 
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the impact of resources needed for the transaction, including administrative overheads, such as 
staff time; 2) indirect costs, which result from the impact of the delivery mechanism on the 
achievement of development goals; these include poor recipient ownership and longer 
disbursement delays which discourage both donors and governments from entering into new 
agreements; and 3) opportunity costs, which measure benefits forgone from alternative 
applications of the resources consumed in the transaction; senior officials, for example, may 
need to trade off their time between aid management and policy development (Bartholomew & 
Lister, 2002, p.5). While these costs may be high when launching a new system, the actual cost 
of operating that system may be more modest.163  
7.6 TARGETED BUDGET SUPPORT FOR EFA 
The education sector is the most progressive sector in terms of harmonization and alignment in 
Vietnam. The education sector working group meeting used to be chaired jointly by the 
government and donors, but since July 2004, the government has taken the lead. Eighty-one 
percent of donors participate in these discussions (OECD, 2005b, p.138). 
Donor agencies have directly supported the Vietnamese government’s targeted program 
for EFA. This program provides 5% of the requirement for achieving the government’s goals in 
primary education by using the government system under the coordination of one lead agency: 
the World Bank (Partnership Group on Aid Effectiveness, 2006, p.3). 
                                                 
163 Regarding the National EFA Plan, “The first time you do it, it is bound to be laborious because it is breaking new 
ground but afterwards you would expect it to be simpler and faster for all the stakeholders involved,” and “even if 
the start up costs are high, the running costs are much lower” (Jacquemin & Bainbridge, 2005, p.17). 
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The World Bank and several other bilateral donor agencies, including Belgium, Canada, 
EC, New Zealand, and the U.K., have implemented the targeted budget support for EFA in 
Vietnam from 2005 to 2008. 164  This targeted budget support for EFA was designed as a 
transitional one from traditional projects to full budgetary support (World Bank, 2005d, p.9). 
The targeted budget support aims at assisting the government of Vietnam in the 
implementation of its National EFA Plan, in terms of the expansion and quality of primary 
education opportunities. Although the primary enrollment rate in Vietnam is high (91% in 2003), 
“an estimated 20% of ethnic minority children have no access to basic education” (World Bank, 
2005d, p.1). 
The Vietnamese EFA Plan shows that EFA goals will remain elusive without an 
additional investment of at least $2-2.5 billion for the period of 2003-2015 (World Bank, 2005d, 
p.2). “In spite of substantial government and overseas contributions to education, the existing 
level of effort is not yet sufficient to achieve Vietnam’s target for EFA by the year 2015” (p.2). 
This targeted budget support intervention would partially bridge the estimated financing 
gap at the primary level for the period of 2005-2008 (World Bank, 2005d, p.2). The World Bank 
has played a coordinator’s role with the five co-financiers, including Belgium, Canada, EC, New 
Zealand, and the U.K., in targeted budget support (p.3). The project strives to more efficiently 
channel ODA more efficiently and reduce transaction costs through the utilization of a sector 
budget support aid delivery mechanism (p.3). This operation builds on existing budget support 
arrangements under the PRSC series (p.3).  
                                                 
164 The amount of contributions from each donor agencies is IDA (the World Bank) $50 million, Belgium $6 million, 
Canada $11 million, EC $20 million, New Zealand $3 million, and the U.K. $38 million, respectively. 
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The funding agreement consists of an IDA credit of $50 million and parallel bilateral 
donor grant funds in the order of $78 million. Since this project is disbursed as budget support, 
donor and government funds are indistinguishable; this project, which relies on the Vietnamese 
government’s own rules and procedures for implementation, this is a relatively new funding 
approach at the sector level in Vietnam (World Bank, 2005d, p.4). Making future funding 
dependent on the previous year’s performance not only motivates provinces to add to 
expenditures on the identified sub-components at the district level but also encourage, that ODA 
resources act as additions to, not substitutions for, existing levels of financing (p.7) 
In this project, ODA funds fully merge with domestic funds to support the Vietnamese 
education objectives. This approach honors governmental ownership, facilitates donor 
harmonization and alignment with government’s procedures, reduces transaction costs, and 
strengthens sector management capacity (World Bank, 2005d, p.9). 
Sector budget support empowers the Vietnamese government to rationally manage 
spending. It also forces donors and the government to focus on systematic weaknesses and to 
build capacity. Finally, sector budget support reduces some of the transaction costs associated 
with traditional project approaches and promotes accountability within the country (World Bank, 
2005d, p.9). 
The donor agencies that finance this targeted budget support have worked together during 
project preparation by providing financing and technical assistance to the Ministry of Education 
and Training; they act in the spirit of increasing donor harmonization and speaking with “one 
voice” (World Bank, 2005d, p.10). Operationalizing education SWAps in Vietnam by focusing 
on EFA is in the trial stage. Most of the major education donor agencies, except for Japan,  
participate in this targeted budget support. 
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In addition to this targeted budget support for EFA, donor agencies have conducted the 
following activities in Vietnam: 
 
Table 16. Donor agencies’ activities in Vietnam 
World Bank Primary Education Project, Promoting Education for Disadvantaged Children Project, 
Higher Education Project, Primary Teacher Development Project, Building Capacity 
for Educational Planning (with CIDA’s trust fund) 
Belgium Teacher training 
EC Strengthening Ministry of Education and Training, Support to the renovation of 
educational management 
EU-DFID Support to Secondary Education Development Program 2006-2010 
JICA Primary school construction project 
NORAD Educational development support to ethnic minorities 
UNICEF Education in disadvantaged areas, ethnic minorities 
Oxfam  
Great Britain 
Teacher training, Basic education for ethnic minorities 
Save the Children 
Australia 
Primary teacher training 
Save the Children 
France 
Education for ethic minorities 
UNESCO Support for National EFA Plan 
Source: World Bank (2005d) 
 
In conclusion, the World Bank-led targeted budget support for EFA has brought about the 
spirit of the FTI in terms of promoting aid effectiveness. Harmonization, alignment, and donor 
coordination have materialized through this sector budget support, and a number of major donor 
agencies, except for Japan, have joined this World Bank-led activity. However, it is important to 
note that nuances exist among the stakeholders at the country level, as well as within the FTI 
Secretariat, regarding the interpretation of the aid effectiveness agenda. An obvious example is 
Japan. Due to its domestic policies and aid philosophy, Japan does not buy into such new aid 
modalities as budget support. Yet, there is room for Japan to contribute to the internationally 
agreed-upon mechanism of the FTI; both the donor community and the Vietnamese government 
appreciate Japan and its endeavors in terms of the FTI in Vietnam. It is important for donor 
agencies in Vietnam to be flexible enough to listen to these voices which differ from their 
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beliefs. They should also selectively and experimentally employ different aid modalities to 
improve aid effectiveness. At all times, donor agencies need to make maximum use of their 
“comparative advantages,” those approaches which fit best the context and philosophy of each 
aid agency.  
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8.0  CAMBODIA 
The Cambodian government and in-country donor agencies in the education sector have 
developed the sector-wide approach (SWAp). This approach supports a single sector policy and 
expenditure program under government leadership, adopts common perspectives across the 
sector, and relies on government procedures to disburse and account for all funds (Cambodia’s 
Education Sector Working Group, 2006, p.7).165 Currently, only ADB and EC provide direct 
budget support to benefit the education sector, while most other donors support the sector with 
more traditional project-type modalities (p.7). 
The following tables show the current condition of ODA in Cambodia: 
 
Table 17. ODA in Cambodia 
Receipts 2003 2004 2005 
Net ODA ($ million) 514 483 538 
Net ODA/GNI 12.3% 10.4% 10.4% 
Net private flows ($ million) -128 -167 2 
Top 10 donors of gross ODA 
 (2004-05 average) ($ million) 
Japan (94), AsDF (84), U.S. (60), IDA (43), France (28), Australia (27), 
Germany (24), Korea (21), U.K. (20), Sweden (19) 
Source: OECD (2007a) 
 
 
                                                 
165 SWAps have been the mechanism for ensuring that all donor assistance is aligned with the Ministry’s strategic 
priorities and that, as far as possible, the Cambodian government’s procedures are used in the implementation of 
donor programs (UNICEF, 2006, p.5). 
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Due to the political conflict and instability of the 1980s, much of the physical and human 
infrastructure of education was destroyed in Cambodia. In the 1990s, Cambodia heavily 
depended on external assistance; the amount of foreign aid increased significantly during the 
decade (Asian Development Bank, 2003, p.1). However, “the lack of clear education policy 
reform priorities and a proliferation of discreet and often unconnected donor projects were 
contributing to policy fragmentation and undermining development impact” (p.1). 
However, of the Consultative Group meeting in 2000, the Cambodian government began 
to circulate discussion papers offering an alternative partnership paradigm. These documents, 
which drew on early experiences on education development programs in Mongolia, Indonesia, 
and Thailand, made donor agencies more familiar with alternative approaches to project aid 
(Asian Development Bank, 2003, p.1). 
The Education Sector Working Group (ESWG) was established in 1999 as part of the CG 
process. EFA-FTI assessment is one of its topics (UNICEF, 2006, p.4). In 2003, the Cambodian 
Education Ministry prepared a national plan for the achievement of EFA by 2015. In December 
2004, the FTI co-chairs (i.e., USAID and SIDA) suggested that Cambodia consider participating 
in the FTI. While the donors active in the education sector were responsible for the FTI appraisal, 
a consultant hired by the World Bank in 2005 drafted the main part of an assessment. Also in 
2005, the Cambodian Department of Planning hired a consultant to develop a finance model 
which, it was hoped, would allow the funding needs and funding gap to be calculated with 
greater precision (p.7). The FTI proposal was endorsed by all the donor agencies in Cambodia 
and approved by the FTI secretariat in 2006.  
Some existing mechanisms of the Cambodian government enabled donor agencies to 
recognize that Cambodia has the potential to be an FTI country. The National Poverty Reduction 
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Strategy (NPRS), which is the Cambodian version of PRSP, and the Education Strategic Plan 
(ESP) 2004-08 have emphasized UPE: the achievement of nine years of high quality basic 
education by 2015 and the promotion of equity in educational opportunities.166 In addition, the 
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MoEYS) has adopted a rolling Education Sector 
Support Program (ESSP), which identifies specific action plans. All education partners, 
including the government, NGOs, and international donor agencies, annually and jointly review 
this ESSP.167 Both ESP and ESSP have adopted a sector-wide approach to education planning 
and development that provides the overarching framework for the development (World Bank, 
2005e, p.1). Cambodia, using this solid framework, joined the FTI.  
A number of international donor agencies conducted the following activities in relation to 
UPE and the FTI in Cambodia (World Bank, 2005e, pp.9, 25): 
Table 18. Donors’ activities in Cambodia 
World 
Bank 
Education quality improvement (2002-07, $4.8 million) 
Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) grant for education in reconciliation area  
(with Save the Children-Norway, 2002-03, $1.5 million) 
JSDF grant for public education for disadvantaged children (with Save the Children-Norway,  
2004-07, $1.8 million) 
ADB Second education sector development (2004-07, $15 million) 
Targeted assistance for education of poor girls and indigenous children (2002-07, $3 million) 
Strengthening education sector management (2004-07, $1 million) 
ADB-financed Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction implements a pilot scholarship program in 93 lower 
secondary schools. 
Japan Primary school construction in Phnom Penh (2004-07, $4.8 million) 
Secondary school teacher training project in science and math (2002-07, $2.8 million) 
                                                 
166 The Education Strategic Plan (ESP) is the principal document specifying the targets and the strategies for 
education in Cambodia. Its first installment was made in 2001-05, while the latest installment ranges from 2006-10. 
The ESP 2006-10 is set within the framework of the National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS) and the National 
Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) 2006-2010. Both documents emphasize the importance of education as an 
enabling factor for income generation and job creation (Cambodia’s Education Sector Working Group, 2006, p.7). 
Also, as a long-term strategy, the Education for All National Plan 2003-2015 was created, while the ESP only covers 
the short term (p.8). The ESP 2004-08 and EFA Plan were produced in parallel, but are being managed separately 
rather than as two parts of a single integrated strategy, they focus on the same broad goals (p.8). The ESP 2004-08 
and EFA Plan yield different projections, even for primary enrollments (pp.7-8). 
 
167 ESSP is supported by ADB’s education sector development loan, EC’s targeted budget support, and bilateral 
grants from Sida, Japan, and Belgium (Asian Development Bank, 2003, p.2). 
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BTC  
(Belgium) 
Basic education and teacher training (2002-07, $8.75 million) 
Scholarship programs 
WFP School feeding program (2002-07, $19 million) 
Supporting MoEYS through primary school breakfast schemes and take-home rations for upper 
primary girls. 
AusAID CARE/MOEYS highland children’s education project (2002-07, $2.2 million) 
EC Targeted budget support (2002-07, $15 million) 
SIDA/ 
UNICEF 
Basic education capacity building priorities for SWAp readiness (2002-07, $8 million) 
Expanded learning opportunities for school and child readiness (2002-07, $6 million) 
USAID Basic education project (2004-07, $6.5 million) 
Others Service delivery quality enhancement interventions—NGOs (KAPE, Save the Children-Norway, 
VSO: Voluntary Service Overseas) 
Belgium (BTC) and UNICEF/SIDA—avoid overlapping and duplications, promote harmonization 
and integration in procedures and interventions. 
8.1 DONOR RESOURCE FOR EDUCATION 
The total external funding to the education sector from 2002 to 2007 is estimated at $282.5 
million. Of the total projected financing from 2002 to 2007, 42% is expected to come from the 
ADB and the World Bank. There is a growing diversity of the methods used to optimize the 
impact on various MoEYS’s education reform policies. Some patterns of donor assistance 
include direct project support, direct budget support, off-budget support, support through NGOs, 
and agency direct support. The main traditional type of assistance in Cambodia, i.e., direct 
project expenditure, remains the predominant method from 2002 to 2007 (Asian Development 
Bank, 2004, p.40). 
A need for improved donor aid coordination to enhance development effectiveness also 
exists. Over 50% of all development has gone towards capacity buildings, while ad hoc project-
based salary supplementation schemes are also common (World Bank, 2005a, p.14). The large 
number of donors providing foreign aid without an effective strategic or coordinated framework 
has fragmented assistance and limited its impact. The multiplicity of implementation and 
financing structures has undermined the development of government systems and has increased 
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the costs of providing assistance to Cambodia. Similarly, different policy prescriptions by 
development partners have sometimes undermined the achievement of sustainable and unified 
development policies (pp.14-15). However, the ADB and the World Bank both advocate a 
division of labor to support the Cambodian government in its development of SWAps. The ADB 
favors the education sector SWAp, while the World Bank, in collaboration with DFID, embraces 
the health sector (World Bank, 2005a, p.38). 
The resource needs of the education sector, excluding technical and vocational education, 
amount to $293.7 million from 2006-2008; $110.5 million of the total is projected as being 
provided by the government of Cambodia. Since the donor commitment for education is $156 
million, a $27 million funding gap exists (Cambodia’s Education Sector Working Group, 2006, 
p.27). To fill this gap, the NSDP (National Strategic Development Plan) points out the need to 
significantly reduce freestanding technical assistance and to instead increase the budget support 
linked to measurable qualitative and quantitative performances and states that there is much 
inconsistency between individual donor commitments as reported by donors themselves and as 
recorded in the Cambodian government’s Public Investment Program 2006 to 2008 (p.27).168 
In 2003, about $546 million in ODA was disbursed for Cambodia, this figure represents 
nearly 8% of Cambodia’s GDP on a per capita basis. Cambodia, which has received significantly 
more ODA than other low-income countries during the past decade, primarily uses its aid 
inflows to improve health and education, rebuild physical infrastructure, and increase 
institutional capacity building. Given Cambodia’s substantial financial needs and its limited 
capacity to mobilize domestic revenues, it will continue to depend heavily on ODA in the mid 
                                                 
168 Regarding the resource availability and funding gap in the education sector in Cambodia from 2006 to 2010, the 
government and donor agencies will finance 50% and 9% for resource demands, respectively, and 41% for the 
funding gap (Cambodia’s Education Sector Working Group, 2006, p.33).  
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term (World Bank, 2005a, p.2). In light of Cambodia’s weak governance, a significant portion of 
ODA is handled off-budget and is, therefore, difficult to assess (p.14). 
8.2 FINDINGS FROM THE INTERVIEWS 
Blunt and Samneang (2005) report the qualitative findings based on semi-structured interviews 
conducted during 2005 in Phnom Penh that targeted aid workers in Cambodia.169 They conclude 
that while the government and donor agencies understand the notion of harmonization and 
alignment, they do not grasp the concepts of national ownership, managing for results, and 
mutual accountability (p.5). 
Cambodia spends a great deal of time on aid coordination, sometime at the expense the 
design and implementation of programs and projects. Donor agencies, therefore, experience a 
degree of “coordination fatigue” and “information overload” (Blunt & Samneang, 2005, p.5). An 
aid worker points out that “aid coordination seems to have become an end itself, rather than one 
of a number of means to poverty reduction. It is difficult to see a clear link time spent on aid 
coordination and result achieved” (p.5). While some aid workers label the time spent on aid 
coordination as about right, some others feel that the aid effectiveness agenda is too time-
consuming, too structured and too inflexibly in terms of diversity (p.5). One interviewee adds 
that aid coordination in Cambodia is “over-engineered” and too “choreographed” (p.27). 
The following section analyzes the situation of Cambodia from the perspective of donors’ 
concerns, contracting problems, and capacity. 
                                                 
169 The small sample size, the limited time available for conducting interviews, and the anecdotal nature of the 
evidence make the findings suggestive at best (Blunt & Samneang, 2005, p.5). 
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8.3 CONCERNS 
A consultant familiar with the FTI appraisal process in East Asia mentions that Cambodian 
government officials were skeptical of the FTI, especially because FTI membership did not 
necessarily guarantee an increase in external resources for education. The World Bank and 
several other donors argue that Cambodia should join the FTI to develop better sector planning 
and an education master plan. Because donor agencies often implement their projects according 
to their own agency procedures, some also assert that being an FTI member could enable donor 
agencies to “sing in the same choir” and thus avoid distortion in the education sector.170 
Although donor agencies see aid effectiveness, a core agenda of the FTI, as the “front-
center” on development agendas, aid effectiveness tends not to be the subject of much formal 
explicit discussion (Blunt & Samneang, 2005, p.14). An aid worker states that the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness “had not really been well thought through from an operational 
standpoint” (p.14). 
Nearly all the people interviewed expect to talk about aid effectiveness solely in terms of 
aid coordination (Blunt & Samneang, 2005, p.14). Donors’ agreement that aid coordination is 
desirable may translate into peer pressure not to criticize it. Others looking at aid coordination 
raise questions about “who was leading whom.” Donors, rather than the Cambodian government, 
may be “the main driving force behind the aid coordination agenda.” This constitutes a clear case 
of being “hoisted by your own petard” (p.15). 
Every donor agency seems to agree that the issue of “visibility was unlikely to fade away 
anytime soon” and that visibility would probably always be a source of tension for donors, 
                                                 
170 Interview with a consultant familiar with the FTI appraisal process in Cambodia, Mongolia, and Vietnam. 
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particularly for some bilateral agencies where development assistance is clearly an extension of 
foreign policy. This concern constitutes “a fundamental barrier to how far you can go without 
harmonization” (Blunt & Samneang, 2005, p.20). Some aid agencies, with the exception of the 
Like-Minded Donor Group (LMDG), may share this concern.  
ADB is one of the donors that has promoted SWAps and adopted budget support for 
education. The ADB has taken this approach due to the “government recognition of the 
disappointing sector performance in the 1990s, and the limited development impact of external 
assistance of $30-40 million per annum between 1994-1999” (Asian Development Bank, 2003, 
p.2). Another reason is a determination within the highest level of government to move from 
“donorship” to ownership and partnership, set out in the Cambodian government’s partnership 
paradigm paper (p.2). Also, an alliance of LMDG has facilitated the ADB to take such an 
approach (p.3). Between 1999 and 2001, ADB, SIDA, EC, and UNICEF jointly financed a 
sector-wide education policy dialogue and analysis in Cambodia. This work culminated in the 
draft ESP (Asian Development Bank, 2003, p.4). 
EC also supports a SWAp in education (European Commission, 2005, p.2). To strengthen 
policy planning and management in education, EC’s assistant program for Cambodia from 2003 
to 2008 consists of budget support combined with institutional support and technical assistance 
(p.10). Its budget support approach reflects the concern of EC. “The addition of resources 
through the budget support will be conditional upon acceptable pro-poor progress in the 
education sector as verified in the independent EC technical monitoring missions” (pp.12-3).  
Coordination between donors, which is institutionalized through the monthly Education Sector 
Working Group meeting, includes a representative of NGOs (p.14). EC reports the lessons 
learned from its past support to education sector in Cambodia underscored the importance of 1) 
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ensuring a close alignment with government policy, 2) developing nation-wide support and 
covering reforms and capacity building, and 3) dispersing support in a manner that strengthens 
provinces, districts and communes as well as the central level (European Commission, 2004a). 
The current EC programs consist of a sectoral budget support combined with institutional 
support and technical assistance to strengthen policy planning and management in education. In 
2001, the total ODA disbursed to Cambodia from EU member states accounted for $112.5 
million, which is 28% of total ODA.171 This large contribution is second only to Japan’s of $120 
million. 
The World Bank provides the Education Sector Support Credit, a combination of $8 
million IDA Credit and $20 million of grant. The project was appraised jointly with the ADB’s 
Second Education Sector Development Program (ESDP2) to ensure programmatic alignment and 
complementarity between both programs of financial assistance (World Bank, 2005e, p.8). 
Although direct fiduciary (i.e., financial management and procurement) risks for this project are 
limited, the countrywide fiduciary environment remains weak—strong financial management 
and procurement guidelines and supervision will be instituted through the implementation of the 
project, including annual independent audits (p.13). This is why the World Bank, as well as some 
other donor agencies, consider it premature to introduce budget support to Cambodia.  
The current World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) has a strong focus on 
strengthening national budgetary and financial management systems; it has considered a budget 
support for this operation (World Bank, 2005e, p.8). ADB and EC are presently providing 
targeted budget support to the education sector and addressing challenges through technical and 
                                                 
171 EU member states active in Cambodia include Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the U.K. 
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financial assistance (p.8). Financing to education has increased significantly in the past few years, 
but the timeliness and reliability of disbursement continue to be problematic (p.8).  
In Cambodia, the ADB and EC have taken an initiative to promote education SWAps and 
to introduce budget support. Other donor agencies have tried to transcend their traditional 
constraints and to align their aid with such multi-donor mechanism as SWAps, although the 
magnitude of bilateral agencies is not necessarily sufficient to meet the internationally agreed 
upon goals. 
8.4 CONTRACTING PROBLEMS 
The ADB and the EC are providing budget support to the education sector in Cambodia. 
However, the Cambodian government does not yet function well owing to political infighting in 
the wake of the country’s recent tragic history. The sector strategy developed by the government 
was not as sound as many donors would like it to have been, and the government misused some 
of the budget support earmarked by the ADB and EC for education, diverting it to other ends. 
Considering this background and the weak capacity of the government, delivering aid resources 
through governmental mechanisms in Cambodia may be premature at this time.172 
Blunt and Samneang (2005) present several conflicting perspectives among stakeholders 
in Cambodia in relation to the contracting problems of aid. They observe fundamental 
philosophical differences between two types of donor agencies in Cambodia. Some donors 
interpret “national ownership” as being linked with the employment of a national system 
                                                 
172 Interview with a consultant familiar with the FTI appraisal process in Cambodia, Mongolia, and Vietnam. 
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delivery despite the evident shortcomings of the Cambodian government. According to these 
donors’ perspectives, it is better to be “in there” and to be helping things to improve than to be 
operating “in parallel” (Blunt & Samneang, 2005, p.15). These donors include European LMDG-
type of agencies. On the other hand, another type of donor agencies believes that minimal levels 
transparency and accountability of government systems should be ensured; these agencies 
primarily interpret national ownership in terms of development objectives and their priority, not 
in terms of how development assistance is rendered (pp.15-16). Japan and the U.S. can be 
classified in this group.  
Furthermore, some tensions between government and some donor agencies with regard to 
the different interpretation of the term “national ownership” occur. One view sees virtue in a 
harmonized program approach involving multiple donor support to a government initiative, in 
tune with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, while another view perceives this as a 
threat to genuine government ownership (Blunt & Samneang, 2005, p.16). Because of 
Cambodia’s high level of aid dependency, a tension exists between the rhetorical claims of 
interest on the part of government in coordination and the incentives to maximize donor 
investment at the expense of the interest of Cambodian government (p.16). An aid worker said 
that overall transaction costs for the government and donors should decrease as a result of 
effectiveness donor coordination, but no verification exists that this yet happened (p.18).  
MoEYS and the international community recognize that the coordination and 
programming of external assistance will need to respond to changing sector priorities, especially 
in a shift towards the expansion of secondary and post secondary education opportunities 
anticipated in the revised Education Strategic Plan 2004-2008 (Asian Development Bank, 2004, 
p.41). For example, the support for capacity building, which is projected to shift towards sector-
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wide planning and management as opposed to project implementation and management, requires 
a review of the nature of technical assistance (p.41). 
Education donors meet every month in Cambodia. The Education Sector Working Group 
(ESWG) addresses the issue of donor coordination and serves as an information exchange on 
programs and projects supported by donor financing and technical assistance.173 Donors also 
finance the position of the Donor Coordination Advisor who compile information, works closely 
with MoEYS, and responds to the other heavy demands prior to and following the ESP and 
ESSP reviews (Cambodia’s Education Sector Working Group, 2006, p.9). 
Cambodia’s external assistance portfolio is a heavily technical assistance-oriented one. 
Technical assistance, comprising personnel charges, training and associated operational spending, 
is estimated at 45% of the project portfolio, while 21% of the portfolio deals with total domestic 
and externally financed investment spending. The key issue is to focus more resources on 
capacity enhancing technical assistance and to shift from technical assistance to investment and 
budget support for priority sectors (World Bank Institute, 2004, p.2). 
A case of the World Bank’s CAS (Country Assistance Strategy) exemplifies the strengths 
and challenges of donor coordination in Cambodia. The World Bank has shared the latest CAS, 
which covers from FY 2005 to 2008, with the ADB, DFID, and U.N. Development System. 
Also, the ADB, Japan, and the World Bank have worked over the last year to improve synergies 
among their programs (World Bank, 2005a, p.i). The Bank will contribute to improving the 
                                                 
173 ESWG, established in 2001, is chaired by UNESCO and EC. ESWG has two representatives of the NGO 
Education Partnership (NEP), also established in 2001. The ESWG serves as a regular forum for the many private 
orgnizations working in support of education (Cambodia’s Education Sector Working Group, 2006, p.9). 
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government-led coordination of external assistance, either by working through or helping to 
promote the evolution of coordination structures such as SWAps (p.ii).  
The CAS is also substantially aligned with UNDAF (World Bank, 2005a, p.1). During 
the preparation process of CAS in October 2003, the ADB, DFID, and the World Bank organized 
joint consultation workshops with partners and stakeholders, including the Cambodian 
government, other donors, NGOs, civil society, and the private sector. In the wake of the CAS 
development process, less duplication and fewer gaps in terms of sectoral coverage of the 
partners’ programs vis-à-vis Cambodia’s needs and priorities have reduced the transaction costs 
for the Cambodian government. Meanwhile, the transaction costs for the donor agencies have 
either stayed the same or grow larger than would have been the case had they prepared their own 
stand-alone country strategies. Staff overtime and the length of the process have also increased 
the overall costs. However, all four partners consider this an acceptable price to pay for the gains 
made. (p.2) 
8.5 CAPACITY 
Donor capacity is seen by some as an impediment to aid effectiveness. Those who work in the 
field assert that “many staff are not technically qualified in any particular discipline to a level 
that enables them to engage in high level debate or substantive issues, which sometimes leads to 
poor judgment about aid coordination” (Blunt & Samneang, 2005, p.15). 
An ADB officer states that the Cambodian government, not the donors’ capacity impedes 
aid effectiveness. Education sector SWAps in Cambodia used to lag behind those of the health 
sector. Cambodia developed its education SWAps based on the initiative of ADB. Quality 
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enhancement of education cannot be reached without the ownership of the ministry of recipient 
countries. SWAps have lowered transaction costs for developing countries by reducing the 
reporting requirements, etc. Donors need transparency in introducing SWAps in order to track 
where the money goes and how much recipient countries can expect. Although SWAp has been 
established in Cambodia, much work still needs to be done before the government bureaucracy 
assumes an ownership position. This includes the establishment of network systems to connect 
villages.174 
8.6 CONCLUSION 
Donor agencies have striven to support the educational development of the Cambodian 
government by using each donor’s comparative advantage and aid modalities available for 
respective agencies. Blunt and Samneang (2005) conclude: 
 Donors may decide to work together and pool funds or to provide budget support 
to government, or delegate to other donors, or to work separately. All forms of 
support have strengths and weaknesses that will vary from one situation to 
another. There are considerable risks to assuming a “one best way” approach to 
development assistance that pays no attention to circumstance. Which approaches 
to use, where and when should be a matter of informed judgment based on a 
careful assessment or circumstances and available development assistant methods. 
(Blunt and Samneang, 2005, p.25) 
                                                 
174 Interview with a staff member of ADB. 
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After examining the case of Cambodia, I would like to echo this perspective. “Singing in 
the same choir” for all donor agencies may be preferable but not compulsory. Taking it for 
granted that donor agencies, particularly some bilateral agencies, are more or less controlled by 
their home countries’ policies and diplomacies, a realistic solution should respect each donor’s 
different approach based upon the assumption of good will. Designing global guidelines may 
help donor agencies improve aid effectiveness, but flexibility should be ensured in the 
application of aid field-level activities.   
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9.0  EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGIES 
This section evaluates the strategy of the FTI in relation to the donor agencies from the 
viewpoints of concerns, contracting problems, and capacity. Since the international donor 
community launched the FTI in 2002, it may be premature to evaluate the successes or failures 
of the Initiative. However, like UNESCO (2005), I have attempted to make an initial assessment 
of the results of the FTI. Because various donor agencies have already made general assessment 
of the FTI, I focus particularly on donor agencies and their institutions here. The following figure 
is a flow chart of Chapter 9.  
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Figure 16. Chapter 9 flow chart 
 
UNESCO (2005) concludes that since the launch of the FTI, the amount of foreign aid for 
basic education has increased.175  The Initiative has heightened the visibility of UPE in the 
international society and facilitated donor coordination and harmonization in the education sector. 
Still, the FTI has received criticism. Various research findings demonstrate that the increase of 
foreign aid is not sufficient for many developing countries to reach the goal of UPE. Moreover, 
some educational practitioners question the “value added” of the FTI, particularly for the 
developing countries which already have a poverty reduction strategy and credible education 
sector plan.  
                                                 
175 According to UNESCO (2005), total bilateral aid to education increased from $3.55 billion in 2000 to $4.65 
billion in 2003, but education’s share of total foreign aid declined from 8.8% in 2002 to 7.4% in 2003 (p.108). 
Meanwhile, the budget support, which is not counted as aid for education in the OECD’s system, accounted for 5% 
of the total ODA in 1999-2003; the FTI Secretariat analyzes that 15% of budget support can be ascribed to 
education, half of which goes to basic education (p.111). 
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The following figure, obtained from document analysis and interviews, depicts the 
structural tensions among major stakeholders in relation to the FTI. On the field level, recipient 
countries try to mobilize resources from donor agencies in order to fill the gaps in achieving UPE, 
while aid workers in the field attempt to improve the effectiveness of their aid projects. 
Developing countries, by taking advantage of the international conferences, also appeal to the 
international society regarding the necessity for more external resources from donor agencies. 
However, donor-led international conferences usually expect the recipients to help themselves by 
developing  poverty reduction strategies and credible education sector plans. Meanwhile, tension 
exists within donor agencies: the donors’ top management and policymakers tend to promote 
innovative and appealing initiatives such as the FTI, while the aid workers in the field tend to 
prefer their traditional way of implementing projects in order to ensure credible outcomes from 
their aid activities. While international conferences call for more contributions from donor 
agencies, donors attempt to advertise their contributions at the international arena and justify that 
their way of aid delivery is effective in terms of assisting developing countries. In this chapter, I 
analyze these tensions from the viewpoint of donors’ concerns, contracting problems, and 
capacity.   
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Figure 17. Mapping of tensions among stakeholders of FTI 
9.1 CONCERNS 
The following section evaluates how donors’ concerns make a difference in the FTI in terms of 
the global and country levels.  
 215 
9.1.1 Global level 
On the global level, the strengths of the FTI derive from the Initiative’s effort to make maximum 
use the concerns of participating donors. The FTI has made an effort to keep the challenge of 
basic education in developing countries “catchy” so that the politicians of rich countries will pay 
attention to this agenda. For example, the FTI has proactively involved the G8 summit in its 
activities of advocacy and public relations. Although industrialized countries have demonstrated 
their commitment to the objectives of the FTI by pledging to a series of international agreements 
such as EFA, MDGs, and the Declarations of Aid Effectiveness, it is imperative to keep the 
Initiative attractive to the politicians of wealth countries in order to keep mobilizing resources 
from them. The amount of resource transfer from developed to developing countries was modest 
during the 1990s after the international community committed to the EFA in 1990. The FTI, 
therefore, recognizes the importance of advocacy for the politicians in donor countries.176  
Specifically, in collaboration with the participating donor agencies, the FTI has made 
UPE an agenda item not only at the annual EFA High-Level Meeting, which UNESCO convened, 
but also at the Annual Meetings of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund, 
and the G8 Summit. Through these international events, the heads of state and the Ministers of 
Finance and Education of wealthy countries acknowledge the urgency of establishing a basic 
education, or UPE. This political advocacy is critical for maintaining the momentum of foreign 
aid flow from rich to poor countries. To convince the policymakers, not only the aid workers of 
wealthy countries, to give aid for UPE in developing countries is formidable undertaking. To 
                                                 
176 UNESCO (2005) concludes that the FTI gained political visibility in 2005 through a series of international 
meetings: the Millennium Project, the Development Committee of the World Bank and the IMF, the Commission 
for Africa, and the G8 Summit in Gleneagles; however, these commitments in the international arena have not yet 
resulted in a significant increase in aid to basic education (p.120).  
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maintain the momentum, therefore, it is critical to use the above-mentioned international 
coordination mechanisms to support basic education in developing countries by targeting 
policymakers of rich countries. Consequently, the FTI has strived to keep UPE attractive for the 
policymakers. Such efforts have so far succeeded in increasing the number of donor agencies 
committed to supporting the FTI. 
Yet, the FTI’s inability to control donors’ concerns limits the Initiative. The FTI insists 
that mutual accountability of both donors and recipients forms the basis of the Initiative; it 
expects participating donor agencies to provide aid resources in a transparent and predictable 
manner. Due to the lack of capacity and/or willingness of aid workers, however, the FTI has no 
guarantee that all participating donors will comply with its guideline. An interview with a U.S. 
aid worker implies that the U.S., believing that its aid delivery system is a sufficient one, will not 
reconsider the effectiveness of its system when interacting with other donor agencies. The U.S. 
only expects the sharing of knowledge and exchange of information. Although donor agencies at 
least respect the internationally agreed upon consensus, such as EFA, the MDGs, and the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the magnitude of their commitment to these goals varies 
because each donor provides foreign aid in accordance with its own multiple incentives. The FTI 
does not have the power to alter the behavior of the donor agencies. 
As analyzed in Chapter 5, the perspective of the FTI secretariat regarding the stance of 
the FTI towards participating donor agencies appears to have changed, moving from a leadership 
role to that of mediation with various stakeholders. While the former director of the FTI 
secretariat asserted that the FTI should address the “market failure” in the allocation of ODA by 
promoting aid harmonization, an interviewee of the FTI secretariat from this study concluded 
that the FTI should remain low key and support the activities in the field simply by putting 
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questions on the table. Although both officers seem to share a common concern regarding the 
promotion of the FTI, this change in approach benefits developing countries. The FTI would not 
be able to gain anything if it imposed a certain aid modality on donor agencies; rather such 
action might make donor agencies reluctant to join the FTI and instead embrace a stand-alone 
strategy.  
In addition, a strong and undue influence from specific donor countries on the FTI makes 
the participation of other donors difficult. Some of the key concepts of the FTI, particularly the 
promotion of budget support, are derived from the discussion of the Like-Minded Donor 
countries and their experiences in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is widely known that major European 
donor countries took the initiative by directly providing their foreign aid to the national budgets 
of recipient governments and by intervening with the management of the public finance of low-
income countries to improve aid effectiveness. This has occurred because the traditional way of 
donors’ delivering foreign aid by establishing project implementation units has not worked well 
in a number of recipient countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, due to the weak governance 
of recipient countries.  
On the other hand, some other donor agencies such as Japan, whose major aid recipients 
in East Asia have enjoyed some socio-economic success, believe they do not have to introduce 
budget support. Because the context of East Asia differs from that of Sub-Saharan Africa, budget 
support seems a more relevant solution for European donors in Africa. Japanese aid workers 
reached this conclusion for several reasons. Since major recipients of Japan’s foreign aid in Asia 
usually have more organized institutions than Sub-Saharan African countries, Japan has not 
faced the necessity of introducing a new modality, such as budget support, to their aid system. 
Providing technical assistance and infrastructure development has been an impetus for socio-
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economic development in those Asian countries which have most benefited from Japan’s foreign 
aid. In addition, the principal-agent structures of some donor countries, such as the relationship 
between the headquarters and field offices of donor agencies, do not allow the aid modality that 
gives the developing countries receiving aid priority over the visibility of donor countries in the 
field. Moreover, the lack of capacity of donor agencies to ensure the accountability of their aid 
resources under the environment of coordinated and harmonized aid makes some donors hesitant 
to join the FTI. 
In terms of foreign aid philosophy, both the U.S. and Japan share a similar perspective. 
An American NGO worker has the skepticism toward the FTI and EFA goals per se due to their 
feasibility. “The idea of EFA came out of the U.N. The action plans which were agreed upon in 
Jomtien and Dakar are the same as those being used by the U.S. Regarding UPC’s unrealistic 
goal, I doubt that aid workers are able to stick to it and question why the goal is set too high.”177 
This perspective is in line with that of Easterly (2006). Most major donor agencies, including the 
U.S., attended a number of international conferences which designed those internationally agreed 
upon objectives of education.   
The fact that Japan and some non-European donor countries have selectively adopted 
budget support and aid harmonization for the countries in which such a system may work marks 
a favorable shift. The case study in Vietnam demonstrates that Japan, to improve aid 
effectiveness, has dialogued with the DFID, which has actively promoted budget support; Japan 
has selectively introduced this new aid modality wherever possible and appropriate. Conversely, 
the DFID, like Japan, acknowledges the usefulness of technical assistance projects in the context 
of Vietnam. Japan has generally been cautious of using the system of low-income countries in 
                                                 
177 Interview with an American NGO worker. When disbursing its foreign aid resources, the U.S. government 
increasingly favored contractors over NGOs (Johnes & Nickinson, 2006, p.351). 
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delivering its aid resources. Yet, it is significant that those aid workers in the field with the 
capacity and willingness to improve their aid have applied the good practices of other donors to 
their system. 
9.1.2 Country level 
On the country level, the FTI generates the leverage by interacting with international donor 
agencies in the field. The concerns of the FTI in the field are mobilizing more resources for UPE 
and developing the capacity of recipient governments, while local donor agencies are interested 
in generating the results and demonstrating them in accordance with their respective strategies. 
The FTI provides a forum for communication and knowledge exchange among local donor 
agencies for UPE. By doing so, the participating donor agencies satisfy both the needs of the FTI 
and of themselves.  
Nonetheless, some limitations of the FTI’s role in developing countries still exist. Since 
donor agencies usually work in accordance with their own strategy to ensure the accountability 
for their constituencies in industrialized countries, their commitment to the FTI is finite in all 
cases. The incentives of donor countries have typically been reflected in the selection of their 
recipients and the amount of their aid resources and disbursement. Although the initial FTI 
selected countries were the most likely ones to achieve UPE to ensure the FTI's effectiveness and 
efficiency, all low-income countries are currently eligible to apply for the FTI. Within 
developing countries, the FTI hopes to support the donors’ existing system and to provide 
Catalytic Funds in those areas with insufficient donor resources. However, the change of donors’ 
concerns can stop the disbursement of the pledged amount of aid resources. For example, the 
country strategy of Japan in providing aid for Vietnam explicitly mentions that Japan aids 
 220 
Vietnam because of its economic importance for Japan. The FTI’s Catalytic Fund also depends 
on bilateral donor countries and their contributions, which are subject to the policy of each donor 
country. The amount of the Catalytic Fund is not sufficient to enable developing countries to 
reach UPE. Even if they become FTI partners, developing countries have no guarantee that they 
will receive the necessary amount of resources from the regular donor channel or the Catalytic 
Fund. This fact undermines the incentives for some low-income countries to participate in the 
FTI.    
9.1.3 World Bank’s influence 
Although the FTI is technically a multi-donor network independent from the World Bank, some 
stakeholders regard the FTI as a World Bank’s initiative. While all the decisions regarding the 
FTI have been made through the discussion and consensus of FTI partners, some donor agencies, 
equating the FTI with the World Bank, tend to distance themselves from the FTI rather than 
enrich the Initiative by incorporating their respective perspectives. An aid worker in Mongolia 
and Cambodia says that some donors’ staff, rather than seeing a consultant as a representative of 
as a representative of all international donor agencies supporting education, instead saw him as 
an employee of the EPDF178 represented the World Bank.179 It is obvious that the FTI has a 
connection with the World Bank since the Bank proposed its idea, took initiative for its launch, 
housed its secretariat, and managed its trust fund such as the Catalytic Fund.  However, since the 
core implementation mechanism of the FTI is to use door agencies’ existing channels in the field, 
                                                 
178 An FTI Trust Fund. 
 
179 Interview with a consultant familiar with the FTI appraisal process in East Asia. 
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the FTI would not be successful without the active participation of donor countries. The World 
Bank launched a number of global development initiatives, such as the Strategic Partnership with 
Africa (SPA) and the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA), that later 
became independent from the Bank. These experiences reinforce the necessity of making the FTI 
more multilateral and of minimizing the influence of the World Bank in order to increase the 
number of donor countries that actively support the FTI.  
The FTI and the World Bank have discernible differences in their concerns. The ideal 
picture of the FTI includes: 1) having the recipient country develop a master plan; 2) endorsing 
the plan by donor agencies; and 3) introducing budget support, or using the country’s mechanism, 
as much as possible. A World Bank economist described that “this is different from the standard 
investment project of the World Bank. Even in the case of policy lending, the World Bank sets 
the conditions and asks recipient countries to fulfill them.”180 
A senior World Bank official makes a multilateral and pro-FTI statement regarding an 
ideal stance that donor agencies should take in relation to supporting UPE in developing 
countries: 
International donor agencies in the field are expected to understand FTI’s culture, 
the details of FTI’s plan, the value of working with countries, and the 
consistencies within the Indicative Framework. Bilateral donors involved in the 
FTI should transcend their own political interests. The FTI framework enables 
donor agencies to coordinate their efforts better. Bilateral donors should not 
implement “niche programs,” but should pursue uniform plans so that they can 
                                                 
180 Interview with a World Bank economist. 
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implement consistent financing and reduce the administrative burden on the 
government and the transaction costs. (Interview with a World Bank official) 
As these two experts clearly indicate, considerable differences divide the World Bank’s 
top management from its practitioners in the field. The senior officer urges participating donor 
agencies to “transcend their own political interests” to help developing countries achieve UPE 
under the FTI. Yet, even a field level officer within the World Bank recognizes that the Bank’s 
operation is different from what the FTI attempts to do. Bilateral donor countries, which have 
more explicit political interests in providing foreign aid, have more difficulties in adjusting their 
aid practices to the FTI’s.  
An American education specialist of an NGO shows an apathetic view toward the FTI. 
According to this specialist, “The FTI does not make a lot of difference; the idea is the same as 
that which American aid workers have done. There are no ways to avoid the tensions that have 
arisen from donors’ concerns, i.e., between pursuing donors’ national interests and helping poor 
countries. Often, a donor’s major concern is how the aid money is used while, generally 
speaking, donor coordination does work well in many places.” 181 This perspective exemplifies a 
challenge that FTI members must overcome in order to make the Initiative really work: 
presenting an explicit value added from the FTI and a realistic solution to reconcile with donors’ 
various concerns. 
The FTI is making a difference in the effort to reach UPE by the international community 
by utilizing various concerns of different donor agencies. Despite the Initiative’s limitations 
mentioned above, the FTI is significant because it provides donor agencies and recipient 
governments with an arena of doing “experiments” for reaching UPE. Through the mechanism of 
                                                 
181 Interview with an NGO worker. He also points out that “the EMIS (Education Management Information System) 
is usually shared by many donor agencies in the field.” 
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the Initiative, the participating donor agencies pilot various approaches for UPE and share those 
lessons with other participants. In this way, the FTI mediates the participating donors’ various 
concerns.  
However, judging from the case study of Vietnam, donor agencies should care about the 
absorptive capacity of recipient governments when they do “experiments” regarding new aid 
initiatives. Due to their excellent governance and socio-economic performance, donor agencies 
have provided significant amounts of aid resources, sometimes by using new aid approaches. By 
collaborating with major bilateral donor countries, the World Bank has taken a leadership role in 
providing both general budget support and targeted budget support to assist Education for All, 
which includes UPE, in Vietnam. While these new initiatives seem to have worked well in 
Vietnam, donor agencies must recognize that it is the recipient country that should sit in the 
driver’s seat. The donors’ role should be no more than assisting developing countries in learning 
how to drive, rather than “experimenting” with the donors’ new ideas in the field.  
9.2 CONTRACTING PROBLEMS 
Although the FTI asserts that the mutual accountability of both developing and industrialized 
countries makes the Initiative different from other aid activities, the power structure of the 
contractual relationship between recipients and donors is uneven. Developing countries cannot 
receive assistance from the FTI unless they satisfy the requirements of the Initiative: using the 
Indicative Framework, prepared by the FTI to create a poverty reduction strategy and a credible 
education sector plan. Even if developing countries fulfill these requests, they have no guarantee 
that they will receive a sufficient amount of aid; the amount of foreign aid depends on the 
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discretions of each donor agency. While all low-income countries are eligible to apply for FTI 
membership, the FTI may lose its attraction if it does not live up to its launch by making a 
difference in filling the gap of data, policy, capacity, and resource in achieving UPE. This 
limitation of the FTI may cause developing countries to reconsider whether they want to become 
members. 
Meanwhile, donor agencies are not subject to the guidelines of the FTI. The FTI, in line 
with the standards set by the OECD-DAC, prepares the criteria regarding donor coordination and 
harmonization, which is known as the Donor Indicative Framework; it attempts to improve the 
effectiveness of foreign aid from the participating donor agencies. Ultimately, however, donor 
agencies can selectively join or even leave the FTI, if the Initiative’s guideline is unfavorable for 
them. They can then use their modalities so that donor countries can maximize their own benefits 
by providing foreign aid. This reality may negatively affect the morale of the FTI’s 
stakeholders.182  
Regarding the transaction costs in relation to the contracts between donors and recipients, 
the FTI’s core strategy, i.e., donor coordination, harmonization, and alignment toward the system 
of recipient governments, contributes to reducing the administrative costs of developing 
countries. As part of the process for low-income countries to become an FTI member, donor 
agencies in the field assist these countries in creating poverty reduction strategies and credible 
education sector plans; the developing countries and donor agencies then assess those documents 
in a collaborative manner. This process, which forms the basis that allows donor agencies in the 
field to work together under the common framework of FTI, shows that donor agencies bear the 
                                                 
182 Former World Bank economist Easterly (2006) concludes that voters in rich countries choose the actions of 
foreign aid; they love “the promises of easy solutions, the utopian dreams, the side benefits for rich-country political 
or economic interests, all of which hands the aid agency impossible tasks” (p.170).  
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administrative costs on behalf of the recipient countries. Consequently, an agency that has an 
incentive to be a mediator among donor agencies usually plays the role of Lead Coordinating 
Agency in the field.183 Such donor agencies include some U.N. organizations, whose mandate is 
donor coordination per se, as well as Like-Minded Donors, who have promoted harmonization 
over the past decade. These donors have already established an accountability system, such as 
DFID, in their home countries, so that their own visibility in developing countries does not 
matter as long as their foreign aid contributes to the development of poor countries. 
However, both the case study of Mongolia and the many interviewees of different donor 
agencies indicate that successful donor coordination depends on the personality of aid workers in 
the field rather than the policies and strategies of aid agencies. The three case studies in this 
paper illustrate that motivated individual aid workers, not officially selected Lead Coordinating 
Agencies, are the ones who contribute to the coordination among donor agencies and who make 
a difference in the preparation for the FTI. This is a significant point since all donor agencies 
have more or less committed to providing assistance for developing countries to achieve UPE. In 
other words, with aid agencies already motivated for the FTI, it becomes more important to 
stimulate the capacity and willingness of individual aid workers to take piecemeal action in the 
field for the FTI.  
                                                 
183 Easterly (2006) asserts that “aid agencies are rewarded for setting goals rather than reaching them, since goals are 
observable to the rich-country public while results are not” (p.185). The donors who took an initiative to set goals 
have an incentive to be mediators. Donors can also take an initiative to modify the standards or setting goals that 
follow the current one.   
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9.2.1 Aid modalities 
Each donor has different contracting problems in relation to the FTI, particularly concerning the 
aid modalities. While it seems that Japan has become open to the new aid modalities and 
promotes harmonization, alignment, and donor coordination, some Japanese aid workers place 
higher priority on demonstrating Japan’s spirit in its foreign aid activities.184 This stance may 
have an adverse effect on global efforts, including those of the FTI, towards aid effectiveness. 
Japan has officially expressed its willingness to play a more active role in the FTI, including its 
financial contribution to the Catalytic Fund; like other donor agencies, the magnitude of its 
commitment differs, depending on each aid worker.  
A Japanese aid worker spells out the significance of donor coordination for Japan: 
In promoting donor coordination and participating in aid harmonization, it is 
important to consider and estimate costs and benefits. For example, Japan may 
simply disseminate its information to other donor agencies in the developing 
countries in which it is a leading donor. On the other hand, in the developing 
countries in which Japan’s input is relatively small, proactive participation in 
donor coordination is rational in order to better demonstrate its contribution. 
Japan should use donor coordination to implement “Japan’s foreign aid” 
effectively. Donor coordination sometimes instigates an excessive volume of 
meetings and brings about “coordination fatigue” among some donor agencies. 
                                                 
184 A Japanese aid worker expressed his concern on new aid modality. “Participating in budget support makes it 
difficult for donor countries to track how their aid resources are actually used” (Interview with a Japanese official 
aid worker). However, this view seems to be myopic. Because foreign aid resources are fungible, it is necessary to 
pay attention to how recipient countries’ budget monies are used, regardless of the participation in budget support, in 
order to ensure the effective use of aid resources.  
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Taking into account the rationale of donor coordination, Japan should avoid being 
involved in such a situation. (Interview with a Japanese official aid worker) 
The priority of Japan seems to be putting its spirit into the operation in developing 
countries and, thereby, contributing to the development of recipient countries. This seems to 
explain why Japan has kept its distance from playing an active role in the FTI at the country level, 
although it would be ideal for Japan, like the U.S., take a leadership position to promote the FTI 
in these countries where Japan is the leading donor.  
An ADB officer concludes, “Nuances exist in the collaboration efforts among donors 
because each donor agency has different products. A challenge for collaboration with other 
donors is different for the budget cycle. The consciousness of donor coordination is different for 
upstream policy dialogue and project preparation and operations.”185 Both the case studies of 
Mongolia and Cambodia indicate that “nuances” seem to exist even within the ADB. While the 
ADB has attempted to promote education sector wide approaches in Cambodia with EC, the 
ADB, reluctant to participate in the preparation of the FTI in Mongolia, has concentrated on 
implementing its lending projects in Mongolia. This ADB case shows that it is important for 
donor agencies to show their presence and credit in the field; without field presence, a donor is 
not willing to collaborate with other donors, even if donor coordination may benefit recipient 
countries.  
An American NGO worker warns against the impetuous introduction of new aid modality. 
“SWAps, or the approach using the recipients’ systems and harmonization, will not work unless 
the recipient countries create a corruption-free climate. Aid workers do not want to be blind 
when delivering aid money to developing countries in which there may be corruption. Before 
                                                 
185 Interview with a staff member of ADB. 
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offering budget support, aid workers must be aware of the risk that tax money paid by hard-
working citizens of donor countries may go to the elite of other countries for their personal 
enrichment.“186 American and Japanese official aid agencies share similar evaluations. 
A World Bank economist agrees that the ultimate ideal picture is to abolish Project 
Implementation Units and use the Ministries of Finance of recipient countries for delivering aid. 
He adds that “the starting point is parallel financing, where FTI funds are used to support 
specific Government priorities in primary school education. We have to take some risks for 
budget support in order to improve aid effectiveness.”187 This perspective appears favorable 
when seen from the viewpoint of improving aid effectiveness for the sake of recipient countries. 
If the World Bank took more risks and extended more budget support, it would be an exemplary 
prototype for other education donors as well. However, judging from the concerns of major 
donor agencies, it would be difficult for donors to take risks unless their credit and presence in 
the field are guaranteed. 
A senior World Bank officer also takes the position of pro-harmonization. The officer 
declares that “an ideal modality to achieve UPE is budget support, which focuses on broader 
country programs. PIU could function as a ‘ring fence.’ The ‘ring fence’ should be changed so 
that the whole sector can be supported properly. SWAp is an inevitable trend, but it is important 
to ensure that money is spent judicially and the flow of money can be tracked.”188 This officer’s 
comment that budget support is ideal for the FTI is in accordance with the early stage perspective 
of the FTI secretariat. Currently, however, the FTI secretariat explicitly states that the FTI does 
                                                 
186 Interview with an NGO staff member. 
 
187 Interview with a World Bank economist. 
 
188 Interview with a World Bank staff. "Ring fencing" means ensuring that an agency's own projects are corruption-
free and implicitly worrying less about what happens outside the fence. 
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not support a certain aid modality, but that it does respect the discussion between donors and 
recipients in the field. The “ideal” way of assisting developing countries may differ, depending 
on the context of the recipient country and its donor agencies. As this officer explains, the 
donors’ stand-alone projects, or “ring-fence,” should definitely be minimized, but it is important 
not to exclude major actors from the discussion in order to make the multilateral initiative, such 
as the FTI, successful. In this sense, all stakeholders should tolerate diversity of various ways of 
providing aid. 
While each donor agency has a different position concerning the optimum way to deliver 
aid resources, all donors must recognize their limitations and the roles they are expected to play. 
The relatively small portion of foreign aid in the education budget of recipient countries 
illustrates that donors’ aid activities alone cannot make a difference. Instead, the bulk of 
educational funding should come from a domestic budget. According to UNESCO’s EFA Global 
Monitoring Report 2007, 80-90% of total financing for education typically comes from domestic 
sources (EFA-Fast Track Initiative, 2006, p.18). 
Therefore, if donor agencies intend to support the UPE in developing countries, donors 
should pay more attention to the education budget of developing countries. Rather than simply 
managing their aid projects, donor agencies should instead help recipients effectively use their 
own funds. This context justifies the recent trend of introducing sector-wide approaches and 
budget support. Because a large portion of aid for education is still off budget and off plan, the 
latest FTI Partnership Meeting asserts the necessity of increasing the share of finance that 
supports the national education sector plan. This promotes the FTI’s principle of harmonizing 
donors’ aid in support of a single and locally-owned education sector plan (EFA-Fast Track 
Initiative, 2006, p.19). 
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Also, for donor agencies to improve how recipient countries manage their education 
budget to reach UPE, they need to decentralize their decision-making system. A Japanese 
education scholar points out that “no entity other than developing countries themselves can claim 
to be responsible for financing education and setting educational agendas” and donor agencies 
“should recognize their limitations and seek modest and appropriate EFA roles in close 
cooperation with the respective countries they aid (Sutton et al., 2007, p.236). For this purpose, it 
is critical for donor agencies “to transfer authorities, budgets, and people from their headquarters 
to their field offices” (pp.236-7).  
9.2.2 Anti-corruption 
Many donor agencies see a policy of anti-corruption as indispensable to improving aid 
effectiveness. It is widely known that former World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz, who was 
tough on corruption in recipient countries, strengthened the function of the Bank’s anti-
corruption unit (Mallaby, 2006, February 20). Some of the interviewees’ comments on their aid 
deliveries seem to stem from their own anti-corruption efforts. While a retired USAID worker 
and an American NGO worker both describe their aid delivery systems as sufficiently 
sophisticated, they add that using recipient countries’ system in disbursing their aid resources is 
risky. Their assertion, understandable from the viewpoint of ensuring quality outputs of foreign 
aid, may not be applicable to all developing countries because the level of governance differs in 
each recipient country. 
When donor agencies argue anti-corruption, they usually refer to the recipient countries’ 
corruption, not the corruption in aid organizations. However, corruption exists within aid 
agencies. Chakravarti (2005) insists that “the majority of officials in aid organizations cannot 
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have the mind set to take a critical view of their own work or the desire to try to understand 
whether aid is achieving any of its long-term objectives or goals” (p. 102). He describes that staff 
members at donors’ headquarters as focusing on their own career enhancement rather than 
having an altruistic motivation to help low-income countries. On the field level, aid workers care 
about ensuring their generous benefits and “so-called diplomatic life style” provided by aid 
agencies. Chakravarti concludes that “this mind set is very far away from the requirement of 
development” (p.103).  
The FTI attempts to minimize such corruption within aid agencies. In line with the 
international consensus on aid effectiveness, as described in Chapters 4 and 5, the FTI 
encourages donor agencies to follow alignment (i.e., respecting the ownership of recipients), 
harmonization (i.e., promoting donor coordination), and mutual accountability (i.e., 
implementing their commitment to provide more and better aid). It is true that changing the 
mindset of individual aid workers that causes corruption within aid agencies is difficult. 
However, if donor agencies promote alignment, harmonization, and mutual accountability in the 
context of the FTI, then their aid delivery systems will become more transparent. Such change 
will mitigate corruption within donor agencies.  
9.3 CAPACITY 
9.3.1 Absorptive capacity and donor agencies 
A number of researchers and practitioners conclude that the capacity of recipient countries to 
absorb aid is limited by the administratively cumbersome aid of donor agencies (See Chapter 5). 
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These experts assert that donor agencies should improve their own mechanisms so that recipient 
countries could receive greater and better foreign aid. While this assertion sounds reasonable, 
judging from the case studies that I conducted, it appears that recipient countries also should bear 
some costs so that donor agencies could improve the quantity and quality of their aid.  
First, the case study of Mongolia shows that two large donors, ADB and Japan, were 
reluctant to join the FTI, preferring to instead implement their projects in a more traditional 
manner (See Chapter 6). These donor agencies viewed participation in the FTI as leading to the 
increase in the donors’ administrative burden and a decrease in the recipients’ aid absorptive 
capacity. The requirement of all donors’ signatures on the Mongolian FTI proposal exacerbated 
the situation. Both ADB and Japan have a centralized structure in relation to providing foreign 
aid. Their aid workers stationed in Mongolia had to get permission from their headquarters to 
sign the FTI proposal. As a result, the administrative burdens involves in FTI participation 
exceeded those of other decentralized donor agencies.  
Second, the case study of Vietnam demonstrates that two influential donors, the U.K. and 
Japan, dialogued to improve their aid delivery by stating good practices with each other (See 
Chapter 7). Other international donors in Vietnam were proactively willing to test new aid 
modalities such as general budget support and targeted budget support.  
Third, the case study of Cambodia indicates the complexity among donor agencies. While 
ADB and European Commission attempt to introduce sector-wide approaches in the education 
sector to promote the ownership of the Cambodian government, many other donors prefer to 
disburse their aid resources by a donors’ system; they do not support the Cambodian 
governmental system due to its lack of governance (See Chapter 8).  
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Participation in the FTI, which adds an additional administrative burden for donor 
agencies, therefore, reduces the aid absorptive capacity of recipient countries, at least in the short 
run. However, once the FTI functions well, those costs will decrease; the FTI will allow donors 
to provide more and better aid, and it will give recipients more benefits for UPE. The case of 
Vietnam is the closest to this ideal picture. The FTI will benefit both donors and recipients if 
both parties are willing to accept additional costs, particularly at the introductory stage. 
9.3.2 Donors’ capacity 
The donors’ capacity to mobilize resources, specifically in terms of coordinating the stakeholders 
in the field, makes a difference in the foreign aid for UPE. Since the launch of the FTI, donor 
agencies have mobilized more aid resources aiming at the recipient country’s plan to achieve 
UPE. In order to go beyond the limitations of the FTI, as mentioned in the above sections, and to 
make the FTI more effective, the following types of capacity are required of donor agencies.  
Donor agencies need to have the capacity to coordinate the events in developing 
countries and to coordinate the stakeholders of foreign aid in their home countries. The FTI, as 
well as many other recent trends and agreements of international development, attempts to 
harmonize the process of foreign aid and alignment with the recipient countries’ system. The 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness emphasizes that making foreign aid more useful for 
developing countries and, where necessary, compromising donor countries’ visibility in the field 
are becoming the consensus of the international community. As the case study of Vietnam spells 
out, Japan and the U.K., two major donors with totally different aid approaches, have dialogued 
to review their respective practices and traditional ways of providing aid in order to learn from 
each other’s effective practices. This is possible because of those officers who have the capacity 
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to coordinate different perspectives and the willingness to transcend their traditional beliefs in 
the field. To be successful, the FTI needs to create such officers. 
However, donor agencies can use the new modality resulting from this consensus, such as 
the budget support or pool fund, only when their domestic resource providers accept such a 
modality. In order for some donor agencies to adjust to aid harmonization, reorganization of their 
principal-agent structure around foreign aid will be necessary. The interviewees of both Japanese 
and American aid workers point out a constraint of domestic policy in providing foreign aid; this 
implies that Japan and the U.S. cannot exclusively provide foreign aid to support developing 
countries.  
Many donor agencies attempt to program their solutions based on the recipient countries’ 
contexts; therefore, more aid agencies are decentralizing their decision-making systems to the 
field offices. This is a favorable transformation from the viewpoint of improving aid 
effectiveness for developing countries. However, the roles of aid agencies in their home 
countries, particularly the capacity of these agencies to create a bridge between the discussions in 
the field and the stakeholders in rich countries, are equally critical. No matter how many 
recipient-friendly aid programs an aid agency designs in the field, aid resources cannot be 
predicted unless such programs are accepted by the donors’ home countries. Taxpayers and 
politicians will not support the foreign aid programs that do not respond to the concerns of the 
people in the donors’ home countries. The capacity to connect and coordinate the arguments in 
the field with those of northern industrialized countries is, therefore, important in order to make 
the FTI effective.  
A Japanese aid worker asserts that donor agencies should strengthen the following three 
capacities:  
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1) Capacity of human resources: donors should improve the capacity of aid workers 
in terms of monitoring, evaluation, appraisal, and sector analysis; 
2)  Capacity of aid modality: donor agencies should promote both regional 
cooperation and South-South cooperation. We [the Japanese government] 
welcome that new donor countries, such as China, are emerging. At the same time, 
it is important to encourage them to observe established international rules 
regarding providing ODA of OECD-DAC and other international bodies; and  
3) Capacities of operation and institution: Donor agencies should make their aid 
activities user-friendly and sustainable. Local procurement of aid goods, for 
example, should be promoted where appropriate. (Interview with a Japanese 
official aid worker) 
Not only does the FTI open the door to all kinds of donor agencies, but is also welcomes 
the participation of all low income countries. In addition to official donor agencies, both NGOs 
and private sector representatives have started to participate in the FTI. The policies and 
practices of these new donor agencies, including those from China, are critical agenda items in 
ensuring aid effectiveness. Having donor countries such as Japan play a mediator’s role between 
the international society and emerging donor countries in relation to the FTI is also of value. The 
international society should address the participation of new donor countries, such as China, in 
order to make the FTI work properly. 189  Unlike the more traditional OECD-DAC member 
donors, many advanced developing countries tend to use their foreign aid for their political and 
diplomatic purposes. As a result, advocacy and pressure from a multilateral body like the FTI 
                                                 
189 For example, see Naim (2007, February 15). 
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will be necessary to enable those new aid agencies to comply with international consensus and 
rules.  
In May 2007, the King of Jordan, concerned about new donors’ contributions, invited 
leaders from ten lower-middle income countries, as well as the current and next G8 presidents as 
observers to organize a “G-11” meeting.190 Asserting that “the success of lower-middle income 
countries will create an anchor for regional stability and prosperity and provide a crucial model 
of what structural and economic reform can achieve,” the “G-11” meeting called for international 
support to help development, especially in education, one of four priority areas (Hussein, 2007, 
May 21). For donor agencies, providing foreign aid in collaboration with this kind of South-
South movement will help enhance the ownership of recipient countries.  
From the U.S. perspective, an American NGO worker emphasizes the necessity of 
strengthening donors’ technical capacity in order to better identify, implement, monitor, and 
evaluate projects for the staff of donor agencies; he also warns about the dangers of the aid 
effectiveness agenda, especially in terms of an excessive administrative workloads and the 
number of meetings: 
Aid workers are overwhelmed by all the bureaucratic red tape, including 
excessive reporting requirements and ad hoc meetings, all of which increase 
donors’ transaction costs. In order to avoid taking on these administrative 
burdens, the U.S. can say, “this is the way we do business,” which is different 
from European donors. U.S. aid workers are constrained by, among other things, 
Congressional legislation and the requirement to supply U.S.-made goods. The 
                                                 
190 The countries include Croatia, El Salvador, Ecuador, Georgia, Honduras, Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, and Sri Lanka. 
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U.S. process for granting foreign aid is well-established and under close scrutiny. 
(Interview with a U.S. NGO worker) 
This comment exemplifies a typical U.S. perspective that defines the FTI as a forum for 
various stakeholders to understand each other; it asserts that participants should respect each 
other’s way of providing aid. 
How the U.S. views the aid effectiveness agenda differs from that of the international 
society. The OECD-DAC concludes that “the U.S. Government sees results-based management 
of its bilateral system as synonymous with aid effectiveness and the best way to address 
Congressional insistence on ‘value for money’” (OECD, 2006b, p.14). However, the 
internationally-recognized OECD perspective on aid effectiveness stresses “an international 
issue, involving interaction between partner countries and the donor community, as much as a 
bilateral one,” which is “organized across government action that fosters ownership, strengthens 
partner country systems and procedures, and collaboratively tracks results would support the 
international Paris Declaration effort to address effectiveness” (p.14). The U.S.’s apparent 
ignoring of this view makes it difficult for other agencies to promote collaboration with U.S. aid 
agencies.  
A World Bank economist claims that the FTI should play a more active role in changing 
the World Bank’s operations, since the Bank’s activities in the field make a difference in the 
success of the FTI.191 This officer also pointed out that the FTI Secretariat should contribute 
                                                 
191 “FTI should understand how rigid the World Bank’s operations are and should exert its influence to change the 
World Bank’s structure. Other donors should disseminate their information more. U.N. agencies lack the knowledge 
about FTI.” (Interview with a World Bank economist) 
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more to developing FTI guidelines that are more clear for these aid officers willing to work for 
the FTI.192 
In conclusion, as pointed out by Martens et al. (2002, pp.8-9), the delegation in foreign 
aid, especially regarding donors’ concerns, contracting problems, and capacities results in two 
problems: moral hazards and adverse selection. It is obvious that a kind of moral hazard has been 
generated between donor agencies’ headquarters and field offices. A number of comments from 
different aid agencies imply that many aid workers at the country level, who have direct contact 
with recipient governments, take it for granted that foreign aid should be recipient-friendly and 
should be provided flexibly to meet the demands of recipient countries, regardless of aid 
modality or consensus in the international community. Although almost all donor agencies have, 
more or less, attempted to use the aid effectiveness agenda as an impetus to improve their foreign 
aid policies and activities, many donors, particularly non-European ones, insists that new aid 
modalities generate additional costs for donor agencies. A number of aid workers comment that 
aid effectiveness depends upon the personalities and abilities of individual officers in the field. 
Despite the political constraints imposed by the headquarters, the goodwill and craftsmanship of 
each aid worker can make a difference in aid effectiveness and in minimizing the “moral 
hazard.” 
                                                 
192 “There are no FTI guidelines on how, for example, governments and donors could work better together, and there 
are few best practices available. The FTI Secretariat should improve the dissemination of FTI information. The 
Q&A section should be improved.” (Interview with a World Bank economist) 
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10.0  CONCLUSION 
This section summarizes the major findings of the research, including how this study clarifies the   
“black-box” of foreign aid in the FTI. I also describe the discussion between the theoretical 
perspectives reflected in the literature review (Chapter 2) and the research findings, as well as the 
usefulness of the analytical framework that I used for this research. Finally, I present the 
implications of the finding of this research for foreign aid policy makers and practitioners, as 
well as a future research agenda.   
10.1 MAJOR FINDINGS 
This paper discusses the effectiveness of the EFA-FTI from the donors’ perspective by focusing 
on donors’ concerns, contracting problems, and capacity in relation to aid provision. This study 
further attempts to clarify the donors’ aid delivery mechanism, which many economists who 
have researched aid effectiveness treat as a “black box.” The document analysis, as well as 
interview research vis-à-vis my research problems, yield major findings:  
First, the multiple incentives of donor agencies influence their delivery of foreign aid in 
the FTI. The FTI participating donors share common concerns, such as helping low-income 
countries achieve quality universal primary school completion with gender equality and 
promoting aid harmonization and alignment. Yet, each donor agency has its own incentives, 
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which affect each donor’s aid delivery. The DFID of the U.K. emphasizes promoting 
development-oriented and recipient-friendly aid; consequently, the DFID has been active in 
strengthening and enriching the function of the FTI. The U.S. would like to promote its own 
agenda, such as endorsing a public-private-partnership in education and integrating foreign aid 
into diplomacy. Thus, USAID has been reluctant to encourage collaboration with other donor 
agencies. Japan, believing in the importance of being visible, uses a hand-in-hand modality, such 
as technical assistance, to provide foreign aid.  
Second, it is difficult to conclude whether the donors’ delivery of foreign aid resources 
influences the outcomes of the FTI. This is because the cause-and-effect between donor’s aid 
delivery and the improvement of primary education completion in developing countries is hard 
to prove. However, in view of the fact that the portion of foreign aid is relatively small in the 
education budget of developing countries, it is critical that recipient countries properly and 
effectively use their resources to achieve the UPE goal. The core strategy of the FTI, one that 
relies on poverty reduction and a credible education sector plan made by the recipient countries 
and endorsed by the donor community, makes sense. It allows donor agencies to monitor how 
recipient countries use their resources, and it provides them with proper advice where necessary. 
Also, by promoting an aid effectiveness agenda that includes harmonization and alignment and 
that introduces a new aid modality, such as Sector-Wide Approaches and budget support when 
appropriate, both donors and recipients move in the right direction to achieve the UPE goal, 
despite their limited resources.  
Third, the coordination among different donors’ foreign aid policies for the FTI has 
reduced the transaction cost in aid delivery and the administrative burden of developing 
countries in receiving external assistance. However, it is noteworthy that some donor agencies, 
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like the U.S., consider their aid system the best; they are more interested in knowledge sharing 
and information exchange with other donors than in a collaboration that reduces the 
administrative burden of developing countries. The huge financial gap within developing 
countries trying to achieve the UPE goal makes it critical for these nations to draw more 
resources from donor agencies, no matter what kind of aid delivery systems they prefer. The FTI 
has taken a realistic and understandable stance in relation to donor coordination by respecting 
each donor’s concerns and priorities, by encouraging donors to promote alignment and 
harmonization, and by keeping a low profile so that all donor agencies could feel comfortable 
being FTI members. 
Last, friction does exist in the transfer of resources for the FTI from donors to recipients; 
this may hinder the effective use of those resources. Particularly, a discernible disparity accurs 
between policy makers in the headquarters and practitioners working in the field offices in 
relation to donors’ aid provision for the FTI. Policy makers tend to propose something 
innovative and attractive in order to draw the attention of various stakeholders, but aid workers 
prefer to produce quality outcome, which will not only ensure their own reputation but also 
contribute to the socio-economic development of recipient countries. Therefore, while policy 
makers in the headquarters promote, or at least express an understanding of, the aid effectiveness 
agenda, a number of practitioners in the field prefer traditional ways to secure quality outcome.  
10.2 CLARIFICATION OF THE “BLACK-BOX” 
This study, as presented in Chapter 1, attempts to clarify the portion that economists treat like a 
“black box” in their analysis of aid effectiveness, i.e., aid delivery by donor agencies. I 
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demonstrate a causal pathway of aid effectiveness by using donors’ concerns, contracting 
problems, and capacity in relation to the FTI. This causal pathway has a significance for other 
foreign aid initiatives, especially the viewpoint of donor agencies, because the FTI is designed 
upon a number of international agreements; it is influential not only in promoting UPE in 
developing countries but also in facilitating aid effectiveness. This clarification of a “causal 
pathway” would contribute to the clarification of cause and effect between aid and the 
performance FTI in future research.  
The FTI makes a difference in reinforcing the weakness of door agencies. Carol 
Lancaster, a researcher in international development and foreign aid, presents a perspective that 
is relevant to the FTI. She asserts that political constituencies inside and outside donor 
governments increase the development purpose of foreign aid. As a constituency outside the 
government, “NGOs supporting aid grew in numbers and influence in most major aid-giving 
countries” (Lancaster, 2006, p.213). As a constituency within the government, “Aid agencies 
were set up, expanding their budgets and their staffs, strengthened their professional capacities, 
and increased their ‘development education’ programs with their own publics” (p.213). 
According to Lancaster, the development-orientation of foreign aid weakened in which those 
constituencies were weak. A role of the FTI in relation to donors’ aid delivery is to reinforce 
such “constituencies.” The FTI attempts to improve the donors’ existing aid delivery channels by 
putting pressures on donor agencies via various mechanisms such as international conferences 
and NGO networks. These illustrate the contributions of the FTI in relation to the “black box.” 
Moreover, a recent study on aid effectiveness, which the Swedish Development 
Cooperation Agency (Sida) proposes, points out the challenges of the donor agency. “Powerful 
incentives are built into structures over which a development agency has little control: the 
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structure of political institutions in both donor and recipient countries beget rules that can work 
directly against effective development aid” (Gibson & Andersson, 2005, p.224). “Development 
assistance will continue despite its problems because its funding does not depend on its 
sustainability. There are no institutions or market mechanisms that ensure the efficient delivery 
of sustainable aid. The only way that an understanding of incentives will lead to better 
development assistance is through the determination of an agency’s own staff to create rules that 
‘good’ incentives” (p.225). The FTI attempts to create the “good incentives” among donor 
agencies and aid workers by facilitating “mutual accountability” between donors and recipients 
and by supporting existing aid agencies to become more development-oriented and less 
politically oriented.  
10.3 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
This study contributes to enriching the theoretical perspectives that I reviewed in Chapter 2: 
development economics, institutional economics, foreign aid effectiveness, and education and 
development. First, development economics plays a significant role in designing the FTI. To 
justify their education projects, many donor agencies conduct economic analyses before prepare 
and design these programs. While each donor agency has its own organizational priority with 
economic analysis not necessarily the most important component, many donor agencies use 
indicators based upon economic analysis in preparing, monitoring, and evaluating their projects 
in the education sector. For example, the FTI encourages donor agencies to finance recurrent 
costs of primary education in its initial stage. The World Bank proposed this idea as one based 
upon its economic analysis of education projects.  Development economics is a useful tool to 
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analyze the FTI if donor agencies emphasize economic analysis and create policies that are 
development-oriented.  
However, since donor agencies have multiple concerns, they sometimes implement 
education projects that cannot be justified by economic analysis; development economics cannot 
always address the reality of foreign aid. Although some bilateral donor agencies use their 
foreign aid as a means to ensure their national interests, it is not productive to criticize their 
policies simply because they cannot be justified by development economics. Low-income 
countries face a huge resource gap in their efforts to achieve UPE. Therefore, the FTI attempts to 
involve as many donors as possible by serving as a low-key coordinator among various donor 
agencies. This shift is preferable because it can provide all participating donors a win-win 
situation. Development economics cannot fully explain the complexity of donors’ incentives and 
the policy of multi-donor initiatives such as the FTI.  
Second, institutional economics, particularly principal-agent theory, is a useful tool to 
analyze the FTI from the donors’ points of view. Asymmetry of information between principals 
and agents can explain moral hazard and adverse selection between donors’ headquarters and 
field offices (Martens et al., 2002). Institutional economics could be a useful explanatory tool to 
analyze donors’ capacity, because “the moral hazard problem is further exacerbated by the fact 
that there are no well-defined or quantifiable objectives against which a staff member’s 
performance can be assessed” (Chakravarti, 2005, p.99). 
Institutional economics have some limitations when applied to the analysis of the FTI.  
Marten et al. point out the difficulties in collecting quantifiable data and in conducting cross-
country analysis. Also, external actors have influence on the principal-agent structure in the FTI. 
The international consensuses or advocacy activities by NGOs often affect the way donor 
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agencies deliver their foreign aid. These external actors’ roles should be taken into account when 
applying institutional economics to the analysis of the FTI. 
Third, regarding the arguments of foreign aid effectiveness, it is obvious that a series of 
international consensuses facilitate the development of the FTI. The FTI operationalizes its 
international aid effectiveness agenda, particularly in relation to promoting the ownership of 
recipients and partnerships among donor agencies, by asserting the importance of enforcing the 
commitment by both recipients and donors (i.e., “mutual accountability”).  
It is important to explore ways to find a compromise between the ideal of the FTI and 
reality of foreign aid. Judging from the arguments of the aid effectiveness agenda and 
international consensuses such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, all donor agencies 
seem to agree that foreign aid should be development-oriented; donors should not pursue their 
individual interests by providing foreign aid. However, the magnitude of commitment to 
enforcing the international consensus differs for each donor agency. Generally speaking, since 
the European Like-Minded Donor countries proposed and developed the aid effectiveness 
agenda in collaboration with OECD-DAC, non-European donor countries, particularly the U.S. 
and Japan, have tended to take different approaches from European donors. It is a favorable shift 
that the FTI supports the diversity of aid modality among aid agencies and leaves its strategies to 
the donor agencies in the field of recipient countries; in its initial stage, the FTI encouraged 
donor countries to finance the recurrent cost of primary education through budget support. The 
FTI should pay more attention to how donor agencies are motivated to work within the 
framework of the FTI and to how donors support UPE in low-income countries. Without greater 
donor participation, the FTI will not be attractive for recipient countries. So far, the FTI has 
functioned well for both donors and recipients by playing a low-key coordinator’s role. Yet, this 
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role should be revisited in line with the changes of donor agencies’ policies. Also, the division of 
labor between the FTI and UNESCO should be analyzed. What the FTI currently does (i.e., 
playing a coordinator’s role to promote UPE) also serves as a mandate of UNESCO.  
Last, the arguments in education and international development make it necessary to 
mainstream the educators’ perspectives in the FTI. A number of interviewees cite as a problem 
the lack of expertise in education among aid workers involved in the FTI. In order to make the 
FTI more beneficial for recipient countries, it is necessary for the economists, bureaucrats, and 
diplomats who are involved to share the educators’ perspectives regarding development in low-
income countries. Likewise, the FTI should encourage more active participation from educators. 
While economists and bureaucrats dominate the field of foreign aid, a counter proposal from the 
educators’ perspective should be welcomed as a way to improve the quality of the FTI. 
Therefore, educators need to understand the logic of aid workers and to have sufficient 
knowledge of foreign aid. In this sense, this paper contributes to bridging the gap between aid 
workers and educators. 
10.4 USEFULNESS OF THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework of this study, the donors’ 3Cs (concerns, contracting problems, and 
capacity), intends to clarify the complexity of foreign aid by focusing on the FTI. This 
framework is not only useful in analyzing the FTI from the donors’ perspectives, but it is also 
significant from the viewpoint of international comparative education. Educational development 
in low-income countries is a critical topic in international comparative education. As some of the 
interviewees point out, educators are expected to be more actively involved in the education 
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sector of such foreign aid initiatives as the FTI, while economists and bureaucrats tend to take 
leadership roles in launching aid initiatives. Therefore, it is important for the scholars and 
practitioners of education to have an in-depth understanding of foreign aid so they can contribute 
to designing aid programs in the education sector for developing countries. As I explain in 
Chapter 3, political economists propose the concept of the “3Cs” to analyze the effectiveness of a 
multi-donor aid initiative in the environmental sector. The analysis of the FTI in this study 
demonstrates that the “3Cs” are also useful for the analysis of the international education 
initiative. It is worthwhile for educators to know this conceptual framework. 
However, some difficulties regarding the application of the “3Cs” occurs in this study. 
First, regarding donors’ concerns, this study is not fully able to clarify how foreign aid policies 
reflect the taxpayers’ interests of donor countries. In order to clarify the complexity of the 
policymaking process in foreign aid, it will be necessary to conduct in-depth research by 
contacting more stakeholders in donor countries. In some donor countries, such as Japan and the 
U.S., multiple governmental agencies manage foreign aid programs, thereby creating conflicts 
among ministries. It will also be beneficial to clarify the expectations of donor countries’ 
taxpayers regarding public donor agencies, especially because of the other active players in 
foreign aid, such as the private sector and NGOs. 
Second, regarding the donors’ contracting problems, this study does not fully touch upon 
how the consensus in the international arena was built. As I explain in Chapter 4, the World 
Bank proposed the FTI and developed it based upon a number of international consensuses. The 
World Bank and some European donor countries took leadership roles to make the FTI active. 
This study demonstrates how some individual donor countries contribute to the FTI. However, 
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collecting information from more donor agencies will aid in the clarification of how each 
individual donor agency influences the mechanism of this multi-donor initiative. 
Third, it is difficult to evaluate the donors’ capacity because of the absence of 
mechanisms to do so. The internationally agreed-upon aid effectiveness goals, such as the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, could be a benchmark to evaluate the donors’ capacity, but the 
contribution to the aid effectiveness agenda shows merely one aspect of this donors’ capacity. 
Considering the fact that other agencies criticize Japanese foreign aid for its lack of transparency, 
the donors’ capacity should be evaluated based upon how the donors communicate with other 
stakeholders, including recipients and other agencies, to make their aid programs transparent and 
to ensure their justifications. This point should be noted as a future research topic.  
I conducted document analyses and interviews to clarify the causal pathways of foreign 
aid in the FTI. My interview research proved useful in collecting candid opinions from foreign 
aid professionals and in contributing to the clarification of the “black-box” to a certain extent. It 
should be recognized that the informants may be responding to my questions in terms of self-
interests related to the particular aid organizations with which they are affiliated. For example, 
World Bank informants may be over-emphasizing the role of the Bank in facilitating the FTI, 
while aid workers from other agencies may be underestimating the significance of the FTI. 
Although the informants provided me with their opinions as individuals, not as representatives of 
their agencies, it may be appropriate to interpret the findings from the interviews vis-à-vis the 
official policies or perspectives of their aid agencies in order to understand the pathway of 
foreign aid in the FTI. 
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10.5 IMPLICATION OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY 
As shown by the following figure, the principal-agent relationship occurs among ministries of 
the donor and recipient governments, contractors who are responsible for carrying out aid 
projects, and political leaders and bureaucracies (Gibson & Andersson, 2005, pp.69-70). 
Asymmetry of information among these stakeholders often impedes the effective use of foreign 
aid resources, particularly for the purpose of development. 
 
 
Figure 18. Principal-agent relationship within donor and recipient countries 
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One of the contributions of the FTI is that it mitigates the risks derived from the complex 
principal-agent structure of foreign aid from the following two points. First, the FTI has 
encouraged the decentralization of donor agencies’ operations. To be a member of the FTI, low-
income countries are required to build a credible poverty reduction strategy and education sector 
plan, and donor agencies are expected to support, assess, and approve these activities in the field. 
The FTI secretariat in Washington, D.C. asserts that the role of the secretariat is to support the 
donors’ and recipients’ activities in the field. Participation in the FTI gives many donor agencies 
a decentralized decision-making structure and the ability to implement field-oriented operations. 
This favorable trend mitigates the asymmetry of information, that is, it alleviates the discrepancy 
between aid policy makers and implementers within aid agencies. 
Second, the FTI’s approach to involve not only education stakeholders but also other 
critical non-education stakeholders has contributed to easing the risks from the principal-agent 
structure of foreign aid. In addition to serving as a mediator among ministries of education 
within recipient countries and educational professionals of aid workers, the FTI has targeted 
politicians of industrialized countries to raise their awareness of supporting UPE in developing 
countries by taking advantage of the G8 Summit and other various international events. Also, the 
FTI has been connected to the international aid effectiveness agenda and has promoted new aid 
modalities such as budget support. The Vietnam case study spells out how a multi-donor targeted 
budget support for EFA has been designed and implemented. These attempts of the FTI have 
contributed to the reduction of the risks coming from the principal-agent structure of foreign aid 
in the education sector.  
Although asymmetry of information among various stakeholders still exists in relation to 
foreign aid in the education sector, it is significant that the FTI has proposed a model to mitigate 
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the negative effects of principal-agent relations by turning this concept into operations in some 
developing countries. Further analysis of successes and failures of individual FTI countries 
should be encouraged. Also, to promote aid effectiveness, further arguments regarding how to 
scale-up the impacts of the FTI and disseminate its model to other countries wherever 
appropriate should be encouraged.  
10.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS  
Based upon the findings of this study, I believe that foreign aid policy makers should focus on 
individual aid workers. By stimulating the motivation and strengthening the capacity of these 
workers, the FTI will become more effective. This section describes the implications of this 
thesis for policymakers.  
The following figure indicates 1) the causal pathway of foreign aid from donor agencies 
to recipient countries and 2) the determinants of the effectiveness of aid programs. The lower 
part reflects how the policies and decision-making structures of donors have influenced the 
effectiveness of aid. Many mechanisms, including the international aid effectiveness agenda like 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, as well as advocacy activities by the U.N. 
organizations and NGOs, urge donor agencies to adopt more recipient-friendly approaches. The 
upper part describes how the capacity and willingness of individual aid workers are critical 
determinants of the effectiveness of foreign aid. Likewise, many mechanisms exist that stimulate 
the capacity and motivation of aid workers to improve aid effectiveness. 
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Figure 19. Causal pathways and determinants of aid effectiveness in FTI 
 
As the findings from this thesis demonstrate, the international aid community has made 
considerable efforts to urge donor agencies to embrace more recipient-friendly strategies. For 
example, the international aid effectiveness agenda, such as the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness and the advocacy for Education for All by UNESCO, has encouraged donor 
agencies to adopt a more development-oriented policy, rather than one oriented to the donors’ 
interests, regarding transferring their foreign aid resources to developing countries. Although the 
magnitude of commitment to the aid effectiveness differs among donor agencies, all donor 
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agencies recognize the importance of adopting recipient-oriented aid policy and coordinating 
with other donor agencies in order to reduce the burdens challenging low-income countries.  
A number of aid effectiveness agenda items have led donor agencies in the right direction 
in terms of assisting developing countries. Some donor agencies, once skeptical of the European-
led aid effectiveness agenda, now actively participate in it. As the case study in Vietnam has 
shown, Japan, along with other donor agencies, has started to provide budget support to Vietnam, 
thereby transcending the traditional belief that foreign aid should be provided by a hand-in-hand 
manner to show the donor’s face and to convey the donor’s value to recipients.  
At the same time, however, these interventions to change donor agencies’ policy and 
strategies have limitations. This is because those who advocate for aid effectiveness, including 
the U.N. organizations and NGOs, do not have the enforcement power to change the policies of 
donors. Ultimately, external parties have no justification to criticize these policies since the 
sources of aid come from the taxation of donor countries. Donor countries have the discretion to 
use their aid resources as they prefer. Furthermore, changing the bureaucracy of donor countries’ 
foreign aid tends to be difficult, because such change requires negotiation with many domestic 
stakeholders in donor countries.  
In order to improve the FTI, I believe in strengthening both its advocacy for aid 
effectiveness and its targeting of individual aid workers. According to the findings of my 
research, policy makers and practitioners point out that the performance of the FTI depends upon 
the personality of individual aid workers who work in the field and their capacity to cooperate 
with their counterparts in recipient countries. As the case of Mongolia clearly indicates, an 
individual aid worker of the World Bank turns the concept of the FTI into an operation in the 
field by coordinating with the government and major aid agencies and by using the mechanisms 
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of international conferences. It is also important to recognize that UNESCO, which made 
international coordination for EFA its organizational priority, did not work well in relation to the 
FTI in Mongolia.193 While approaching the policy makers and top management of aid agencies 
to change their organizational strategies may be worthwhile, it is more practical and useful to 
stimulate the capacity and willingness of individual aid workers to promote aid effectiveness 
with a view to expecting piecemeal changes in the field. Even one individual aid worker with 
both capacity and willingness can make a difference in operationalizing the FTI, as the case of 
Mongolia has shown. Also, as evidenced by Japan’s introduced budget support in Vietnam, the 
accumulation of piecemeal changes at the field level may lead to changes within the 
organizational strategy of donor agencies. 
10.7 FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study clarifies the complexity of foreign aid by focusing on a specific international initiative 
in the education sector and by targeting donor agencies, one of the various stakeholders in 
relation to foreign aid. Further research will more clearly define foreign aid effectiveness and 
introduce the following tangible policy recommendations: 
First, it will be useful to conduct a case study in the FTI recipient countries by focusing 
on all kinds of stakeholders in the field, including donor agencies, the governments of 
developing countries, NGOs, local communities, and the local private sector. Collecting the 
perspectives from these different positions through field research will contribute to identifying 
                                                 
193 One may conclude that this is because UNESCO lacks its field presence in Mongolia. However, other major 
donor agencies in Mongolia do not necessarily have a decentralized organizational structure. 
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the reality of the situation and the problems of the FTI in the field. It is critical to pay attention to 
the local context, because the interpretation of the global aid agenda depends upon the countries’ 
situation; the performance of foreign aid projects also depends upon the individual capacity and 
personality of aid practitioners working in the developing countries. 
Second, it will also be beneficial to conduct a case study focusing on donor countries and 
to implement comprehensive research by targeting politicians, bureaucrats, voters, journalists, 
educators, aid workers, and ordinary citizens. Because foreign aid is influenced by the donor 
countries’ interests and concerns, public support in the donors’ home countries is critical in 
conducting a successful foreign aid program.  
Third, more quantitative-oriented research will produce more reliable policy 
recommendation in relation to the FTI. A number of economists have used an econometric 
model to analyze foreign aid effectiveness. Some institutional economists have also attempted to 
make a model by incorporating the aspects of donors’ aid delivery and the level of donor 
coordination. A quantitative research by modifying these existing models may contribute to 
producing more reliable recommendations for policy makers and practitioners who are involved 
in the FTI.  
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